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THE LORD'S PRAYER

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The Lord's Prayer has of late received renewed study, and fresh material has been brought together for determining its form and meaning. The problems have not been fully solved, but the discussion has reached a point at which a general survey of its present state and results is interesting and profitable.[1]

I

If anything could deter Christians from superstitious belief in the mechanical inspiration and magical transmission of the Bible, it would seem to be the fact that even the Lord's Prayer has not come down to us in a uniform text.

The text in Matthew, to be sure, is substantially sound. The few variant readings are mostly of little consequence. The most important one relates to the closing doxology, which is found in the Textus Receptus, and hence in Luther's Bible and the King James Bible, but is absent from most of the ancient authorities, among them the Vulgate, and therefore from German versions before

[1] Cf. G. Hoennicke, "Neuere Forschungen zum Vaterunser," Neue Kirchliche Zeitschrift, xvii, 1906; and the articles "Lord's Prayer" in Hastings's Dictionary of the Bible, and in the Encyclopaedia Biblica.

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Luther, as well as the New Testaments of Wycliffe, Tyndale, Coverdale, and some other translators.[2]

Quite different is the case with the text in Luke. In the Textus Receptus, indeed, and the versions which are based upon it, the difference from the text of Matthew is slight. There is one variation in the fourth petition: 'day by day' (τὸ καθ' ἡμέραν) instead of 'this day' (σήμερον); two in the fifth: 'sins' instead of 'debts,' and 'everyone that is indebted to us' instead of 'our debtors.' That is all. The doxology is missing in all authorities, ancient and modern. But when we turn to the critical texts or to the translations based upon them, as, for instance, the Revised Version of 1881, we note great differences: here in the address Luke has nothing but 'Father,' while the third and seventh petitions are lacking altogether. It is interesting to observe that in these points too the Vulgate has kept the original form and transmitted it to the late Middle Ages, so that Wycliffe, Coverdale in his Latin-English edition of 1538, the Rheims-Douai Bible, and others, represent the true text against the Authorized Version.

Nearly all the quotations outside the New Testament represent the Matthaean form, or some form akin to it. Thus Didache 8 2[3] follows Matthew; except that in the fifth petition it has 'indebtedness' (ὀφειλήν), instead of 'debts' (ὀφειλήματα), and the present tense 'we forgive' (ἀφίεμεν, compare the late uncials and Textus Receptus) instead of the aorist, 'we forgave' (ἀφήκαμεν); in the doxology 'kingdom' is omitted, as it is also in some Egyptian texts. The interesting inscribed potsherd found at Megara and published by R. Knopf in 1900[4]

[2] These, however, have an Amen at the end of the prayer.

[3] This paragraph is lacking in the Ethiopic version discovered by E. von der Goltz, Sitzungsberichte der Berliner Akademie, 1906.

[4] Mittheilungen des kaiserl. deutschen archaeologischen Instituts, Athenische Abtheilung, xxv, 1900, pp. 313–324. A Coptic amulet was published by U. Wilcken in 1902.

has, together with the mis-spellings which betray an illiterate writer, the present tense in the fifth petition (ἀφίομεν, cf. DELΑΠ); and at the end the place of the doxology is taken by an acclamation, 'O Lord Christ,' which is at variance with the invocation, 'Our Father.' The liturgical use, as attested in the eighth book of the Apostolic Constitutions and other rituals of the church, is entirely in agreement with Matthew. In one remarkable form occurring in the Acts of Thomas, § 144, the fourth petition is lacking.[5]

II

There is, however, one variant reading in the Lukan text which, after being long neglected, has in recent times become the subject of much debate. It is the petition for the Holy Spirit, which is found in some ancient authorities. Not more than two or three Greek manuscripts, and these late and relatively unimportant, give it; but it is attested in the fourth century by the Cappadocian fathers and in the second by Marcion. It runs as follows: 'Let thy Holy Spirit come upon us and cleanse us;' the words 'upon us' varying in position and in some authorities being absent. Further, Codex Bezae (D) appends the words, 'upon us' to the first petition of the prayer, and in some German forms *zu uns* begins the second. This may be taken as a remainder from the petition for the Holy Spirit; but the explanation may also be given that that petition has developed out of the words 'upon us.' The most curious fact is that in Marcion's Gospel this sentence took the place of the first petition, whereas in all the other witnesses it is substituted for the second. It is difficult to account for this variation.

[5] This, however, is attested only by one Greek manuscript (U in Max Bonnet's edition, Acta apostolorum apocrypha, ii, 2, p. 250) and by the Syriac (ed. Wright, p. 279; Burkitt, Evangelion da-Mepharreshe, ii, pp. 105 f., 268 f.).

Bishop Chase, in his book, *The Lord's Prayer in the Early Church* (1891), was the first to call attention to this variant reading; he regarded it as a liturgical development of the second petition made to fit the Lord's Prayer for use in the baptismal service. In 1904 Harnack[6] insisted upon the importance of this very old reading and drew radical critical conclusions from it. Spitta, writing in the same year,[7] affirmed its genuineness; while von Soden[8] suggested that it originated in a baptismal prayer of John the Baptist.

The facts may be presented in the following scheme:

Matthew address	*Luke* address	*Marcion* address	*Others* address
1. name	1. name	1. spirit	1. name
2. kingdom	2. kingdom	2. kingdom	2. spirit
3. will			
4. bread	3. bread	3. bread	3. bread
5. forgiveness	4. forgiveness	4. forgiveness	4. forgiveness
6. temptation	5. temptation	5. temptation	5. temptation
7. deliverance (doxology)			

Now Harnack argued, as in the Textus Receptus Luke's form was assimilated to the Matthaean standard by adding the third and the seventh petitions, so the canonical form in Luke and the other two forms are all attempts to complete an original Lukan text from Matthaean material. One form added to Luke the name (Matthew's first petition), another added the kingdom (Matthew's second); in the canonical form the two enlarged forms were combined and the primitive Lukan petition for the Spirit dropped. It thus appears that originally instead of the first three petitions of Matthew

[6] Sitzungsberichte der Berliner Akademie, 1904, pp. 195 ff.

[7] Die älteste Form des Vaterunsers, Monatsschrift für Gottesdienst und Kirchliche Kunst, 1904, pp. 333–345.

[8] "Die ursprüngliche Gestalt des Vaterunsers," in Christliche Welt, 1904, pp. 218 ff.

Luke had only one, that for the Spirit; and, comparing this result with Matthew's form, Harnack finds that they cannot both be genuine, in fact that they exclude one another.

	address	
1. name		
2. kingdom		spirit
3. will		
4.	bread	
5.	forgiveness	
6.	temptation	
7. deliverance		

Thus the original prayer would have consisted only of the address and the three petitions (4–6 in Matthew) relating to daily needs; Matthew's first three petitions and, equally, the petition for the Spirit in Luke being later liturgical additions.

Spitta, on the other hand, thinks that the form which includes a petition for the Spirit, and which is attested by Gregory of Nyssa and two Greek manuscripts, represents not merely the original Lukan text but actually the primitive form of the Lord's Prayer. But Harnack seems to me to have given ample proof, and von Soden has still further strengthened his arguments, that a petition like this does not correspond with Jesus' mode of thought.

In Luke's Gospel, to be sure, a petition for the Holy Spirit seems admirably to suit Luke's fondness for referring to the Holy Spirit. It is not necessary to adduce the instances from Acts, for they are well known; but we may note the fact that Luke 11 is the chapter of the Holy Spirit, where he is mentioned oftener than in any chapter of the Synoptic Gospels. In Lk. 11 13 for 'give good things' the evangelist glosses, 'give the Holy Spirit'; in 11 20 in a passage from Q, where Matthew has, 'If I by the Spirit of God cast out demons,' Luke, prob-

ably following an exorcistic tradition, changes this into 'by the finger of God'; in 12 12 he gives the comforting assurance that 'the Holy Spirit will teach you in that hour what you must say.' It is obvious that the petition for the Spirit fits in well here; but the argument can be turned in the opposite direction, for it may be said that the very fact that the Holy Spirit is so often mentioned in these chapters led someone to introduce this petition here. Besides, the petition as a whole does not agree with the Lukan style of diction and of thought. In its form with two verbs it corresponds neither to the first nor to the third (Lukan) petition. Luke uses 'cleanse' only for outward levitical cleanness (4 27, 17 14, 17, of leprosy; 11 39, Acts 10 15, 11 9, of vessels and food)—except in Acts 15 9, where the word is used in a figurative sense of hearts cleansed by faith; while in this petition the idea is neither purely levitical nor figurative, but sacramental. Moreover, and this is the main point, Luke never thinks of the Spirit as cleansing; the Spirit is a divine energy, imparting the gift of tongues and other miraculous endowments, never the cleansing power. That conception belongs to the sacramental view, seen in the mysteries, which became common among later Christian theologians and is already found in the thought of the gnostics.

Having thus proved that this petition does not originally belong to Luke's Gospel, we need not concern ourselves with the possibility of its coming from Jesus him-self. It would be a strange chance that a genuine saying of Jesus should find its way into a later form of Luke's Gospel. And in any case it does not agree with Jesus' teaching. In the few instances in which Jesus mentions the Holy Spirit, he implies that he himself and his disciples already possess it, so that there would be no need of praying for it; and the idea of the Spirit as a cleansing power is not germane to the teaching of Jesus.

It is difficult to refute the theory that this petition came from the Baptist. One textual critic has tried to prove that the additions and variations in the Western Text were borrowed from Q, the document used by Luke himself, which he supposes to have been consulted again by a later editor; in somewhat similar fashion von Soden assumes that a saying of the Baptist came into the Gospel of Luke as an additional note. But the burden of proof lies on him who maintains such a thesis.

III

If then the canonical text of both Matthew and Luke can be accepted as authentic, the question as to the original form of the prayer itself becomes much simpler. We have merely to ask whether there has been a shortening or an expansion, for it is evident that the longer form of the address, the third petition, and the seventh petition all belong together. I purposely avoid suggesting that it was Matthew who expanded or Luke who shortened. The evangelists would not have ventured of their own motion to alter what had been transmitted to them; they simply repeated the form used by the churches to which they belonged. The alteration, whatever it was, must have come in at a very early date and without attracting attention.

The Lord's Prayer need not have been drawn by either of the two evangelists from a written source, such as Q; one or both might have taken it from oral tradition. We have, however, one piece of evidence for a common Greek source in the unusual Greek word used to render the adjective qualifying 'bread.' *Epiousios* is not found elsewhere in extant Greek literature, and our limited knowledge is supplemented by the statement of an ancient scholar of the highest rank, Origen, who expressly says that *epiousios* here seemed to be a new word coined

on the analogy of *periousios*. In view of the variation in other words (such as 'debts' and 'sins') the agreement in this unique term is only to be explained, so far as I can see, by the use of a common Greek source, and hence we may infer that the Lord's Prayer stood in Q, or in some other Greek source used both by Matthew and Luke,[9] but that the text of the prayer was reproduced by one of the evangelists in a form changed so as to accord with the form to which he was accustomed and which was current in the church to which he belonged. This local form may have been a late and altered one, but it is equally conceivable that we have in it the original form, restored in the Gospel against the authority of Q. As to this literary criticism gives no help; we are confined to internal evidence.

Now it is a general observation founded on experience that the shorter form is usually the more original. This rule admits of exceptions, but in our case it leads to the best solution. No reason can be given why the address should have been shortened and the third and seventh petitions dropped altogether, whereas the enlarged form of the address corresponds to the liturgical fashion and the third and seventh petitions are mere repetitions of the second and sixth. Nothing is missed when they are lacking, while they give a certain coloring to the second and sixth petitions which, as we shall see later on, was not originally intended. And the very fact that the longer, Matthaean form was adopted for all liturgical purposes speaks for the genuineness of the shorter, Lukan form. A deviation from the commonly used form would be inexplicable if not caused by a very good tradition.

[9] It is not the place here to enter upon the Synoptic problem. I am convinced that not all the materials common to Matthew and Luke are taken from Q; for example, with Matt. 11 12–14 compare Luke 16 16 and with Luke 7 29, 30, compare Matt. 21 32. Only where the wording or the order is identical is it probable that Q is used.

There is still the possibility that both forms go back to Jesus himself. Harmonists like Osiander supposed that Jesus gave this prayer once in the Sermon on the Mount and a second time on the occasion when his disciples asked him to teach them how to pray, and modern apologists insist upon the probability that Jesus would have repeated so important a lesson. To me the repetition does not seem in itself probable, especially as the introductory request of the disciples in Luke 11 1 loses all reasonableness if Jesus had already told them how to pray. One would expect that in his answer he would at least remind them of this fact. In trying by this theory of repetition to get rid of the difficulty of a double tradition more improbabilities are created than are dispelled.

IV

Before discussing the prayer itself, a word must be said about the occasion on which Jesus gave it.

In Matthew 6 the prayer is found in the Sermon on the Mount, which according to this Gospel is addressed to the disciples, who are surrounded by the people. It is introduced with no special occasion, in a series of sayings about prayer; in opposition to the hypocritical practice of Jewish rabbis and to the loquacity of gentile prayers, Jesus says, 'After this manner therefore pray ye.' But it is not difficult to see that this is not the original place of the prayer. The verses 7–8, 9–13, 14–15, are insertions by the evangelist which destroy the harmonious structure of the passage with its three examples of good works,—almsgiving, praying, fasting,—as given in 6 1, 2–4, 5–6, 16–18. That these verses form an original unity, only partly obscured by the insertions, is obvious to anyone who has a feeling for symmetry. It is the catechetical method of Matthew which makes him gather at the same point everything belong-

ing to one topic. So we conclude that Matthew did not find the Lord's Prayer in its present surroundings, but himself gave it its position in the Sermon on the Mount.

This conclusion seems to be in favor of Luke's introduction. But it is by no means necessary that either Matthew or Luke should have preserved the original position of the prayer. Luke 11 belongs to the so-called "longer insertion," in which Luke brings together most of his non-Markan materials. He is not following a single source but is combining several; and more than once we can see that he has himself provided a fitting situation. That the instructions given, according to Luke, to the seventy disciples were in the source addressed to the twelve, is evident from the allusion in Luke 22 35; Luke has introduced the seventy in order to distinguish these instructions in chapter 10 from the similar ones given in 9 1–6, where he followed Mark 6 7–13. It is therefore entirely possible that the introductory verse 1 in chapter 11 is likewise the free composition of Luke. He is fond of representing Jesus in the act of praying (cf. 3 21; 6 12; 9 28; only 5 16 has a parallel in Mark 1 35), and is particularly interested in the disciples of the Baptist (cf. Acts 19 1–7). Thus all the elements of this introduction are easy to explain.

But whatever view be taken as to the situation given by Luke, it is obvious that Luke's introduction gives to the Lord's Prayer a wholly different character from that which it wears in Matthew. According to Luke the prayer is a model given to the disciples at their request; in Matthew it appears as the prayer which a Christian is bound to say whenever he prays. It is only a short step from the formula, 'After this manner therefore pray ye,' to the instruction of the Didache, 'Three times a day ye shall pray.'

V

The address is the shortest possible: 'Father.' Much has been said about the "communicative" value of 'our,' and about the importance of reminding oneself that this father is not an earthly one but is so high that he inspires at once awe and trust—awe for his holiness and trust in his power. That is well; but a later addition interests us less, and we may well fear any interpretation which turns the Lord's Prayer into a sermon on religious and moral topics. It is a prayer, a normal prayer, and in no wise a lesson. We are allowed to say, 'Father,' and are not thereby in any way reminded of other beliefs or duties.

'Father' is the most simple and natural address for a child in asking for something from his human father (cf. Luke 15 21); the whole attitude of the child towards the one who is able to give and willing to help him to his best, finds expression in this word. Is it so natural for men in speaking to God to call him 'father'? It is noteworthy that in all religions the idea of fatherhood is present in some way or other. It may be called a common notion of mankind. And yet there is a great difference. When the Assyrians speak of their god Sin as 'father,' it is the father of the gods whom they have in mind; they ask Nebo to intercede as son with Marduk his father. So Zeus is the father of gods and of men; the Latin Jupiter expresses this in the name itself. The Romans in their prayers call Mars and Romulus *pater* because the nation is said to be derived from them: it is a national and mythological connection which finds expression in the address. So Israel calls God 'father' because he has created the nation, or, according to another figure, has selected it from among the nations. In this case the connection is again national, but is not mythological. In Israel monotheism does not recog-

nize any physical relation between God and man, God and his people; the relation is purely moral, but it is national. Not the individual, as individual, but the nation is son of God; the individual has this relation only as a member of the nation; for instance, the king as the national representative. It is remarkable that in the Old Testament more is said about men as sons of God than about God as their father. Judaism shrank from bringing God into too close relation to humanity. Nevertheless the development of piety, encouraged by the influence of Greek philosophy, individualized the thought of this nation also. In the Alexandrian book of Wisdom the individual pious man is said to boast of God as his father—possibly only in addressing him in prayer, but more probably in speaking about him in general. There is a great difference between pondering upon the fatherhood of God and realizing it in prayer, for only in prayer does the relation become vital and important.

Now this is what we find in Jesus; he not only refers to God as 'the father,' but addresses him as 'father' in his prayers. With Jesus what was in former times exceptional becomes the rule. For Jesus himself it is the expression of the natural relation to God in which he feels himself to stand: God is his father, he himself God's beloved son, who is sure that nothing can happen to him which is not in his father's will and therefore good; who on his part is sure of his loyalty to his father's will, and is prepared to fulfil it by every means. This relation of father and son as it existed between God and Jesus is, however, unique. Jesus wishes men to enter into the same relation, but he is aware that their position is different; he never speaks of God as 'our (common) father.' He says 'my father' and he says 'your father.' John 20 17, if not a genuine saying of Jesus, surely gives a just interpretation of his thought. "I ascend unto

my father and your father, and my God and your God." Being himself the Son of God, he could make men to be God's sons and to feel as such and to behave as such. When Paul uses the term 'adoption,' he brings in a strange legal touch, but the underlying idea is true: sonship to God is not for men what it was for Jesus; it is not inherited as a right but is given them by Jesus.

These remarks may seem out of place here, where we are discussing the Lord's Prayer; but I wish to make it clear that this intimate address, 'father,' short and full of trust, is not an obvious form of speech. When used in Jewish prayers, the term is almost buried under solemn additions, 'God our father and our king,' and the like, due to the same tendency which made Christians add 'our (father) which art in heaven.' Jesus, when he prays, addresses God simply by the word 'father'; cf. Mark 14 36, where the sound of the original Aramaic word is preserved in 'abba, father.' In Matt. 11 25 'father' is enlarged to 'father, lord of heaven and earth,' but the address returns to 'father' in verse 26; again we have 'father' in Luke 23, 34, 46, as well as in John 12 28, 17, 1, 5, 21, 24. We do not find it used by anyone else in the gospels; even Jesus himself, when describing the prayer of others, does not use it; cf. Luke 18 11, 13 where both the Pharisee and the publican say 'God.' On the other hand, the Christians used it from the beginning. This is attested by Paul in Rom. 8 15, Gal. 4 6, where the Aramaic 'abba, father,' is kept, as it was in Mark 14 36. It was through Jesus that the Christians learned to address God as their father; it is probably by the Lord's Prayer that they became accustomed to do so. This seems a reasonable explanation, whereas the suggestion that Paul, in the two passages adduced, had the Lord's Prayer in mind, quoting it by its first word, can hardly be accepted.

VI

The Lord's Prayer itself is divided into two parts. The first two (or three) petitions bear a character quite different from the following three (or four); they are exactly parallel and solemnly asyndetic.

Hallowed be *thy* name;
come *thy* kingdom;
[done be *thy* will . . . .].

'Thy' is here the prominent pronoun, whereas the following petitions have 'our' and 'us'; in these latter, moreover, the structure varies and there are connecting particles.

Our bread, the *epiousion*, give *us* today;
and forgive *us* *our* debts . . . . ;
and do not bring *us* into temptation
(but deliver *us* from the evil one).

We need to observe this general structure before entering into details. The difference is remarkable, but it does not prove that the first part did not originally belong to this prayer. The change in tone is, I think, intentional.

Now what is the meaning of the first series of petitions? They seem to be prayers not to God but on his behalf. This sounds strange, and therefore interpreters have tried to turn these first two (or three) petitions into something like a vow—for that is the substance of nearly all the interpretations, differing though they do in form of statement. "We would hallow thy name—do thou help us to do so; we would bring in, or spread, thy kingdom —do thou work with us; we promise to do thy will as it is done by the angels—enable us to fulfil this promise." In particular, the first petition is usually spoken of as representing a kind of doxology,[10] and many interpreters

[10] Non tam petentium quam adorantium (Wetstein).

refer to a rabbinical statement, quoted by J. Lightfoot and J. J. Wetstein from *Berachoth*, p. 40 b, that a prayer without a doxology is not to be counted as a prayer. I venture to think that this way of putting it would rather tend to support Harnack's view that the first series of petitions is a later addition springing from liturgical motives (ecclesiastical feeling often coincides with rabbinical views); the same motives leading to the addition of the regular doxology at the end. But who can explain this strange form for a doxology? Why not 'we hallow,' or better 'we praise'? We have no right to construe the words 'hallowed be' in any other sense than the word 'come,' and the latter surely expresses a petition. Likewise 'be done' must be taken as a real petition, not as a concealed form of promise or vow.

Zahn is right in insisting upon the aorist tense of these two (or three) imperatives. For the Greek understanding, whatever the corresponding Aramaic form may have been, the aorist imperative means some demand which is to be fulfilled by an instantaneous, or at least a single, act. How can the name of God be hallowed in a single act? It cannot, if it is to be hallowed by men. But Jesus is not thinking here of men; nor will the Christian think of their agency, if he understands the prayer as a real prayer; rather is he asking God to hallow His own name. What does this mean?

The name, important with us in private and public life (a name often carries with it a great mass of associations; without the name a document is worthless), was still more important for the Semite.[11] It is full of meaning; to change one's name means a substantial change in his position. One can take neither man nor spirit without knowing his name. The name is not the man; but the man is nothing without his name. To calumni-

[11] We ask, 'What is your name?' or 'How are you called?' The Semite asks, 'How is your name called?' Gen. 32 28.

ate another is to give him a bad name, to bless him is to make his name great (Gen. 12 2). The name represents the man to others, and also to posterity.[12] The names of the twelve tribes on the high-priest's breast-plate represent the tribes themselves before God. So likewise the name of God, revealed by himself to his prophet (Ex. 3 15, 6 3), represents God himself; one can praise God or praise his name, one can curse God or curse his name, but the name always implies reputation in the sight of others or of mankind. The angels decline to answer when asked for their name (Gen. 32 29, Jud. 13 18), but God says of his angel (Ex. 23 21) that his (God's) name is in him; therefore he can be God's representative. The common phrase, 'to cause his name to dwell there' (Deut. 12 11 and often) may be derived from an old fashion of inscribing the name of the god on the walls of his temple (compare 'to put his name there,' Deut. 12 5), but in Israel it is meant figuratively: the name represents the gracious presence of God himself, and contains a power (compare the benediction Num. 6 24–26). Often the name may stand for the person represented by it (compare Ex. 34 16); sometimes it may mean 'fame'; it usually implies the notion of a spoken word (compare 2 Sam. 7 26).

The combination 'hallow the name' is as uncommon in the Old Testament as the other combinations 'make the name great' and 'praise the name' are common. In Is. 29 23 (perhaps a late addition) it is said: 'They shall sanctify my name; yea, they shall sanctify the Holy One of Israel, and shall stand in awe of the God of Israel.' Here the sense is 'praise.' In the same way it is used as an equivalent for 'praise' and 'glorify' in Enoch 61 12, and often by the Rabbis (*kiddush hashem*, *hillul hashem*).

[12] Cf. Gen. 21 23 (LXX), 48 16, the law relating to marrying a brother's wife in order to keep up his name; Deut. 25 6–10, Ruth 4 5 ff., 2 Sam. 14 7, 18 18. The persistence, not being personal, is bound to the name; therefore to drop the name (from inscriptions, etc.) is to destroy existence; Deut. 9 14, 29 20, Josh. 7 9.

But in Ez. 36 23 it is said of God himself: 'I will sanctify my great name, which hath been profaned among the nations, which ye have profaned in the midst of them; and the nations shall know that I am the Lord, saith the Lord God, when I shall be sanctified in you before their eyes.' Here the meaning is clear: it is God himself who sanctifies his name by restoring his people to glory and holiness. When God allows his people to be defeated and scattered through the nations, he causes his name to be profaned; again, when he brings his people back to their former position, he sanctifies (hallows) his name. All this shows the path to the right understanding of the first petition in the Lord's Prayer. God is asked to sanctify his name by some wonderful mighty deed, in a word by nothing less than the establishment of his kingdom.

The second petition is merely the interpretation of the first. Here again a sound interpretation has to start from an historical analysis of the idea of 'kingdom.' *Malchuth* properly designates not 'realm' but 'dominion,' not the place of rule but the act of rule, the government. Now in the Old Testament two conceptions run side by side. One takes the dominion of God as something present: he rules the world, the sidereal as well as the spiritual; he governs the nations; he is king and lord over the gods. More important, however, is the other, which, starting from a pessimistic view of the present, sees the dominion of God made real only in the future. At present, worldly powers, the party of the impious, Satan himself and his evil spirits, exercise their dominion, but the time will come when God shall suddenly break this tyranny and establish his own dominion, and thereby bring in the reign of bliss. It is in this future sense that the kingdom of God is spoken of in later Jewish literature, and Jesus himself shared this view of his time. The kingdom (or dominion) of God is not something empiri-

cally in existence; it has to be brought about, and therefore the disciples may ask for it in their prayer. It is not to be established by men; God sends it, or establishes it, by his own wonderful power. The novel feature in Jesus' gospel is that he thinks of God's intervention as independent of the behavior of men. God brings about his kingdom, even if men do not care for it; they do not hinder its coming, they only deprive themselves of its blessings (compare Luke 10 9, 11). To be sure, Jesus says much of the conditions for the individual's entrance into the kingdom, but the coming of the kingdom is not conditioned by the attitude which the individual, or even the people, takes in regard to it. It comes of itself, sent by God; it has in some sense already come in Jesus, and it will come in glory with Jesus at the parousia.

Here again the combination, 'thy kingdom come,' is remarkable. We are more used to such phrases as 'enter' the kingdom, 'see' the kingdom, 'inherit' the kingdom, 'share in' the kingdom. This group of verbs, which in the Old Testament designate the possession of the land of promise,[13] convey the notion of a topographically circumscribed and located kingdom, or realm. The kingdom is there; the question is whether one can enter it or not. But another set of verbs is frequently used in connection with kingdom which embody a different conception: the kingdom 'is at hand,' 'comes'; this involves the notion of something movable, pertaining to a temporal not to a local scheme. Doubtless, the Jews of that time conceived of heaven and earth as capable of motion; Paul expects the "building from God," the "house not made with hands, eternal, in the heavens" to be moved thence to earth because it is the new body with which he longs to be clothed upon. Nevertheless, the idea of coming, of being at hand, suggests

[13] So in Matt. 5 5, 'they shall inherit the earth' (better, 'the land') is equivalent to 'theirs is the kingdom of heaven.'

rather future time than distant position. And in fact the notion of the kingdom of God is a temporal one: it is the future reign of bliss, a dominion to be made real by God when his good time shall arrive.

But the more important aspect is that Jesus does not teach his disciples to pray that they may enter the kingdom, that God may grant them to share the blessings of his realm, that they may be able so to act as to bring about, establish, or spread his dominion. On the contrary, he makes them pray directly for the coming of the kingdom. Here we grasp the very meaning of the idea. It is not individual happiness; that is expressed elsewhere by the equivalent, 'live.'[14] Jesus is looking for a general change of all conditions, which will bring bliss to mankind. So this petition, taught to his disciples, does not interfere with his claim that in his company they already enjoy the blessings of the kingdom. They do already enjoy them personally; but there still remains the desire that these blessings may become universal, that everything which is opposed to true happiness may be removed. And this can be done only by God himself, by some supernatural act of his almighty power.[15]

By bringing about the kingdom in this full sense of the word God will hallow his name, that is, will cause it to be praised by all creatures. The same thing is prayed for in both these petitions; only it is first viewed with relation to God—he has honor from it; then with relation to mankind—through it men are blessed.

The third petition is an addition which does not quite fit here. It might be interpreted as meaning that God is asked finally to fulfil his will, that is, to bring to effect

[14] Observe that the same group of verbs which we found connected with 'kingdom' is used in combination with 'life'; 'enter,' Mark 9 43, 45, Matt. 18 8, 9, 19 17; 'inherit,' Mark 10 17, Matt. 19 29, Luke 10 25, 18 18.

[15] See the discussion of individual and collective salvation in my book, The Eschatology of the Gospels, London, 1910.

what he has planned and promised. 'Will' can have this meaning, *Heilsratschluss*, the intention to save mankind; in Matt. 26 42 'will' means God's decree, to which man has to submit.[16] But it is much more common in the sense of 'will to be obeyed,' that is, law, commandments.[17] This petition seems therefore to be a moralizing interpretation of the former ones: the kingdom, or dominion, of God is established when the will of God is done by all creatures, on earth as well as in heaven.

This last clause, 'as in heaven so also on earth,' cannot be taken as belonging to all three petitions, as is held by Westcott and Hort,[18] for it is connected in tradition exclusively with the third one. The introductory particle 'as' indicates that heaven and earth are not taken as the two parts of the universe on an entire equality (compare Gen. 1 1, Matt. 5 18, etc.), but are contrasted; the heaven, God's residence, being the model of perfection, where the will of God is done always without reluctance, the earth on the contrary being the scene of rebellion against God (compare Is. 55 9, Deut. 30 12, Ps. 2 7). The petition thus asks God to cause his will to be done by men as it is regularly done by the angels; perhaps one may include the idea that the wild beasts and other brute creatures on earth shall submit to God's law as fully as do his heavenly creatures, the stars.

[16] This passage, however, seems to be modelled after the Lord's Prayer; there is nothing similar in Mark 14 36, 39, Matt. 26 39. Luke 22 42 again comes nearer to the Lord's Prayer, but is not identical with the third petition, as is Matt. 26 42. Submission to God's irresistible will is implied in Acts 21 14.

[17] 'To do the will of God' is the common phrase in Judaism as well as in the gospels, cf. Mark 3 35, Matt. 7 21 (Luke 11 28), John 7 17, 9 31, Acts 13 22; in Rom. 2 18 'will' stands for the totality of the Law. It is remarkable that the Old Syriac, which usually translates 'do the will,' here gives the plural, 'thy wills (wishes) be (done).'

[18] It is maintained already by Origen, the Arian author of the Opus imperf. in Matt., and the Catechismus Romanus; it has been supported recently by Nestle, in Zeitschrift für Neutestamentliche Wissenschaft, vi, p. 190.

In Luke a few Latin manuscripts have the third petition without this addition. This reading was supported by Lachmann.

This would enrich the notion of God's dominion, which in fact is never a purely moral one, but almost always includes the idea of a realm of peace, a restored paradise. This would fit into Jesus' conceptions; but as we have here a later addition, I do not feel sure that it is right to go beyond the moral meaning.

Thus the first part of the Lord's Prayer may be summed up in the one idea that God is entreated to fulfil the desire of his faithful people and bring about his dominion, the realm of bliss. That this one idea is expressed in two (or perhaps three) petitions is exactly what would be expected in view of Jesus' custom of illustrating his points with two or three examples.[19] This does not run counter to his own warning to avoid vain repetitions (Matt. 6 7); he himself prayed insistently and with repetition of the same words (Mark 14 39). The repetition here is not vain; the one idea is expressed on two sides and so receives its due emphasis.

VII

The second part of the prayer is markedly different. It begins with the petition for daily bread. We shall not attempt to solve the riddle contained in *epiousios*.[20] The phrase 'bread of tomorrow' (*mahar*) in the Gospel according to the Hebrews does not signify, since this Gospel is probably a retranslation from the Greek, not the original Aramaic. Jerome's translation *supersubstantialem*, which reappears in Wycliffe's 'bread over other substance' (compare also Coverdale, 1538, and

[19] Cf. my paper on Doublets and Triplets, in Neutestamentliche Studien Georg Heinrici zu seinem 70 Geburtstage dargebracht, Leipzig, 1914, pp. 92–100.

[20] It has been discussed recently by A. Debrunner, Glotta, iv, 1912, pp. 249–253, and A. Deissmann, Neutestamentliche Studien Georg Heinrici dargebracht, 1914, pp. 115–119. The former proposes to take the adjective, or what the grammarians call hypostatic, form for ἐπὶ τὴν οὖσαν (*scil.* ἡμέραν) 'for the day just being,' whereas the latter still maintains the derivation from ἡ ἐπιοῦσα (*scil.* ἡμέρα) 'the next day.'

'supersubstantial' in the Rheims-Douai Bible) spoils the very best in this petition, which is not spiritual, nor sacramental, but natural and human, man's answer to God's call for trust in him (Matt. 6 25 ff.). To omit *epiousion* as being a gloss on the word 'today' meaning 'every day' is too easy a solution. My own opinion is that the word indicates that men are to ask for what they need, what is appropriate for them, but not for more. The difference between Matthew's 'give us today,' with its aorist tense (δός), and Luke's 'give us day by day,' with its present (δίδου)—it is remarkable how accurately the tenses are used in this popular Greek—may be explained by the purpose of the prayer for use in the evening, just as the translation 'tomorrow' seems to be governed by liturgical motives.[21] Matthew's version is here supported by symmetry as well as by internal evidence.

The next petition is akin to the one just considered. Forgiveness of sin is the daily bread of the soul, and it is significant that Jesus puts it in this way. This was not the attitude of later Judaism. Consciousness of guilt and longing to be rid of it was, indeed, not lacking—one need only remember the Psalms—but it is usually on account of a special fault, under the pressure of a special penalty, that the Jew asked for forgiveness. We are not told that the publican's sigh, 'God be merciful to me a sinner!' was his daily prayer. The formulated confessions of sin which we find in the Mishna are meant for special days, like the day of atonement. On the other hand, we find the prayer for forgiveness constant in Christianity from the beginning. In spite of its enthusiasm and excitement, Christianity was fully aware that man has every day to struggle with sin and that his struggle is often unsuccessful. I do not refer

[21] Cf. F. H. Chase, The Lord's Prayer in the Early Church (Texts and Studies, i, 3), 1891, pp. 42–53.

here to the seventh chapter of Romans, but to 1 Thess. 5 14, 1 Cor. 3 12 ff., and to all the exhortations of Paul's letters. Following Jesus' utterance about sins which can and sins which cannot be forgiven (Mark 3 28 ff., Luke 12 10, Matt. 12 31 ff.) primitive Christianity for the most part distinguishes between sins of weakness and ignorance and mortal sins—the former to be forgiven through the intercession of the heavenly Lord (Rom. 8 34, Heb. 2 18, 4 15, 7 25, 1 John 2 1), the latter irreparable (Heb. 6 4 ff., 10 26 ff., 1 John 5 16). Jesus does not assume that such sins have been committed by his disciples, but he thinks it necessary for them every day to ask forgiveness.

The question has recently been much discussed whether or not Jesus offered the prayer in his own behalf, and so accepted a share in this petition for forgiveness. The tradition does not give the Lord's Prayer as meant for himself; it does not introduce it by 'Let us pray,' but by 'When ye pray, say'; and in view of what has been pointed out above regarding Jesus' attitude of distinguishing himself from his disciples in his relation to God, I think it highly improbable that he meant here to include himself among penitent sinners.

In this petition, likewise, the wording of Matthew seems to come nearer to the original than that of Luke; 'remit debts' is a familiar figure with Jesus for the forgiveness of sins (compare Matt. 18 23). Luke likes to explain[22], and therefore says 'sins' instead of 'debts,' keeping, however, 'debtors' in the second part of the petition. The genuineness of this second part has been doubted[23], because it is said to make the structure unsymmetrical and to have a moralizing tendency unfit for a prayer. Here again there is a slight difference between Matthew and Luke. Luke's form expressed

[22] Compare Luke 11 13 with Matt. 7 11.

[23] Eduard von der Goltz, Das Gebet in der ältesten Christenheit, Leipzig, 1901, p. 51.

rather the willingness on the part of the person praying to forgive if anybody is 'owing' him, that is, has offended him; with Matthew the man insists that he has forgiven, and that now it is God's turn to forgive him. Both ways, we are sometimes told, are alien to Jesus' mind, and unfit for a real prayer; therefore this must be a later addition, suggested by the parable of the Unmerciful Servant (Matt. 18 23–35) and other sayings of Jesus (compare Mark 11 25, 26, Matt. 18 21 f., Luke 17 3 f., Matt. 5 23 f.). I am not prepared to agree with this criticism. First, the tradition is against it: Luke proves that this is an old part of the prayer, not an enlargement added when this was connected with Matt. 6 14 f. On the contrary, it attached to itself this other saying. Secondly, Jesus is here teaching; a certain amount of pedagogical matter would not therefore be surprising. It is true that prayer ought not to be abused for purposes of teaching and preaching; prayer is addressed to God, not to a congregation, and Jesus knew this better than anyone else. But is it necessary to assume that by adding this sentence Jesus wished to intimate to his disciples the duty of forgiving? He makes them speak to God and declare their willingness to forgive (for here Luke's form seems preferable to Matthew's, which was probably influenced by the parallels in 5 23 f., 18 23 ff.: first forgive, then ask for forgiveness). It is a natural expression of right sentiment and only incidentally a reminder of one's own duty.

The next petition is closely connected with this: forgiveness does not help, if sin is done again; therefore shield us from new temptation. It is a self-created difficulty which has led to the Old Latin rendering: 'Do not suffer us to be brought into temptation.' Theological reflections like those expressed in James 1 13 ff. are far from Jesus. His undisturbed religious sense traces everything immediately back to God. While

later Jewish narrowness and timidity introduced Satan instead of the anger of the Lord (1 Chron. 21 1), and so corrected the old Biblical view that God tempted David (2 Sam. 24 1 ff.), Jesus goes back to the primitive conception.

It is therefore unfit for his prayer and evidently again a later addition when Matthew adds here, 'but deliver us from the evil one.' A careful study of the phraseology convinces me that the word 'evil' cannot be understood in the sense of *Übel*, evil inflicted upon a man, so that the petition becomes a prayer for deliverance from death, illness, or other distress; it bears a moral character, and is either neuter—the evil which one does, or masculine—the evil one. This latter meaning not only is attested by the interpretation of the fathers but is required by the context, for it is needed to meet the difficulty contained in the reflection that God tempts not directly but through Satan (cf. Job 1). The sixth petition was supplemented by this seventh, which however is less comprehensive, excluding only one line of temptation (the devil, not the world or the flesh).

The second part of the Lord's Prayer thus shows greater variety than the first; it comprises three different petitions, all, however, closely related to one another.

Neither the doxology nor the 'Amen' belonged originally to the Lord's Prayer. Both attest its early liturgical use.

VIII

Having thus analyzed the Lord's Prayer in detail, let us now sum up its contents. We find that, except for the short address, it contains nothing but petitions. That is remarkable. A rabbinical rule says that no prayer is complete without praise, and it is this feeling which has caused the enlargement of the address and the addition of the doxology at the end. The same

feeling has induced many interpreters to explain the first petition as a kind of praise rather than prayer. To us it seems fitting that thanksgiving should be included in every prayer (compare 1 Thess. 5 18, Col. 3 17, Eph. 5 20, 2 Cor. 1 11, etc.), but for Jesus to pray means to ask for something (compare Matt. 7 7–11). Many a theory about prayer will have to be revised, if we take Jesus as our example in praying and adopt the prayer he taught his disciples as a model.

And for what does he bid his disciples ask? A German proverb says, *Not lehrt beten*, necessity teaches to pray. This is often censured: one ought to pray without being urged by necessity. But, like all proverbs, it has truth in it, and Jesus supports it; it is necessity which makes his disciples pray. Rather, two necessities lead them to ask God for relief. First comes the one great urgent necessity that all the conditions of life be changed. In this present world with all its distress and woe man needs a general change which shall bring happiness and peace. This is the kingdom of God for which the Christian looks; and he calls upon God to bring it about, beseeching him to hallow his own name, exposed to blasphemy if God do not exhibit his power and justice. Secondly, there are the minor necessities of the intervening present. As long as this world with its existing conditions remains, man wants bread to eat, and he needs daily restoration through the forgiveness of sin and the averting of temptation; body and soul both need support. Jesus puts this in the plainest form. He does not enter into detail as to the needs of bodily life; daily bread expresses it all. He does not use many words about feeding the soul with spiritual food, supporting it by divine communion, and so on. That our sins may be forgiven and that we be not led into temptation, that is all that he tells us to ask for. But he plainly and insistently wishes his disciples to ask for these things.

Here is no making of words; it is prayer, real prayer.[24] Instead of moralizing upon the Lord's Prayer we had better observe the Lord's attitude as it is expressed in this model prayer, and then learn from him what he values, what he thinks worth while to pray for, what he does not mention at all, and why he puts things in this order; what is his valuation of the several objects he is setting before his disciples' minds, and how plain and simple it all is. The whole prayer is, so to speak, only one great petition: deliver us from our burden, universal and individual.

Jesus begins with the common, and in his view the most urgent, necessity in order to put emphasis upon it, and he expresses it in two parallel petitions. Then he goes on to speak of the needs of the individual in the present time, and here three short sentences cover the whole ground.

It is important to notice that Jesus starts from the evil situation in general. It shows how strongly he himself feels the depressing state of the present world, how deeply he is impressed by the misery of his people, or rather of mankind in general (for he is a Jew, but without the narrow limits of nationality); it shows how social his mind is and how much he values the common benefits and deplores the common evils. However individualistic he may be, he cares for mankind as a whole, nay even more, for the world universal, including all being, and he is not satisfied until the universe shall be changed from a place where Satan exerts his influence into a dominion of God.

It is remarkable that Jesus ascribes so much importance to the daily needs of human life. Nothing human

[24] That is very appropriate which Isidore of Seville, De officiis ecclesiasticis, i. 15 3 f., says: that in the first three petitions *aeterna poscuntur*, and in the following four *temporalia petuntur*. It has no value to compare the Lord's Prayer with the Decalogue: twice three petitions corresponding to twice five commandments; the first part dealing with piety, the second with charity. Calvin, otherwise the best interpreter, is here misled by a bad tradition.

is alien to him; he is not one of those exalted spiritualists who are above the need of eating, nor does he share the dualistic view that the material body has no claim for support because it is the creature of an inferior God. No, Jesus well knows what hunger means to man, and he puts into the world-prayer a petition for daily bread, thereby securing to the bodily life its proper right for all time to come. But at the same time he by no means confines himself to this domain; there is something else in man which has equal claim to attention. If the body is tormented by hunger, so is the soul by the interruption of communion with God, which is what sin means. Therefore sin must be removed and not allowed again to enter. Whenever this is done by God's forgiving sin and averting temptation, then man is safe and happy. There is no need to add a special petition for bliss and joy; these are here;[25] but since they are merely individual, the first two petitions are necessary.

The prayer thus reflects the gospel of Jesus. The gospel is not a new law, not a new kind of morals. It is a message of grace from God our Father announcing his readiness to bring about his kingdom, that is to fulfil all his promises regarding the future realm of bliss; it is at the same time a declaration on the part of God that he is willing to act as the Father of each individual man, supporting, forgiving, defending. Nothing is said in this prayer about Jesus. Christianity from time to time missed something and tried additions having regard to John 16 23. But it is exactly Jesus' attitude. He announces the kingdom and he preaches God's fatherly love without saying much about himself; and yet he is the king of this kingdom and it is but through him that we are sure of God's fatherly love. So it is

[25] Alcuin is reported to have prayed daily: 'O Lord, grant me to acknowledge my sins, to confess them sincerely, to make satisfaction for them justly; and so grant me forgiveness of my sins'; to which prayer Benedict of Aniane wished to add, 'and after this make me blessed (grant me salvation).' Was this addition necessary?

Jesus who teaches his disciples this prayer; they never would dare to pray in this way were it not for him. To be sure, the single petitions have parallels in the Old Testament and the Jewish literature.[26] But one looks in vain for anything like this prayer. It is unique as to its composition, and original as to the religious spirit revealed in it. It is the Lord's Prayer, in the sense that it expresses the new relation into which God and mankind have been brought by Jesus.[27]

[26] J. J. Wetstein: Tota haec oratio ex formalis hebraeorum concinnata est. See the materials in E. von der Goltz, Das Gebet in der ältesten Christenheit, 1901, pp. 40–41, and G. Heinrici, Die Bergpredigt, 1905, pp. 66–67.

[27] C. C. Torrey, "A Possible Metrical Original of the Lord's Prayer," in Zeitschrift für Assyriologie, vol. xxviii, 1913, pp. 312–317, gives a retranslation of the Lukan form of the Lord's Prayer into Aramaic in "six perfectly metrical lines of seven syllables each," which deserves careful consideration. Torrey's article, "The Translations made from the Original Aramaic Gospels," in Studies in the History of Religions presented to C. H. Toy, New York, 1912, pp. 269–317, also contains discussion of some of the problems of the Lord's Prayer.

MARRIAGE AND SOCIAL CONTROL

ANNA GARLIN SPENCER

The Nineteenth Century was ushered in with trumpet-calls to self-assertion and social freedom. A vague but long-cherished hope of the elect of humanity that the masses, each and all, might yet become persons, crystallized during the eighteenth century into a popular assertion of "equality of rights" in the body politic as "the first of rights" and essential to the process of universal individuation. Thus was born the democratic State. The Church in Christian civilization had long before recognized the independent personality of all, even of slaves and of women, in its spiritual Magna Charta, which secured to every human being the right to own his own soul and laid upon each the burden of saving it. The Protestant Reformation added to this the duty of understanding "the plan of salvation," and hence reinforced, and in many instances initiated, the demand of the State for an intelligent electorate. Thus Church and State worked together to call into being the free, tax-supported school, and to make compulsory some minimum of formal education. The democratic State and the democratic school have worked together to create slowly legalized freedom of association for manual laborers. Labor reform organizations, springing up at once as soon as legal restrictions upon such associations were removed, have initiated the collective struggle for common industrial betterment. Of the five basic institutions of society, therefore—the family, the Church, the State, the school, and the industrial order—four are already well on their way toward thorough-going democratization. It is necessary to remind

ourselves of these familiar facts in order to escape the common error of treating some one institution of society as a detached social structure, the problems concerning which are to be solved independently of other human relationship. The first, the most vital, the most intimate, and the most universal of social institutions, that of marriage and the family, has longest resisted re-adjustment to the new ethics involved in the now accepted principle of equality of human rights.

This was natural, since conservatism toughens in fibre in proportion to the sentiment involved in the preservation of an inherited social mechanism, and the word "home" symbolizes the acme of sentiment. Long after the Church had emancipated women from the family bond of ethnic faiths and had taught them to approach the altar singly and alone, it gave its sanction to laws and customs which deprived women of all control of their persons or estates and hence reinforced the aristocratic order of the family. Long after the State had written its bills of rights to secure government of the people, by the people, and for the people, its political systems ignored women as people; and its statutes gave the married woman no more contract power than her minor child possessed, and hence incapacitated her for legal guardianship of that minor child; and denied her right to choose her own residence or national allegiance, or to secure redress for any form of oppression by her husband short of personal violence or extreme deprivation of food or shelter, proved dangerous to life. Hence the democratic State for generations buttressed the autocracy of the ancient family order. Long after the democratic school offered to all boys the chance to know and to do to the uttermost, girls were not counted as among those whose trained intelligence was a necessity to the State. Hence not until the middle of the nineteenth century did human beings of the mother-sex share the

advantages of that education which is the basis of the larger life.

At last, rising to popular view on the crest of a wave of passionate protest against African slavery in the United States, what was at first called the "Woman's Rights Movement" was born. Not until such a movement was definitely initiated could the family order respond radically to the world currents of democratic influence. It was inevitable that such a movement should at last appear. The Church had begun to affirm with Emerson: "Every soul has private access to the Divine." The State had already declared, as President Wilson once phrased it, that "human quality is the basis of political equality." The school had announced in the words of Channing: "Every soul is sacred, and therefore every child has a right to the best development society can afford." The industrial order was beginning to thunder with Carlyle: "Work is great, and there is no other greatness, and Labor must yet ascend its throne." It could not be otherwise than that women should at last apply to themselves and to their own condition the ideals thus made conscious and determinate throughout the social structure.

What is now called the Feminist Movement has naturally specialized in several lines of struggle and endeavor. One section has been busy with echoing the eighteenth century claim to political rights, and a lively contingent of its propagandists is still at work on that belated task, which should long ago have been accomplished and taken out of the way of even more vital concerns. Another section, seeking higher education and professional and business training and practice, has been obliged to segregate itself sharply for this achievement of personal power. This section of the Feminist Movement has been largely recruited from, and is now most efficiently sustained by, an increasing

class of unmarried women who can meet men on their own ground of specialized vocational work in the most effective and uninterrupted manner. Still another, by far the largest and the most socially important section, has been at work with the best and wisest men to make over family and social life, bit by bit, in its legal, ethical, and domestic aspects, in the interest of "two heads in counsel, two beside the hearth, and two in the tangled business of the world." The industrial order has, however, contributed an unsought and unexpected but stupendous acceleration of the movement toward the individuation of women. The invention of power-driven machinery, with its subsequent transformation of domestic industry into the factory system, has obviously and greatly changed the life of working-men, but it has completely revolutionized the life and work of women. Schiller says: "While philosophers are disputing about the government of the world, Hunger and Love are performing the task." In the same manner, while new ethics have been pressing toward the conscious readjustment of the family along the lines of democratic tendency already established in the other basic institutions of society, the old economic need and the new economic system have conspired to change rudely and completely that environmental pressure by which all human relationships are most radically affected. The social requirement that girls and women should labor at useful employment between the days of their schooling, whether those days be long or short, and the days of their marriage, is as old as peaceful industry itself. Except for an almost negligible minority of the privileged classes, unmarried girls and married women have never been allowed to "idle." They have had less time for recreation allowed them than boys and men have secured for themselves. They have never had a chance to go a-fishing in house-cleaning time nor to limit their labor

to an eight-hour day. Moreover, their work-capacity has always been counted as a part of the family treasury. The economic value of the unmarried girl and woman has been recognized through the ages as an asset of the family into which she was born, and has been legally attested by the price paid in service or in money by would-be husbands to fathers, who would lose the labor of daughters on their marriage and should therefore receive just compensation for the loss. And when, in some new tenderness of fatherly solicitude, or some dawning recognition of the daughter's right to personal recompense for her labor, the marriage price became the "dowry," secured to the wife in principal if not in income for her economic protection in the case of the death of the husband, this dowry still recorded a clear understanding of the work-value of the unmarried girl and the married woman to the family economy. This ancient dedication of womanhood to constant labor has today taken on change for the mass of average life in but four particulars, namely: girls and women now leave the home for the factory and the shop in order to secure the same work they used to do in the household; they do a specialized section of the task instead, as of old, of undertaking complete processes of labor; they receive through this highly specialized labor of modern industry a training away from rather than, as of old, directly towards the manifold activities of the house-mother's task; and they receive a definite wage for their work outside the home instead of being paid within the family, as of old, by a share in household provision. These are weighty differences, and they each and all affect the conditions of marriage and the family as no previous economic experience of the race has done.

Without some understanding of the political, educational, and economic elements which enter into the instability of the modern family, the true significance of

the problems of marriage and divorce cannot be discerned. Well-known facts prove that this instability of the modern family is serious in extent and has in it grave social dangers, and shows deplorable effects especially in relation to child-life. So true is this that many churchmen and many ethical teachers are seriously alarmed and, even at times, moved to the pessimistic belief that the foundations of social order are breaking up and the family is in process of destruction. In no attempted analysis of social change, however, is evidenced more dense ignorance of what is really happening in institutional structure; and in none is the cowardice and dogmatism of the ultra-conservative more clearly shown. What is really happening in the family is that women have become too free and too strong longer to accept bad conditions which once their weakness and ignorance forced them to endure. What is really happening is that men themselves are not longer content, as of old they were, to have one sex-relationship for upper-servant help in the household and another for enjoyment outside the home, but demand in one chosen wife an honorable and equal comradeship in mutual work and in common pleasures. What is really happening is that the marriage ideal is becoming more and more exacting in the consciousness of both men and women; and that more and more freedom of choice, both in taking on and in giving up marriage ties, is operating to forbid content with less than the most satisfying relationship between men and women. What is really happening is that the best interests of children are understood as never before, and that those best interests are now seen to demand not merely the outward form but the inner substance of a united and a loving parenthood. The tragedy of a ruined home is no longer expressed solely in terms of separation of the married pair; the mistake and failure are now seen to be themselves the tragedy,

whether or not separation occur to publish the fact. Nay more, what is really happening is that the idea of "eternal punishment" for mistakes and failures, as respects both this life and the next, is passing out of the human mind, and men and women will not longer consent to sit forever among the ashes of desolation if life seems to offer the chance to recover from such mistake and failure in a new and happier venture. It is these realities of changed and changing ideals of life that are at work to make divorce possible, and re-marriage of divorced persons no longer, in and of itself, a cause for moral condemnation. In the face of these realities of changed and changing ideals it is as futile as it is childish for church synods and convocations—composed, be it noted, exclusively of men—to ordain a return to the older type of family autonomy. The fact that men as well as women are seeking legal release from hated marriage bonds, and often, as well, the readjustment of family relations in a new effort toward domestic satisfaction, is not, as many suppose, significant of man's ethical back-sliding but rather of his moral advance. For, be it remembered, men have always found ways to relieve themselves from domestic companionship proved obnoxious or even tiresome; often by legal repudiation of their wives, when wives had no escape from unhappy marriage conditions; but oftenest, by illicit sex-relationship while preserving the outward semblance of family unity. The statistics of illegitimate births, and the known prevalence of marital infidelity among men, in those countries which allow no legal divorce, furnish unimpeachable testimony to an element of moral progress in the ideal generally held by men of today, that sex-relationship is limited in honor to legal marriage even if the legal bond be made more flexible thereby. The majority of applications for divorce and of legal separation are, however, made to our courts by women, and this is the most significant fact in the

problems affecting the stability of the modern family. It proves beyond question that the relations of the sexes in marriage must undergo profound changes in order to fit the family structure to the new democratic order of society. It gives this conclusive proof of needed change because it shows that the innermost centre of social relationship is responding consciously to the ethics of equality of rights. Political democracy has taught women to feel themselves of too much worth as human beings to be appraised wholly by sex-relationship, and has therefore made them unwilling to "obey" a husband any more than a king. They have begun to interpret constitutions and bills of rights as giving them an inalienable right to choose for themselves in marriage and to escape from intolerable, even from disappointing, results of a wrong choice. This sense of an inalienable right once engendered cannot be destroyed by inherited church doctrines or conventional ethics. Its most positive expression is shown where women refuse to endure enforced union with vicious men whose touch is contagion and whose heritage to their children is disease and misery. In a world newly awakened to the prevalence of diseases due to vice, and newly made aware of the dire consequences of these diseases in respect to marriage, family life, and the welfare of offspring, dare any enlightened person oppose or regret this revolt of women against the invasion of the home by the worst of social evils? This revolt is only a reassertion of woman's ancient right and duty of sex-discrimination in the interest of race preservation. It is a vicarious sacrifice offered to secure strength and purity in the blood of the nation. It is high time that so much of eugenic wisdom as is represented by the breaking of marriage ties so mistakenly assumed, for causes of mental defectiveness, degenerative diseases, and moral insanity, in either party to the union, should be socially approved and not condemned.

The influence of the school, now opened freely to girls from kindergarten to university, gives an added and quite different tendency, both in entering, in refusing to enter, and in leaving the marriage bond. Educated women have become conscious of personal tastes, capacities, and ambitions, which make many unwilling to "give all for love." This leads to some nice calculations of give and take on the "souls' Rialto," whose "merchandise" creates difficult transactions for any but the intellectual and moral élite. Men find it difficult to realize that household arts and domestic tastes do not come, like Dogberry's "reading and writing, by nature," to all women. Pride in a gifted wife's achievement in some special line is often quite consistent in their minds with demands upon her for equal facility in the all-round usefulness of the old-fashioned housewife. At best, the circumstances of ordinary family life make necessary sharp and often painful decisions between the special taste and capacity of a wife and mother and the general demands of family well-being. If those demands are tempered by understanding, on the part of all concerned, that her personal development has some claim upon the family indulgence as well as the family large claim upon her time and strength, all will go well, and the difficulties may but perfect the moral discipline of the domestic order in the higher grades of social life. If, on the contrary, all concerned look upon the service of the woman-head of the family as rightfully shared with everyone but her own personality, there must be trouble. It is impossible to send girls to schools in which specialized achievement is the motive power and guiding attraction, and not develop in them desires and qualities that demand play and opportunity within, as well as without, the family relationship; and that play and opportunity require a more flexible construction of woman's obligation to the family than most persons yet perceive.

Many men, however, surprisingly many for the short time they have had in which to acquire the graces of concession to equals in the marriage bond, have already adjusted themselves to household conditions of a quite new type. Yet the majority of men are still confused by, if not intolerant toward, the claim for re-adjustment of family life which higher education has made inevitable in the case of many women. Moreover, the masses of women have not yet ethically adjusted their own technique of living to the new principles of life. They often claim all that the old type of woman claimed even when specially privileged, while claiming at the same time all that the "new woman" can or should demand. Such take advantage of the full measure of freedom in work and in social opportunity which the new time has made possible, and yet may sue for "breach of promise" for disappointment in marriage, or claim support in idle luxury from hard-working husbands, and even demand "alimony" after selfish and hasty repudiation of marriage obligations. In spite, however, of some selfishness and of more shallow and inconsistent assertion of their new freedom, educated women have, for the most part, kept their poise during the transitional period and walk the dizzy heights of the bridge between the old and new conditions with admirable agility and still more admirable conscientiousness. With few exceptions the leading womanhood of our time, aided by the leading manhood, is bravely attacking and loyally achieving the difficult task of creating a new family order. Already the centres of higher education are themselves definitely engaging in the task of fitting into working efficiency the school and the feminine ideal in terms of mingled personal development and family service. In nearly one hundred and fifty institutions of higher learning in the United States, courses in household economics and home-making are already established,

courses in which the relation of the most highly-developed womanhood is directed toward both a finer and wiser service in the home and a broader civic house-keeping. Meanwhile, the most varied and ingenious experimentation is going on within the family in the higher intellectual and ethical areas, by which to demonstrate in terms of successful experience the possibility and social advantage of true democracy in the home.

It cannot be denied, however, that there are serious pathological conditions in the lower strata of the family life due to the maladjustment of the old economic need and the new economic system in the life and work of women. To train the average girl away from domestic arts in her school life and during her usually brief experience in a "gainful occupation," while leaving the demands upon the average house-mother so largely the same as in the past, is to make common wifehood and motherhood more difficult. To give such a girl the new and delightful experience of receiving a pay envelope into her own hand while, as is the case in many even of the poorer families, relieving her from responsibility for her share of the family expenditure, is to make the sacrifice of "pin-money" exacted by marriage distasteful to many. To give woman's work a definite market value while destroying much that used to give the home its economic standing in the world of industry, is to create a conscious antagonism between the condition of the earners and of the spenders among women, which leads to confusion of choice between personal desire and domestic duty. A well-known sociologist has said that many couples seek separation or divorce because "John, who earns ten dollars a week, has married Mary, who used to earn six dollars a week, and now they are trying to live on John's ten dollars alone and bring up a family of children besides." That makes John discouraged and Mary dissatisfied with her meagre share of the tiny in-

come, and may lead John to desert his family and force Mary to return to her earning and leave to philanthropy such burdens of child-care as Mary cannot assume. Sometimes, however, and increasingly is it true, Mary does not try to live on John's ten dollars but keeps on, after marriage, her own paid work outside the home. Then it happens often that children are not sought, or, coming, are not carefully nurtured, and thus the bond of common love for offspring, so far in the history of the race the strongest tie in marriage, loses its power. Or it often happens that John, aware of the dangers and privations of a "lowered standard of living," postpones marriage until he can secure better wages, and in the lonely bachelor days contracts habits which make him unsuccessful in family relationships. Or Mary is coolly prudent and fears to dare poverty with John and turns away from his love with a chilling effect upon his ambition and his idealism, which bodes ill for his future and the woman he may later marry. These economic difficulties are not limited to the range of ten dollar and six dollar a week incomes. They act and react upon the lives of those whose earning capacity is much larger and whose intelligence superior to the average. The economic difficulties inhering in modern marriage are not solved by any "paper plans" by which the entire work of women is to be made as highly specialized as that of men, so that home-making and motherhood shall interfere scarcely more with women's economic opportunities and achievements than with those of men. Most of these paper plans are made by exceptionally clever women whose own work has the relative freedom as to hours and conditions of all expressions of high-grade personality. They have no vital significance for the majority of women, who can earn money only subject to the exactions and the rigidities of man-made systems of labor. Nor have we as yet any data of en-

couragement toward diminishing to such a degree as is indicated by these paper plans, the demand upon the strength and time of the house-mother for that home-making which is the earliest socializing influence in human society. Nor is it women alone who pay a heavy price for the recompense of parental affection. The average man gives hostage to fortune with the birth of offspring, and must do what will give the family economic security rather than what will most please his own desire in labor. Neither fathers nor mothers are "economically independent," but both are bound with chains of service to their children's welfare.

One social fact, as yet hardly perceived by the general mind in its bearings upon family stability, presses for clearer statement and fuller application. This is the fact that the *laissez-faire* theory has been applied to all the basic institutions of society, including the family, in their first transition from aristocratic to democratic forms; and in all has proved itself socially incompetent. It was once thought that freedom in religion would liberate and give adequate expression to a universal passion for excellence. It is now understood that the freer the form of religious organization, the more vital the need for great personal leadership. It was once thought that freedom and class despotism would allow all men to rise immediately to political efficiency, and that when "fishers and choppers and ploughmen should constitute a state" it would be at once demonstrated that the voice of the people is the voice of God. We have learned by costly experience that public welfare demands in democracy, as in aristocracy, the rule of the best; and that the demos must learn to pick and choose its servant-leaders by far more ingenious political mechanism than despots require. It was once thought that to open the school-house door to the masses would guarantee intelligence and virtue in the common life.

We have learned that social control is imperatively needed to make education compulsory, to forbid the industrial exploitation of childhood, and to secure the right kind of training for all sorts and conditions of children. We once believed that if labor could have a fair field and no favor the clash of opposing interests would work out a balanced industrial order and would secure economic well-being to all. We have learned that social control must check the greed and cunning of the masterful, must protect the weaker and younger and less competent from exploitation, must secure the public against the evils of labor wars, and institute clever devices to democratize industry truly. In the same manner, in this latest application of democratic idealism to the institution of marriage and the family, we are learning that freedom and equality of rights are not enough to secure success in this vital relationship of life. Too much weight of unguided choice has been pressed upon ignorant and careless youth; too little safeguarding from the effects of moral weakness has been furnished the individualistic family; too dangerously optimistic trust to mere good intent has left undisciplined the average parent. We are gradually reintroducing in modern social forms the control and direction which the old patriarchal or collective family once applied to each married couple and their children. The modern state is beginning to forbid the mating of the unfit; it is beginning to prevent the breeding of defectives. The modern state is studying the great producing causes of race degeneracy and seeking to prevent them by abolishing pathological conditions in the family itself. The modern state is introducing Domestic Relations Courts, which are already realizing their aim to hold back the thoughtless and foolish, the selfish and wayward from premature and preventable separation and divorce; and these new Courts are already placing the child in the midst of all efforts for

family stability as the central object of care and protection. Not that these Courts always do or always will work to keep two people together who desire or think they desire to be free from marriage bonds; but where there are children, to whom the divorce of parents is always a tragedy even if that divorce may be necessary or right, these Courts, established in the interest of family rehabilitation, will not allow fathers and mothers to ignore the rights of their children. Sometimes the wise judge will see that the claim of the man or the woman or both to freedom, must in justice take precedence of all other considerations. Sometimes the wise judge will find the conditions of family life so abnormal that even for the sake of the children themselves the home should be broken up. The Domestic Relations Courts, however, have already shown that in the majority of cases an external conscience and an external wisdom may tide over difficulties and keep fathers and mothers and children together for a more earnest effort toward loyalty and faithfulness. Especially are these new agencies for the strengthening of the family bond stiffening to higher faithfulness the weak wills, and supporting to greater efficiency the feeble economic capacity, of "truant husbands." Manhood has had a much shorter discipline than womanhood in family devotion and child care; and hence, when the personal fibre is defective or undeveloped the modern individualistic family makes too heavy a claim upon the character and efficiency of husbands and fathers. Bewildered by the multiplicity of cares, realizing the new earning power of their wives and the accessibility of charitable relief, desertion seems easy for them, and not so craven an act or so cruel to wives and children as once it seemed. To put such men back in harness, and by probational discipline hold them to their assumed responsibility, is in itself an invaluable social service. The same Courts which thus hold hus-

bands and fathers, wives and mothers, to their tasks, will yet become the legal guardian of all children deprived of united parenthood by the breaking-up of a home, in order to secure to such unfortunate children the parental feeling of society-at-large, expressed through a chosen agency. The socially enlightened are coming to see that no power but the State can fitly and fully represent the public conscience and the common intelligence in granting permission to marry, in legalizing the bond, in determining its conditions and responsibilities, in giving emergency-help in its difficulties, in the application of social therapeutics to its curable diseases, or surgical treatment in its more serious disorders.

These are homely items of consideration, often ranked below the level of philosophic theory. The whole sociological approach by way of study of the common life to puzzling social problems seems to many too close to the noise and dust of the world's daily task. Today, however, religious idealism itself is becoming socialized; and not what glorifies saints, but what elevates the mass of mankind, is now most keenly desired. The science of human society, touched with this idealistic faith in the upreach and perfectability of common human life, is becoming the theology of a socialized religion. In the love and sacrifice of plain and unknown fathers who toil for their loved ones, in the patient endurance of simple-hearted mothers who give their lives in ready service, in the frolic joy and eager activity of ordinary children, in "these who make up the fabric of the world," is the fruit and promise of the human, in these the sure testimony and revelation of the divine. Yet is this fabric of the world shot over with golden patterns of prophetic beauty, woven by the tears and joy, the aspiration and the service of those who live today in the spirit of tomorrow. These are showing in a new way of life what marriage was meant to be. These are realizing the new

love between man and woman, already celestial in its demands of each upon the other for a perfect life to perfect that love. These are already showing the type and pattern of a new parenthood that calls children from the storehouse of the universal life, not in response to careless passion but in the solemn joy of creative purpose. These are already making clear and shining the pathway of that new comradeship of men and women which shall yet build from the heart's centre a righteous State, a wise school, a just industry, and a pure worship of the Ideal.

BAHAISM—A STUDY OF A CONTEMPORARY MOVEMENT

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More and more there is being brought to our attention the news of a great spiritual awakening in Southwestern Asia, that home of the prophets and birthplace of religions. At first it was called Babism, and centered around the brilliant youth, Mirza Ali Mohammed, the Bab, who after six years of teaching was martyred at Tabriz, Persia, in 1850. Later, most of his followers accepted the leadership of Mirza Husain Ali, generally known today as Baha'u'llah, and following his more universal teaching called themselves Bahais. Baha'u'llah after forty years of heroic teaching in exile and imprisonment closed his earthly existence at Acca, Syria, in 1892. The present leader of the movement, Abdul Baha (Abbas Effendi), under whose guidance the Bahai gospel has spread with remarkable rapidity into many countries, has recently spent more than a year in Europe and America, making its principles known, and through his great kindness, his words of wisdom, his sweet persuasiveness, has reflected its pure spiritual light. Apparently, it is not so much an organization as a spiritual attitude, not so much a new religion as religion renewed. Its followers are found in all sorts of ecclesiastical organizations. To be a Bahai a man need not sever his previous religious affiliations; he may remain a Buddhist, or Hindoo Braman, a Parsee, a Mohammedan, or a Christian. He becomes one of the Bahai Movement when he catches the Bahai spirit.

This is part of a world-wide movement, for without doubt we stand at the dawn of a great spiritual renaissance. New religions are appearing and sweeping through the world with a vigor that makes the religious awakening of our age, as William James has said, "analogous in many respects to the spread of early Christianity, Buddhism, and Mohammedanism." [1] William James referred merely to America. But clearly this is a more universal revival, a spiritual spring-time, as the Bahais call it, when the formalism and dogmatism of the ecclesiastical winter give way to the flowers, the joy, and the gentle breezes of true and spiritual religion. For the reason that the flood of spiritual warmth and sunlight which appears in such an awakening is so great, established institutions, even though they be revived and enlarged, are unable to contain it all. Hence it clothes itself in scores and hundreds of new sciences, philanthropies, and reforms. It is an old truth that the newest and most active wine must often be put into brand-new bottles.

Here is a fascinating opportunity for the study of the psychology of religion, when that mysterious force appears, as now, in its innate freshness, vigor, and conquering power. In fact, it is difficult to see how we can comprehend religious history in the past without the study of contemporary experience. It is easy enough to pronounce the heroes of ancient days illustrious when the world has with unanimous vote put them among the company of immortals, but the task of passing judgment on contemporary men, reforms, and visions, though harder and more adventurous, is far more interesting.

What is the secret of the growth of this Bahai gospel? What makes such a religion, in the face of the most terrible persecution, spread like wild-fire until in a little more than fifty years it counts its followers by the mill-

[1] Memories and Studies; Longmans, Green, & Co., p. 259.

ions? What inspires 20,000 men, women, and children to become willing martyrs in its path? These are questions of universal interest, because they get at the heart of vital religion wherever it may appear.

The Bahai Movement clearly supplies some rather universal need. Otherwise it could not win men of all classes, in all countries. This need is in part intellectual. The Bahai teaching presents a clear and beautifully ordered interpretation of the universe. But this is of course not a universal need. A few intellectually cultivated men crave philosophical consistency. To the mass of men it is a secondary concern. They want not so much new and clear ideas as new life. They are worried and confused; they cry for peace. They are unhappy; they long for joy. They are dissatisfied with mere material pleasures; they pray for something that is satisfying. They feel the chains of self-centered living; they long for release. Their inner self is a prison; they would exchange it for a palace. To the multitude of mankind, as to our new philosophers, knowledge is primarily an instrument for the production of life. This truth is written all over the history of the world. Men value religious truth just so far as it gives them this life. In short, that religion grows and persists which gives to men regeneration. We have come to distrust this word "regeneration," because in the past it has been defined so largely in unethical terms. But seen in its true light the longing for redemption is simply the deep urge of an evolving universe, which, pressing through the minds of men, constrains them to climb from a merely physical existence to one that is spiritual. All men at a certain level of development feel this divine urge upward. The religion which helps them in that climb they greet with gladness.

Many movements are popular today because they offer, with the spiritual, the more material redemption—

release from sickness and poverty. The Bahai Movement offers no physical prizes. On the contrary, it declares the supreme height of spiritual attainment is revealed when man is enabled to meet sickness, poverty, and death with unclouded brow, "radiant acquiescence," perfect joy. The appeal is a purely spiritual one. It bids men come and "drink of the pure Wine which has no likeness, from the Chalice of everlasting Glory" [2] —the wine of union with God.

The Bahai teaching also differs from various spiritual movements of the day in its exaltation of social redemption. The body of humanity is sick; it must be healed. "These fruitless strifes, these ruinous wars, shall pass away and the 'Most Great Peace' shall come." [3] Inequality of opportunity must give way to justice, equality of the sexes be established, and the fiction of "inferior races" melt before the dawning light of universal brotherhood. It takes for granted that the social consciousness is part of man's native endowment, that every man at his best wants not only individual regeneration but the redemption of the world.[4]

The Bahai Movement then makes its appeal to the high human instincts for spiritual, social, universal redemption. It promises only the reward of spiritual joy for the individual and social welfare of the nations. It spreads with surprising rapidity because to such a large degree it is fulfilling these exalted promises. Its converts will often tell you of the power of the spirit they have won in this new teaching, how it opens the doors of inspiration within them while they speak, how

[2] Hidden Words of Baha'u'llah, p. 18; Bahai Publishing Society, Chicago. All references to the words of Baha'u'llah and Abdul Baha are English translations of the Persian and Arabic originals.

[3] Baha'u'llah quoted in A Traveller's Narrative, by Edward G. Browne, p. xxxviii; Cambridge, 1892.

[4] The social gospel of the Bahai Movement is finely presented in The Modern Social Religion, by Horace Holley; Sidgwick & Jackson, London and Toronto, 1913.

it strengthens them to endure suffering, how it makes the rewards of the material world look like tinsel and ashes and sets them afire with the love of the wealth which is spiritual.

Among the oriental Bahais the spiritual results are said to be the most remarkable. Mr. Charles M. Remey in his *Observations of a Bahai Traveller*[5] describes the universal spirit of hospitality and brotherly love which prevails in the Bahai communities of Persia and Southern Russia. Bahais he had never met would travel a day's journey to see him on the train. Mr. Sydney Sprague tells us of the beautiful spirit of comradery which prevails among the Bahais of India and Burmah.[6] They are gathered from half a dozen religions which formerly shunned each other as some dreadful poison. Professor Edward G. Browne describes the remarkable and unforgettable spiritual atmosphere at Acca.[7] Mr. Myron Phelps, after his visit to Palestine and the neighboring regions, dwells on the "pure and gentle spirit of the Bahais—of them all, so far as I have seen them." He declares there is a spiritual exaltation and certainty about them which makes it impossible to question the reality of the unseen in their presence. He tells how their devotion to each other is so perfect that if an officer seeking men for martyrdom takes the wrong Bahai, that Bahai will often not declare the mistake but gladly die in his friend's stead.[8]

In fact, nowhere does the spiritual dynamic in the movement appear more vividly than in its martyrdoms. A man of eighty when assaulted cried out, "'We are from God, and to Him we are returning,' and in the very moment of his expiration he called out in a loud

[5] Bahai Publishing Society, Chicago.

[6] A Year with the Bahais in India and Burmah; Priory Press, London.

[7] A Traveller's Narrative, p. xxxix.

[8] Abbas Effendi [Abdul Baha], His Life and Teachings; Putnam's, 1902; pp. 110, 140.

voice with great joy and exultation, 'You have done us no harm! You are only transmitting us to our Lord!'"[9] A child of eleven is tortured to death by his fanatical school-mates and teacher. They afterwards said: "When we were stabbing him he only cried out, 'Oh Most Glorious God! oh my Supreme Beloved!' never wavering for an instant, but with greatest joy and delight he yielded up his life to his Beloved One."[10] A youth named Badi was present when Baha'u'llah asked for a volunteer to take a letter to the Shah of Persia on the chance that it would allay the horror of the martyrdoms, though it would mean practically certain death for the bearer of the letter. Badi offered himself; and the bystanders declared that as he was granted the commission his face was transfigured.[11] He walked hundreds of miles, delivered his message in person to the Shah, was rewarded by being slowly burned to death during a period of three days, but every moment preserved radiant joy. We need only imagine ourselves in such a position to realize that something has happened within the martyr's mind. A death like that requires a spiritual reinforcement most of us have not yet learned to rely upon.

Abdul Baha gives a beautiful summary of the effects of this new teaching on the people of Persia, where it is said one person in every three is a Bahai, showing how already the movement is achieving its ideal of social redemption. In speaking to Miss Laura Clifford Barney, the author of *Some Answered Questions*,[12] who had spent a number of years studying the Bahai Movement, he

[9] Bahai Martyrdoms in Persia, by Mirza Husain Ali, p. 12; Bahai Publishing Society, Chicago, 1904.

[10] Bahai Martyrdoms in Persia, p. 9.

[11] Flowers from the Rose Garden of Acca, p. 31; Bahai Publishing Society, Chicago.

[12] Some Answered Questions, pp. 343–344; Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner, & Co., London, 1908.

turns to her with the exclamation, "Praise be to God, you have been to Persia, and you have seen how the Persians, through the holy breezes of Baha'u'llah, have become benevolent toward humanity. Formerly, if they met any one of another race, they tormented him, and were filled with the utmost enmity, hatred, and malevolence; they went so far as to throw dirt at him. They burned the Gospel and the Old Testament, and if their hands were polluted by touching these books, they washed them. Today the greater number of them recite and chant, as is suitable, the contents of these two books in their reunions and assemblies, and they expound their teaching. They show hospitality to their enemies. These sanguinary wolves have become as gentle as gazelles in the plains of the love of God. You have seen their customs and habits, and you have heard them speak of the manners of former Persians. This transformation of morals, this improvement of conduct and of words, are they possible otherwise than through the love of God? No, in the name of God! If, by the help of science and knowledge, we wished to introduce these morals and customs, truly it would take a thousand years, and then they would not be spread throughout the masses. Today, thanks to the love of God, they are arrived at with the greatest facility."

Here then is a religion which is succeeding in the undertaking to which all religion is committed, of educating men out of the image of the earthly into that of the heavenly. It is demonstrating its power by entering what are perhaps the darkest countries of the Orient and lifting their people toward the light. What is the secret? What is the method by which it accomplishes these transformations?

It is all summed up in one word—education. Of course in outlining the way to the new social order, to the salvation of the nations, the Bahai teachers suggest

certain laws, especially for the regulation of excessive fortunes, the prevention of poverty. In a hundred years, Abdul Baha believes, poverty will have disappeared from the civilized world. International laws will be necessary for the settling of international disputes. Laws should be framed to accomplish everything within the power of law to accomplish. But this power is limited. We cannot bring in the Kingdom of God by legislation alone. Furthermore, it requires education of the social conscience of men to pass the law and to enforce it. Hence the first and the last word in the regeneration of the world must always be—education.

Abdul Baha distinguishes between education which is material and that which is spiritual. Both are needful. Material education builds up the body of our material civilization. Spiritual education, however, is the only power which can bring to birth that divine civilization which is its light and soul. Upon this heavenly education must the religious teachers concentrate, for therein lies the hope of humanity.

Spiritual education is the proclamation of spiritual truth. Of contemporary thinkers none glorify Truth more than Baha'u'llah and Abdul Baha. To them, as to all liberals, it is the only power under heaven which can set men free. "The Sun of Truth is the word of God, upon which depends the training of the people in the country of thought. It is the Spirit of Reality and the Water of Life." It is "the Fire of God which, glowing in the hearts of people, burns away all things that are not of God."[13]

Religion in all lands and all ages sets men's spirits free in so far as it keeps pure this eternal Word of Truth. The great prophets have given it to men in all its pristine purity, dressed of course in garments fitted to their age and time. Their followers continually imprison it

[13] Hidden Words, pp. 58, 59.

in the husks of barren and materialistic creed and ritual. Dogmatic imitations of celestial Truth always destroy its effectiveness in spiritual regeneration. Behold the history of Buddhism or Mohammedanism or Christianity.

The truth therefore must be rediscovered and restated with each new age. The eternal in the message of the prophets must be dissevered from the merely material provisions and ordinances. This is possible only to those who are free from prejudice and possessed by a passion for Reality.[14] Today it is first necessary to recognize the value of reason and scientific method. "Weigh carefully in the balance of Reason and Science everything that is presented to you as religion. If it passes this test, then accept it, for it is truth. If, however, it does not so conform, reject it, for it is ignorance." For "it is impossible for religion to be contrary to science even though some intellects are too weak or too immature to understand truth."[15] "Religion and science are the two wings upon which man's intelligence can soar into the heights, with which the human soul can progress. It is not possible to fly with one wing alone. Should a man try to fly with the wing of religion alone he would quickly fall into the quagmire of superstition, whilst on the other hand with the wing of science, he would make no progress but fall into the despairing slough of materialism."[16]

Religious truth, however, comes primarily through spiritual insight. It is conformable to reason. It also transcends the measuring rod of our mere rationalistic processes and rests ultimately upon spiritual intuition. The Bahai teachers declare further that the validity of a man's intuition depends upon the purity of his heart. We may hear within us not the voice of the spirit but of the satanic ego. It is only in the spotless mirror of a

[14] Paris Addresses of Abdul Baha, p. 134.
[15] Ibid., p. 146. [16] Ibid., p. 143.

pure heart that the rays of the Sun of Truth are reflected with unbroken clearness and splendor. The purest and most perfect of men, therefore, attain the highest degree of certainty in intuitive knowledge. These by the common testimony of mankind are the great prophets. To them we turn for the knowledge of Reality. The true seeker studies their utterances without prejudice, remembering that "light is good in whatever lamp it is burning. A rose is beautiful in whatever garden it may bloom. A star has the same radiance if it shines from the east or the west."[17] The words of the most illumined prophets, however, are often imperfectly reported and always need interpretation. Therefore traditional scripture alone will not suffice as a criterion for truth. In fact, no one of the four accepted standards of truth—the sensory, the rationalistic, the intuitive, or the traditional—is in itself sufficient. When, however, all are combined and all agree, we may count their deliverance the truth. This is at least the nearest approach that the seeker possesses until, after long spiritual discipline, the voice of the assurance of the Holy Spirit speaks from the serene depths of his own pure and God-illumined heart.[18]

What then are the spiritual truths which, passing this test, stand forth as enduring certainty? Or, to narrow our quest, what are the truths by the teaching of which the Bahai Movement is effecting the transformation of its followers' lives? They are very few; in fact they can all be gathered under one supreme concept—the inherent unity of the universe. Written on almost every page of the writings of Baha'u'llah and Abdul Baha are the words, oneness, unity. Their supreme aim is to bring men to "the Tent of Unity," the "presence of singleness," the "ocean of oneness." And "oneness, in its true significance, means that God alone should be real-

[17] Paris Addresses of Abdul Baha, p. 136.

[18] See Phelps' Abbas Effendi, p. 149; also Some Answered Questions, p. 336.

ized as the One Power which animates and dominates all things, which are but manifestations of Its energy."[19] All nature is one and reveals to the seeker the splendor of the "Ideal King." All the prophets speak one truth, declare one religion, manifest one God. The individual man is the potential manifestation of this one God. The immanence of God in the "servants" is taught with persistent intensity. Hence men of all classes and races are the "drops of one sea and leaves of one tree." Many a mystic has beheld God in his own soul. The Bahai teaching invites men to advance to the more universal view and behold His light in all humanity. Abdul Baha was asked, "Why do the guests that visit you come away with shining countenances?" He answered, "I cannot tell you, but in all those upon whom I look I see only my Father's face." By the inculcation of these few but sublime truths would this new gospel not only regenerate the individual but heal the disease of war, annul the blight of racial, creedal, and class antagonisms, and bring in the "Most Great Peace."

There are however many liberal thinkers in different parts of the world who are announcing these same truths of universal religion and universal brotherhood. The Bahais are part of a great world-movement. Their significance lies in the effectiveness of their teaching. Some teachers present these ideas, and their hearers say, "How true, how beautiful!" The Bahais proclaim the same truths, and often those who listen rise as from the dead, possessed by a new heart, aflame with the love which moves the world. There must be some dynamic in their method of presentation.

What is it? Truth regenerates men when they really believe it. Belief is something far more vital than mere intellectual assent. We may in a vague way surround a truth with the light of our intellect; but if that is all,

[19] Hidden Words, p. 61.

it has little effect upon us. The power comes when the truth surrounds us, grasps our will, kindles our heart, possesses our thought day and night, conquers and subdues our desires, our ambitions, our hopes, and our loves. When the truth shines through the horizon of our mind with such conquering brilliance that we cry, "Woe be to me if I do not do its bidding!" then we really believe. Such belief, as Abdul Baha says, invariably regenerates a man. "If his reality is dark, he will become enlightened; if he is heedless, he will become conscious; if he is sleeping, he will be awakened; if he is earthly, he will become heavenly; if he is satanic, he will become divine. This is the meaning of true belief."

A teacher brings his hearers to this pitch of belief only when he in like manner believes the truth he is proclaiming. Belief is contagious. He who has it not can never transmit it. The Bahais succeed as teachers because of the intensity of their belief. To them, at their best, it is all in all—life for the world, the hope of the ages, the will of God. They die rejoicing, if their service to that Truth requires it.

The fact of their absolute belief in what they teach is made apparent by what they have sacrificed to do its bidding. This is especially clear in the lives of their three great teachers—the Bab, Baha'u'llah, and Abdul Baha. These teachers say that material things count for nothing, are so much "water and clay." The whole material universe is to the spiritual man of no more consequence, says Abdul Baha, than an insect's wing. They show they believe it by giving up all physical comforts. Abdul Baha and Baha'u'llah lost all their property, lived in prisons most of their lives, endured privations and tortures, often in underground dungeons the horrors of which, to Western ears, are almost beyond belief. Yet every day, as Abdul Baha has declared, was a day of joy. They slept of their own choice on the

floor that the poor might have their beds, ate the scantiest food that the hungry might share their meals, refused to flee from their imprisonment when the gate was open. Therefore when they declare the life of physical comfort, of self-centered ease, is nothing, the life of spiritual love is the one glory of existence, their hearers, beholding their life, believe them and toss away their fortunes, their homes, their lives, with the same perfect joy. Their teachers had put their gospel to the severest test and had lived it without wavering. Hence, when the followers heard their prophet proclaiming the word of God, "If My Will thou seekest, regard not thine own, that thou mayest die in Me, and I live in thee," [20] they knew he had proved it true in his own experience and were constrained to offer "what they had for the hope of what [God] had." [21] Baha'u'llah puts this law of spiritual education thus: "The effect of the word spoken by the teacher depends upon his purity of purpose and his severance." [22] "Guidance hath ever been by words, but at this time it is by deeds." [23] "The truth of words is tested by deeds and dependent upon life. Deeds reveal the station of the man." [24] "He whose words exceed his acts, know verily that his non-being is better than his being and death better than his life." [25] In short, they had power as teachers because they lived the truth they taught. "The spiritual teacher shows his belief in his own teaching by himself *being* what he recommends to others." He is the Truth.

Here is one of the supreme laws in spiritual pedagogy. Religious truth is a life. It manifests itself in man as pure love, wisdom, joy, sublime vitality, peace, far-reaching service. This divine life in man is but an image, a reflection of the life of God, which is Reality. The divine life, therefore, whether in man or God is the same.

[20] Hidden Words, p. 5. [21] Ibid., p. 69. [22] Ibid., p. 62.
[23] Ibid., p. 53. [24] Ibid., p. 62. [25] Ibid., p. 63.

Now we may describe this life in essay or treatise. That is a word-picture or photograph of Reality; but it is quite different from the Life itself. The motive power in spiritual advancement is love. And we are so made that we love not abstractions but realities, not cold principles but the life incarnate. For that reason philosophic religions are always a failure. No mere "system of philosophy has ever been able to change the manners and customs of a people for the better." That is the reason all the greatest religions of the world gather around some noble personality—a Moses, a Confucius, a Buddha, a Zoroaster, a Jesus—who lives the creed he proclaims. The effect of the prophet in exalting the lives of the people lies in the degree in which he can say, "I am the Way, the Truth, the Life." True Buddhism is the life that was in Buddha; Christianity, the spirit which was in the Christ. Until he sees the "splendor of the life" incarnate in a human friend, not one man in a thousand is able to appreciate its glory and take the hard steps which lead to the summit of its transfiguration.

Furthermore, this life seems actually to pass from teacher to listener. This experience has been recorded in all ages. It is the secret of every inspiring teacher. His inward glory breaks away and through his words, his face, his deeds, and enters the minds of those who hear or see him. In this experience it seems as though reality were transmissible, as if the divine light could pass from mind to mind awakening the slumbering divinity in the hearts of men by the warmth and brilliance of its shining. "The unusual intellects, for instance, of Plato, Aristotle, Pliny, and Socrates, have not influenced men so greatly that they have been anxious to sacrifice their lives for their teachings; whilst some simple men [have] so moved humanity that thousands of men have become willing martyrs to uphold their words."[26] A

[26] Paris Addresses of Abdul Baha, p. 167.

carpenter, Jesus, was able to light the Roman world with a veritable spiritual conflagration. When the fire of the love of God and men blazed forth in his heart it needs must kindle the hearts of millions, for it is the nature of such fire that it spreads, and burns from the minds it touches all that is not of God. Only "such Fire of Love will assemble all the different peoples into one court."[27] Only by the transmission of this holy fire from man to man will the Kingdom of God appear on earth.

Its penetrative and re-creative power lies in this: it is the light of God by which all things have come into being. It is creator of the world. It is an easy matter, therefore, for it to re-create man. This divine life in the good man is God. "He who desires to associate with God, let him associate with His beloved; and he who desires to hear the word of God, let him hear the words of His chosen ones."[28] God is incarnate in these "chosen ones" in the degree of their spiritual perfection. The sun shines on the stone and the polished mirror. But only the polished mirror reflects its real splendor. The Sun of Reality, which is God, shines on the hearts of all men, but only those which are pure, burnished by the spirit, reflect its Divine Glory. For instance: "Christ was the mirror; God was the Sun. The Sun appeared with all its effulgence and splendor in the mirror; that is, the virtues, the perfections, and the characteristics of God appeared in Christ. That is what is meant where it is written in the Bible that 'We have created man in our own image.' The perfect man is the visage and image of God, just as the mirror reflects the sun. We cannot say the sun has come down from heaven and taken a place in the mirror. The sun is eternal, living in

[27] Tablet of the World, from Tarazat and other Tablets, by Baha'u'llah, p. 27; Bahai Publishing Society, Chicago, 1913.

[28] Hidden Words, p. 72.

its own station. It has no ascent or descent; but the rays and the heat of the sun have become fully reflected in the clear mirror."[29] The sun is in the mirror; God is in Christ. Therefore he that hath seen Christ hath seen the Father.

The Bahais also emphasize an often forgotten truth. This Light, the Spirit, may be put into a book, clothed with the transparent garment of words. Some books contain ideas; others, ideas wrapped and drenched in the living spirit of Reality. These latter books awaken life, transmit the fire of love, usher one into God's very presence, as did their author when he met men in the flesh. Jesus was incarnate not only in the body of the carpenter. He was incarnate also in the words of the Gospels. Reading their pages with pure and receptive heart, we may behold him rising from them in glory. The Bibles of the world have this power: they preserve as a living presence the spirit of their author for future generations. They grasp men's hearts, stir their hopes, strengthen their wills, as did the prophet himself. They move the world. A few pages of the Gospels turned the course of history.

The Bahais, who make a practice of reading as far as possible the sacred books of all religions, declare the words of the Bab, of Baha'u'llah, and Abdul Baha, possess this same re-creative power. They illumine, exalt them, reveal to them the presence of God, and set them aflame with His love. They shake their soul awake with the divine thirst for the "immortal, everlasting chalice" of union with God. And that is the first aim of spiritual education in every land, every age. Inertia is the wall which blocks the pathway of men's spiritual advancement. They are asleep, they must be awakened; spiritually dead, they must be called forth from the tombs. The teacher who can through deeds, through spoken or

[29] Abdul Baha in Star of the West, vol. III, no. 6, p. 8.

written words, awaken that love of the divine life will save men. The first step in the Bahai method of spiritual education is that of reading inspired words or meeting exalted teachers, until one is able for a moment "to taste of the honey of union with [God]. If we drink of this cup we shall forget the whole world."[30]

After this arousing from without, man must take the process into his own hands. His active co-operation is imperative. God puts great responsibilities upon our will. When once "the world-illuminating sun of longing dawns forth, and the fire of love becomes ablaze," we must quickly sever ourselves from all lower ambitions, from "aught else save God," turn our "face from the faces of all created beings unto the Holy Face of [His] Oneness,"[31] and pray. Few religious teachers give to prayer a more central place than the Bahais. The good Bahais rise, if possible, at dawn with a prayer of awakening, turn to God in adoration as they dress, spend a half hour or so in earnest supplication and praise before breakfast, pray as they leave the house for the daily business, pray in the stillness of the evening, and drop away to sleep committing their bodies and spirits into the hands of God's care and protection. Prayer, they declare, is one of the chiefest pillars of all religion. Without it the highest human life is impossible. To them prayer is "giving up the outward eye and opening the inward eye." It is the concentrating of the whole mind upon that "central radiance" of the universe which is God. Above all, it is cleansing our motives by absorption in the thought of God. "A pure heart is like unto a mirror. Purify it by the polish of Love and Severance from all else save God, until the Ideal Sun may reflect therein and the Eternal Morn may dawn."[32] As such

[30] Seven Valleys, by Baha'u'llah, p. 10; Bahai Publishing Society, Chicago. A little treatise describing man's journey to union with God.

[31] Hidden Words, p. 72.

[32] Seven Valleys, p. 28.

prayer grows perfect, he who is traversing the valleys towards the "sea of nearness and union" attains a wonderful knowledge of God. "In an ocean he will see a drop, and in a drop he will detect the mysteries of an ocean." "The core of whatever mote thou mayest split, therein thou wilt find a sun." "He beholds the beauty of the Friend in everything. In fire he sees the face of the Beloved; in unreality he perceives the sign of the Reality." [33] He discerns the "goodness at the heart of things evil." "He finds life in death and glory in shame." His character is therefore transfigured. "If he experiences any oppression, he will endure it with patience, and if he sees any wrath, he will show forth affection." [34] He passes on and on in the divine journey until the self-centered self vanishes as a shadow. He has "abandoned the drop of life and reached the Ocean of the Beloved One." Nay more, he has "plunged into the seas of Grandeur." He is of those who "swim in the sea of Spirit and roam in the sacred atmosphere of Light." [35] "The Beauty of the Face unveils itself from the Orient of the Eternal World and the meaning of 'Everything is mortal save the Face of God' becomes manifest."

Such is the height to which Baha'u'llah would lead his spiritual students through contact with inspired prophets and the intensive practice of prayer. But there is nothing approaching other-worldliness about this exalted state. He who sees God in everything will behold Him first of all in the neighbor who needs his service, in the great causes which make for the upbuilding of spiritual civilization. Abdul Baha declares that today the supreme confirmations of the Holy Spirit come to those who rise to serve the "Most Great Cause" of universal religion and universal brotherhood.[36] Immersion in the "sea of union" is the final preparation for the service of such a

[33] Seven Valleys, p. 40. [34] Ibid., p. 17. [35] Ibid., p. 36.
[36] Tablets of Abdul Baha, passim.

divine cause. It brings that baptism of fire which makes him in whom it is burning a light to illumine all those who hear his word or see his face. "The minds of the lovers are ever aflame with this fire." [37] It transforms character, destroys ignorance, quickens civilization. It made a few illiterate fishermen of Galilee the leaders of the Western world. It is at once the mightiest and the most contagious force known to man. The Bahai Movement is but a new statement and a new demonstration of the power of the Holy Spirit in the education of humanity.

[37] Hidden Words, p. 59.

THE JESUITS AS PORTRAYED BY NON-CATHOLIC HISTORIANS

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From the days of Ignatius Loyola until now the Society of Jesus has bulked large in the imagination of the English-speaking races. The Elizabethan certainty that Jesuits were concerned in plots against the sovereign led with remorseless logic to hangings and quarterings at Tyburn. The Puritan prejudice, common especially in the seventeenth century, that the Pope was Antichrist, made his Jesuit emissaries appear dangerous and almost uncanny. The Enlightenment of the age of Voltaire saw in them a band of obscurantists of darkest dye, whose sinister influence over education and politics properly led the Bourbon courts to expel them from the chief Catholic countries of Europe, and to secure in 1773 from a hesitating Pope their utter and perpetual abolition. In the Brief of suppression[1] the Pope himself enumerated their weaknesses and faults, and declared that these were so great as to outweigh their manifest and signal services; therefore the repudiation.

The nineteenth century saw the dead rise; and the twentieth sees it at the right hand of power in the Church of Rome. If in the judgment of some historians the outstanding political event of the last hundred years in Europe is the creation, out of dry bones, of a United Italy, the outstanding political fact in the history of the Catholic Church is the Risorgimento of the Jesuits.

[1] Reprinted by C. Mirbt: Quellen zur Geschichte des Papsttums und des römischen Katholizismus; 3d ed., Tübingen, 1911, No. 457.

Called back precisely a century ago, on the seventh of August, 1814,[2] they have worked their way to such influence that in the game of ecclesiastical politics as played under Pius IX and Pius X it has been lightly asserted that Jesuits are trumps. Certainly the definition of the dogma of the Immaculate Conception in 1854, the Syllabus of 1864, the definition of papal infallibility and absolute sovereignty in 1870, the condemnation of Modernism in 1907, and at this very moment the codification of the canon law by the centralized authority of a papal autocracy based on divine right[3]—these are monuments to the victory of principles for which the Jesuits have contended, milestones on their march to power. However highly we may appraise the personal initiative of the reigning Pope, we have no grounds to suppose that there is any serious conflict of opinion between him and the Society of Jesus.

Inevitably the Jesuits are a problem to the historian. If with Freeman he conceives history as past politics, he finds in many a tangled skein of diplomacy the black thread that runs back to the Gesù at Rome. If with the Hegelians he holds that history is fundamentally a battle of ideas, he emphasizes the early nineteenth century reaction from the Enlightenment to Romanticism, from Rationalism to authority, a process which found its classic completion in the Vatican decrees which recognized the bishop of Rome as the mouthpiece of the Almighty. If the historian believes that institutions are of primary significance, moulding and dominating the individual, he neglects under peril of superficiality the development of the international empire of the Vatican, which claims every validly baptized Christian as a sub-

[2] Mirbt, No. 471.

[3] Ibid., Nos. 499, 504, 508, 509, 558, 559. On the codification see Nos. 555, 561; N. Hilling, Die Reformen des Papstes Pius X. auf dem Gebiete der kirchenrechtlichen Gesetzgebung; Bonn, 1909; E. Herzog, Der papstliche Absolutismus unter Pius X (Internationale kirchliche Zeitschrift; Band I., Hefte 1 & 2); Bern, 1911.

ject of the Pope, and is even now, through the codification of the canon law, engaged in binding all Roman Catholics closer than ever to the footstool of the Vicar of Christ. Modified as these tendencies may be in practice by what Mr. McCabe has called "the decay of the Church of Rome," the victory of the ideas of papal infallibility and papal autocracy is due, more than to any other promoters, to the tenacious followers of Loyola.

If the modern historian desires anything, it is to be fair. He must seek to mortify within himself the seeds of partisanship. He must abdicate even the traditional dignity of judge of the past, lest he be false to the rigorous demands of a science which asks not, Were the Jesuits right or wrong? but, What were they, and how did they come to be just that? Can a Protestant ever qualify for that task? Can he divest himself of feeling, so as neither to attack, nor yet to desire to defend the objects of his researches? Can he succeed in the far more difficult task of comprehending Roman Catholicism, so manifold in its appeal, yet in its dogmas so consistently one? Has he with the eyes of a child watched the star-like candles on the altar? Has he harkened to the silver Sanctus bell, and to the mysterious murmur of the priest as he creates and sacrifices the Body and Blood of our Lord? Has the thought of hell made him shiver, and the consecrated wafer made him thrill? He who cannot imagine these experiences does not know the A B C of Catholicism, in the mastery whereof lies the deepest secret of the power of the Jesuits; for their ascendancy is rooted in their hold on the fears and aspirations of Catholic piety as directed in the confessional and in the Spiritual Exercises.

Granted that understanding of the psychology of Catholicism which is a prerequisite to scientific objectivity, there remains a still greater difficulty than an

adequate psychology—the problem of the possibility of knowledge. Can an outsider really know the past of the Jesuits? Are the sources so abundant, frank, and trustworthy that we may gain from them a true picture?

An official history of the Society of Jesus began to appear three centuries ago.[4] Though it was composed in the form of annals, then the form preferred by the great Vatican historian Baronius, it found readers and still finds them today, but its importance has been lessened by the publication of certain older sources on which its statements were based. It deserves more attention than does the self-laudatory *Imago primi saeculi societatis Jesu* (1640), or the one-sided reports from the mission fields, the celebrated *Lettres édifiantes et curieuses écrites par quelques missionaires de la Compagnie de Jésus* (Paris, 1702, and often, with varying contents).[5] The interests of their editors and compilers led them to select the edifying rather than the typical, as one may readily see by comparing the account of the Canadian missions given in the *Lettres édifiantes* with the other copious materials edited by the late Professor Reuben Gold Thwaites. Less respected, because more pretentious, is the *Histoire religieuse, politique, et littéraire de la Compagnie de Jésus*, by Jacques Crétineau-Joly (Paris, 1844–1846). Though "written under the auspices of the Society,"[6] this patently apologetic history has been charged with the suppression or distortion of important facts, and has therefore failed to command the respect of scholars. It is to be understood as the product of those tense days when the Society was the object of the bitter and often unjustifiable attacks which preceded its temporary expulsion from France.

[4] Historia Societatis Jesu, Rome, 1614–1758, begins with Loyola and continues to 1633. It was edited successively by Orlandini, Sacchini, Possinus, Jouvancy, and Cordara (Catholic Encyclopedia, 11, 317).

[5] Catholic Encyclopedia, 14, 96.

[6] Ibid., 4, 488.

After the revolution of 1848 various European governments opened sections of their archives to investigators; and early in his reign Leo XIII made large portions of the Archives of the Vatican accessible to the researches even of Protestants.[7] The flood of new material thus inundating the dry and well-trodden lowland paths of political and ecclesiastical historians, compelled them to abandon many old positions; large sections of modern history have had to be rewritten. Perceiving the new situation, Father Luis Martin, twenty-eighth general of the Society of Jesus, arranged for the compilation of a new series of official historical works, to utilize the newly found materials and to answer questions which had lain outside the sphere of interest of the seventeenth century annalists. There is a set of published sources, *Monumenta historica societatis Jesu*, of which over thirty volumes have appeared at Madrid since 1894; and there is a series of histories of the Order in the various countries which have been the scenes of its labors. Differing greatly from one another in merit, these books of Duhr, Fouqueray, and others[8] represent a distinct advance in Jesuit historiography, and can be neglected by no serious writer on their respective fields. Unfortunately they have begun to appear so recently that they have exercised practically no influence on the non-Catholic authors that we shall now consider.

[7] See the comprehensive article by Paul Maria Baumgarten, "Institutes, Roman Historical" (Catholic Encyclopedia, 8, 61–65).

[8] Duhr treats Austria, Germany, and Switzerland; Fouqueray, France; Astrain, Spain; Venturi, Italy; Kroess, Bohemia, Moravia, and Silesia; Thomas Hughes, North America; and Pastells, Paraguay. They are written in German, French, Spanish, Italian, or English. Exact titles may be found in the Catholic Encyclopedia, 14, 94, and 96. On the scrupulous fairness of Duhr as over against the unbending partisanship of Fouqueray, see G. L. Burr, in the American Historical Review, Oct., 1913, pp. 143–145. An earlier work deserves mention also: Foley, Records of the English Province of the Society of Jesus. In addition there should be noted the inspired rebuttals of slanders and legends concerning the Order, such as Duhr, Jesuiten-Fabeln (4th ed., 1904, pp. xii, 975); Brou, Les Jésuites de la légende (1907, 2 vols.). Other Catholic works include E. L. Taunton, History of the Jesuits in England, 1580–1773 (1901), and Father Taunton's much discussed article "Jesuits" in the eleventh edition of the Encyclopaedia Britannica (1911).

In spite of the inherent fascination of the subject, no English-speaking Protestant has ever written a really good history of the Society of Jesus. Portions of the vast field have, to be sure, received dignified and even distinguished treatment by Americans; it suffices to mention Francis Parkman's *Jesuits in Canada* (1867), and the huge source-collection describing the travels and explorations of the French Jesuit missionaries among the Indians, edited by the late Reuben Gold Thwaites under the title of *The Jesuit Relations and Allied Documents* (1896–1901). For the neglect of the larger field various causes may be surmised: the numerical insignificance of the Roman Catholics in Great Britain, leading their opponents to underrate the importance of the task; the former predilection of the great universities for the classics, to the preterition of the study of modern history; the difficulty of doing good work without employing materials which until recently have been secreted in continental archives; and possibly a surmise that only a donkey could browse upon the Jesuit thistle without learning the truth of the motto *Nemo me impune lacessit.* Whether from blindness, caution, cowardice, or caprice, Anglo-Saxon Protestants have usually chosen to leave the Jesuits outside the sphere of their investigations.

Naturally enough the dramatic potentialities of the subject did not escape the eye of Macaulay. In his *History of England* he devotes to it eight famous pages, in which the balancing of vices and virtues, of accusation and rebuttal, issues rather in a series of spectacular contrasts than a judicial estimate of a much-abused Order.[9] Nor did the lay theologian, Isaac Taylor, who was immune against that itching for antithesis which infected Macaulay, rise to Parnassian heights in his treatment of *Loyola and Jesuitism* (1849). More con-

[9] T. B. Macaulay, History of England from the accession of James II; New York, 1849, vol. 2, 49–56; see also his essay on Ranke's History of the Popes, originally published in the Edinburgh Review for October, 1840.

scientiously documented and not altogether to be despised at the present day is the hastily written *History of the Jesuits* by Andrew Steinmetz (1848), who had been for nine months a Jesuit novice; but in spite of his drawing on Ranke and Crétineau-Joly, his two volumes are hopelessly antiquated.

The works just mentioned were all published before 1850. As regards books for the English reader of Jesuit history, the second half of the nineteenth century was almost a blank.[10] Griesinger's *Jesuits* (New York, 1883) is the translation of a German work which reflects the hostilities of the Kulturkampf; and W. C. Cartwright's *Jesuits* (London, 1876) is the careful but amateurish production of a learned member of Parliament. The opening years of the twentieth century have witnessed the publication of more works dominated by the polemical interest. Here belongs Neatby's *Programme of the Jesuits*, which concludes with the dark suggestion that "the best equipped battalions that have ever marched under the banner of Antichrist" may be potent factors in that "culmination of the mystery of iniquity" which "is still future, as Holy Scripture seems plainly to indicate." [11] If Neatby, historian of the Plymouth Brethren though he may be, is negligible when he comes to write on ultramontane topics, one cannot assert the same of the fiery Walter Walsh, author of several books, including *The Secret History of the Oxford Movement*. His *Jesuits in Great Britain* (1903), takes up from a different angle some problems treated two years previously by Father Ethelred Taunton in his *Jesuits in England*. Walsh gives a carefully documented indictment of the activities of the Order in Britain down to the accession of James

[10] Two German works deserve mention: J. Huber, Der Jesuiten-Orden nach seiner Verfassung und Doctrin, Wirksamkeit, und Geschichte, 1873, and E. Gothein, Ignatius von Loyola und die Gegenreformation, 1895. The latter is a solid contribution, based on work in various archives.

[11] W. Blair Neatby, The Programme of the Jesuits; 1903, p. 191.

II. He is chiefly concerned with the plots of what he is pleased to call "that notorious Order."[12]

In the past decade six really notable books on the Jesuits have been published by writers who cannot be classified as Catholics. One of these, by Stoeckius, is a technical study of the organization of the daily life of the Order in the sixteenth century, and should be of special interest to historians of education.[13] Another, *Der Jesuitismus*, by Pilatus (Dr. Viktor Naumann) is an enlarged and corrected reprint of articles which appeared in the *Augsburger Postzeitung*, dealing especially with the history and reliability of anti-Jesuit polemic.[14] In this work Pilate does not confine himself to the question, What is truth? but renders partisan judgment on many matters, nearly always in favor of the Jesuits. As much of the older polemic, which Naumann has hauled out of the cobwebbed recesses in which it was peacefully rusting, is honeycombed with legends and corroded with lies, it defiles the hands of him who touches it. Pilate may wash his hands of it, but he is still incapable of doing justice, for he lacks impartiality.

Of the remaining four books two are elaborate autobiographies of former Jesuits—Count Hoensbroech, and Father Tyrrell; and two are professedly histories of the Order; one of them by the former Franciscan, Joseph McCabe, the other by a conservative Lutheran, Heinrich Boehmer, now professor of ecclesiastical history at the University of Marburg. Of all the histories of the Jesuits

[12] Walter Walsh, The Jesuits in Great Britain: a historical inquiry into their Political Influence, 1903, p. 337. Another work of the same temper is Michael F. J. McCarthy's Jesuits and the British Press (1910).

[13] H. Stoeckius, Forschungen zur Lebensordnung der Gesellschaft Jesu im 16 Jahrhundert: I., Ordensangehörige und Externe; II., Das gesellschaftliche Leben im Ordenshause, 1910 f.

[14] Pilatus (Dr. Viktor Naumann), Der Jesuitismus. Eine kritische Würdigung der Grundsätze, Verfassung, und geistigen Entwicklung der Gesellschaft Jesu, mit besonderer Beziehung auf die wissenschaftlichen Kämpfe und auf die Darstellung von antijesuitischer Seite. Nebst einem literarhistorischen Anhang: Die antijesuitische Literatur von der Gründung des Ordens bis auf unsere Zeit; Regensburg, 1905.

by non-Catholic writers the little book of Boehmer is the most satisfactory.[15] It should be read not in the original German form in which it appeared in 1904, but in the French translation, with a long and valuable introduction by the late Gabriel Monod.[16] Its careful bibliographies, given chapter by chapter, in some measure compensate for the paucity of footnotes. The distinctive merit of Boehmer is the independent treatment of mooted questions, together with a sympathetic appreciation of the aims and spirit of Loyola and his Order.

In his *Candid History of the Jesuits*[17] Mr. Joseph McCabe traces the Society of Jesus from its origin to the present day. In treating the first hundred years he proceeds from generalate to generalate; from then on, he traces the development down to the Suppression of 1773 province by province. The concluding chapters are The Restoration, The New Jesuits, The Last Phase. The book is an excellent example of history as it used to be written in the eighteenth century. It was characteristic of the age of Voltaire to draw no clear-cut distinction between original and secondary sources, trusting to the power of the acute intellect to discern truth regardless of its pedigree. Mr. McCabe's recent program of a volume a year has not left him time to trace the ramifying and often subterranean sources of Jesuit history. He has left the work of exploration to others; he prefers to exploit their results. Had he tested his materials as he went along, he would have given his readers a sense of greater security. Though he does not eschew footnotes altogether, he leaves most of his

[15] H. Boehmer, Les Jésuites. Ouvrage traduit de l'allemand avec une Introduction et des Notes par Gabriel Monod, Membre de l'Institut; Paris, 1910.

[16] Monod supplements Boehmer especially on three points: the Chinese and the Malabar rites, the casuistry and ethics of the Jesuits, the policy of the Jesuits (including the Monita Secreta).

[17] McCabe, A Candid History of the Jesuits; G. P. Putnam's Sons, New York, 1913.

assertions hanging in the air. He would base them, no doubt, on the numerous secondary authorities which he casually names in the text, but nowhere arranges in a systematic bibliography. Orlandini and his continuators he usually sets aside as partisan, or uses them chiefly when they make damaging admissions; Crétineau-Joly he cites chiefly in order to expose; but the official *Monumenta* and the provincial histories by Fouqueray and others he seems scarcely to have employed at all. As for Duhr's *Jesuitenfabeln*, with its attempted refutation of seventy-eight varieties of slanders, he errs when he treats it as quite negligible.

If Mr. McCabe has not used the most recent sources and literature, his motivation of events is also distinctly old-fashioned. The narrative is dominated by politics conceived as the game of priests and potentates; in the antechamber or in the confessional one diverts the current of events, without much reference to the logic of ideas, the clash of the classes, or the struggle for the food supply. Thrilling tales of successful priestcraft or of judicial blindness entertain oftener than they convince; like most court memoirs and much else that passes for inside history, they exaggerate the importance of the individual actors to the neglect of the dull but adamantine background of economic and physical law. Exaggerating the influence of secret intrigues tends to make the Jesuits appear more formidable than they really were. Just as mediaeval housewives used to suspect Satan rather than bacteria when the cheese refused to act as expected, so certain modern writers, rather than analyze the complicated causes actually at work, flee to the dogma of the omnipresence of the Jesuits. Needless to say, their superstitions about the secretive followers of the Black Pope, as the Jesuit general is called, tend to increase the prestige of these as potent factors in history; but the legends also cause

men to hold them responsible for many a hostile act in which they really bore little or no part.

In pronouncing judgment on controverted questions Mr. McCabe has usually shown a sagacious restraint. Not having time to dig up by the roots the difficulties which are embedded in the original documents, he usually bases his case on damaging admissions by his opponents rather than on a study of the conflicting testimony. Therefore, in spite of his conscious endeavor to be fair, he is really interested chiefly in the sins and errors of the Jesuits. Like a celebrated letter of Abelard, which he knows very well, the present volume might have been entitled *Historia Calamitatum*. To be sure, he enumerates sundry successes, and gives due credit to Jesuit foresight, vigor, and perseverance; but who could deny the foresight of Loyola, the vigor of Xavier, or the perseverance of Jogues? These qualities were not refused to Satan himself by the candid Milton. Mr. McCabe, however, considers most Jesuit successes dazzling but hollow; whether conjured up by corpse-like obedience or by a wave of the Pompadour's fan, they were destined to vanish when Man turned against Magic and Priestcraft.

In view of these facts, is this history of the Jesuits properly entitled "candid"? In the word there lurks ambiguity: it may mean free from disguise or reserve; it may mean free from partiality or bias. The book is quite without reserve, even gossipy at times, though rarely spicy. The bias is, however, unmistakable. Out of his own experience the author published *Twelve Years in a Monastery*. In his Franciscan days he may possibly have soliloquized about the Jesuits as if from a Spanish cloister; now from the governing board of the *Rationalist Press Review* he adds to the old disapprobation bitter intellectual disgust. To the keenness of observation characteristic of the member of a rival

monastic Order he joins the slashing quality which has marked him as a critic of "the Decay of the Church of Rome." Therefore his vigorous *History of the Jesuits* is excellent reading, though it stresses one side of the story.

Turning with regret from the stimulating though inadequate books of Boehmer and McCabe, let us examine those palpitating autobiographies of the two ex-Jesuits, Hoensbroech and Tyrrell.

Count Paul von Hoensbroech was born in 1852 of one of the most ancient and highly respected families of Rhenish Prussia. Educated by the Jesuits at Feldkirch just across the Swiss frontier, he studied law at Bonn and Göttingen, and became a "Referendar." At the age of twenty-six he yielded to an impulse he had long resisted, and entered the Jesuit novitiate. It was then 1878, and Germany, in the feverish excitement of the Kulturkampf, had expelled the Jesuits; consequently he had to pass through the novitiate and the scholasticate in Jesuit schools in Holland and in England. Of their obscurantism and relatively antiquated and inefficient character he gives striking evidence, which, though partisan, cannot be neglected by historians of education. After a varied experience in Jesuit colleges he was sent up to Berlin to study at the university. He was to prepare himself to defend Roman dogma against Protestant attack; and to that end he heard Harnack in the history of dogma, and Paulsen in the history of modern philosophy. Neither Harnack nor Paulsen influenced him. He thought Paulsen an honest old bookworm, and considered Harnack learned and usually accurate in detail, but after all surprisingly ignorant of many aspects of Catholicism. He believed him also —and this throws a side-light on the dogmatic and polemical nature of Hoensbroech's own mind—too clever, too prone to resolve contradictions into a higher unity.

So little understanding had Hoensbroech for the professional many-sidedness of the church historian.

Not Harnack nor Paulsen, but Schleiermacher, Rothe, and Biedermann were the liberators of his theology; and the greatest liberator of all was Immanuel Kant. Says Hoensbroech: "Through Kant I attained to a recognition of the autonomy of reason, and its right to self-direction. Kant confirmed me infallibly in the consciousness, which had been long but timidly dawning within me, of the right and duty of conducting research, free and independent of faith in authority, of being not a mere child in leading strings, but a thinking human being, even in the face of the things of the other world. What miserable superficialities my Jesuit philosophy professors had repeated to me about Kant's 'unemployable' because 'illogical' *Critique of Reason.*"[18]

Hoensbroech's breach with Rome was in essence the assertion of reason against authority; and after a while he went so far along the road to rationalism that he broke with that comprehensive but on the whole conservative organization known as the Evangelical League, and found a place of refuge on the extreme left wing of German theologians, in the *Protestantenverein.* It is not, however, as a dogmatician or as a philosopher that Hoensbroech interests us, but as a historian. At the time of his leaving the Order in 1892 he found great comfort in Ranke and in Gregorovius, who taught him to study the papacy not as a "divine institution" but as a historical phenomenon, and showed him that its social influence had been not civilizing and beneficent only; like all long-lived institutions, the papacy had helped to perpetuate obsolete and inhumane prejudices and superstitions. These reactionary aspects of the development of Roman Catholicism Hoensbroech diligently exploited after his flight from the Order, and he pub-

[18] II, 405 f.

lished his researches in several books.[19] Apart from the side-lights thrown by these works, his chief contributions to the characterization of the Order from which he fled are recorded in *Fourteen Years a Jesuit: a Record of Personal Experience and a Criticism.*[20] Hostile and lacking in psychological insight as this presentation occasionally is, it comes from a man who has been on the inside and knows what he is describing. In addition to the fascinating autobiographical portions, Hoensbroech gives a systematic and elaborately documented criticism of the piety and the ascetic discipline of the Order, of its inner constitution, its doctrine of obedience, its use of the confessional, and its influence on court life, politics, and education. The German original has also chapters omitted in the translation, on "Abuses in the Jesuit Order," and on the "Suppression of the Order."

Of all biographies of English Roman Catholics probably the most charming and the most significant since Newman's *Apologia* is the *Autobiography and Life of George Tyrrell* (1912).[21] The sensitive Irish Protestant boy, literary to the tips of his fingers, passed through unbelief and High Churchmanship to the Jesuit novitiate at the age of eighteen. Except for a brief period in Malta, his career in the Society of Jesus kept him employed in England; he taught at Stonyhurst and elsewhere. Interested in philosophy rather than history, he was led, by his zeal for the dissolving of doubts and for the reconciliation of the doubter to Mother Church, to stretch the limits of Catholic liberty beyond measure. Opposition and disillusionment followed, and culminated in excom-

[19] Das Papsttum in seiner sozial-kulturellen Wirksamkeit, 4th ed. (1902), 2 vols.; Moderner Staat und römische Kirche (1906); Rom und das Centrum (1907).

[20] 1909 f.; translation, 1911.

[21] Autobiography and Life of George Tyrrell, arranged with supplements by M. D. Petre; Longmans, Green, & Co., 1912, 2 vols. Reviewed in this periodical, Jan. 1914, p. 123 f., by the Reverend William Sullivan.

munication. When he died in 1909 he still yearned for the Catholic unity in which he had been nurtured, which the logic of his ideas would have rent remorselessly.

In closing let us summarize under four heads what these recent publications would tell us about the real nature and activities of the Company of Jesus.

I. The relations of the Jesuits to the Roman Catholic hierarchy. The members of the Company of Jesus are popularly supposed to be the militia of the Pope. Their innermost circle, "the professed of four vows," swear to go whithersoever he sends them. Obedience to his commands, transmitted through their General, is military; "theirs not to question why"; and bones bleaching on African sands or beneath Canadian snows bear witness to the undaunted loyalty of the individual. The Jesuit Order as a whole has nevertheless repeatedly disobeyed the Pope, when they thought disobedience would redound (in the words of their favorite motto) "*ad majorem Dei gloriam.*" They trust themselves as the unwaveringly consistent representatives of papalism; therefore they are reputed to be more papal than the Pope.

If the Jesuits have been in occasional conflicts with popes, they have waged many a bitter war with bishops. Exempt from episcopal jurisdiction, they have entered diocese after diocese, and before long have endeavored to have things their own way. Jesuit churches and Jesuit schools have often competed with parish churches and schools instead of coöperating with them; and the Jesuits have often diverted to themselves the homage and gifts of the laity, in particular of the upper classes. Like the Mendicant Orders before them, the Jesuits have often crossed the plans of priest, of bishop, and even (though rarely) of the Supreme Pontiff.

The rivalry of the Jesuits with certain other religious Orders has usually been intense. From the start they had to cope with the hostility of the Dominicans, a battle

which was keenest under Pope Benedict XIV (1740–1758), who prohibited those curious compromises with Confucianism and Hinduism known respectively as the Chinese and the Malabar rites. The prohibitions practically put a quietus on Jesuit missions in China and India, which wilted as soon as the subterranean stream of Jesuit accommodation was diverted.

II. If the Jesuits did not always live at peace with their Catholic neighbors, what can we say of their relations to Protestants? Founded primarily for missions in Mohammedan lands, the Jesuits were by the force of the political situation speedily compelled to turn to the home field. Here they confronted sin, unbelief, and especially heresy. Even if we grant the thesis of Duhr,[22] that the Jesuits were not founded to extirpate Protestantism, it is undeniable that a large portion of their work has been directed to that end. It was the Jesuits who educated great Catholic princes of the Counter-Reformation, notably Emperor Ferdinand II, and then incited them to crush Protestantism in their dominions by ruthless force. Let those who think the control of religious education a thing of little moment read the history of the suppression of Protestantism in the Tyrol or in Bohemia and Moravia, and they will not regard with indifference any attempt to indoctrinate youthful rulers, whether under sixteenth-century absolutism or under a twentieth-century democracy.

In the control of religious education lies the key to the future. The appeal to force in matters of religion seems to us not merely antiquated but abhorrent; and it is to be supposed that the Roman Catholics of America share this point of view. Smile cynically as one may at the appeal for toleration made by James II at the very time when the Grand Monarch just across the Channel was revoking Protestant liberties and harrying the Huguenots,

[22] Duhr, Jesuitenfabeln, 4th ed., 1–32.

the American Catholics from the days of Lord Baltimore to the present year of grace have been in a minority, and have consistently pleaded for liberty to worship God in their own way. Granted freedom, the fight will be to dominate education; and this end the Jesuits hope to secure through increased influence on school boards, and ultimately through the division of school funds. This they will be able to secure only on condition that they play politics successfully.

The political activities of the Jesuits have often resulted in failure. This is perhaps the universal experience of all who engage in such fascinating pursuits as politics; but in the nineteenth century they have suffered many a heavy defeat. They lost in opposing the union of Italy;[23] they lost on Napoleon III, and again on General Boulanger:[24] and their friend, Cardinal Merry del Val, the Secretary of State to the reigning Pope, probably lost when he sacrificed the *modus vivendi* offered by the French government and accepted by a majority of the French episcopate in 1906, through fear that if the separation of church and state worked too well in France it would straightway be tried in Spain.

In view of these facts, who can deny that the Jesuit actually has entered and does enter politics? Whatever their official Constitutions may say to the contrary, whatever novice-masters may tell their novices,[25] the leaders of the Order know very well what they want. Said a shrewd Italian observer seventy years ago: "There are three sorts of Jesuits. There are learned members of Loyola's Order who do not know much about its policy, and pious Jesuits who are fully persuaded that their Order is innocent. By the help of the first kind of Jesuits an impression is made on those who are intellec-

[23] W. R. Thayer, Life and Times of Cavour, 1911.
[24] Hoensbroech, II, 133 ff. [25] Ibid., 164.

tually well educated; by the second kind on pious souls. But behind these two stands the real Jesuitism, which is now more eager than ever before, and which aims at the old object of Jesuitism—a counter-revolution and a theocracy." [26] Boehmer, Tyrrell, and more plainly Hoensbroech and McCabe, give case after case where the Jesuits have interfered in politics, often to their discomfiture. The secrecy which is popularly supposed to hedge them about, as doth majesty a king, gives them a prestige beyond their deserts; but it also causes men to suspect them of much mischief which may not properly be laid at their door. They have sown secrecy, and have too often reaped suspicion and hatred; not merely among Protestants, to many of whom a live Jesuit would be as much a curiosity as a great auk, but among the Catholic laity as well. Country after country has expelled them from its borders, not merely in the era of Bourbon ascendency in the eighteenth century, but in the nineteenth;[27] and today their colleges are forbidden in France and Germany. Frequently as the Jesuits have been the victims of greed or blind hostility, one suspects that where there has been so much smoke there must have been some fire—not necessarily the fire of martyrdom.

III. The ethical influence of the Jesuits. Of all themes for lovers of good detective stories, what can surpass the doings of the confessor to princes? Here is secrecy, here is power, here may lie great achievement; here also may be concealed chicanery and the toleration of sin for the glory, shall we say? of God. Let us judge charitably that *tertium quid* which too often passes for a Protestant court preacher; but let us also demand an

[26] Quoted in F. Nielsen, History of the Papacy in the Nineteenth Century (1906), II, 91.

[27] W. Bornemann lists twenty-six times that various governments have officially expelled the Jesuits (Sind die Jesuitengegner "Lügner" und "Verleumder"? 1903, p. 39 f.).

account of the uttermost farthing from the priest who for the sake of peace makes a pact with hell. Skilled as some confessors may have been in ethical acrobatics, in due time their feet did slide; and frequent falls have made casuistry a by-word.[28] The root of the evil is the fact that the father-confessor is put into the position of a judge who must give the accused the benefit of the doubt, and thus lower the standard which should be held consistently high. No wonder that a decisive factor in the conversion of Hoensbroech was the appeal of Kant for the moral autonomy of the individual.

IV. Finally, let us consider the Jesuit as a factor in the history of education. After having turned from Mohammedan to home missions, Loyola specialized in education. For the first century of their existence the Jesuit colleges were probably superior to anything that the Protestants had to offer; therefore the *Ratio Studiorum* of 1585 is a pedagogical document of prime importance. On the side of discipline, the Society appealed not to the birch so much as to emulation. On the side of subject matter, it subordinated everything, including mathematics and the vernacular, to the mastery of Latin. When, however, Latin ceased to be the language of learning and of diplomacy, the educational ideal was out of date; yet with a conservatism worthy of a better cause, the Jesuits kept instruction essentially on the basis of the *Ratio Studiorum* from 1585 to 1832. They fell to the rear of the pedagogical procession. In spite of certain reforms in the nineteenth century, they are today important educational factors in but two modern countries—in Spain and in the United States.[29]

In education, ethics, politics, and in the Roman Church, the Jesuits are a power; yet in most countries their influence is on the decline. Their numbers and wealth

[28] Döllinger and Reusch, Geschichte der Moralstreitigkeit in der römischkatholischen Kirche; 2 vols. (1899).

[29] Boehmer, p. 293.

are constantly increasing; the Order counts nearly as many members today as in the palmy days before the Suppression. Typical as the Jesuits may seem to be of the plots or of the missionary heroism of the romantic past, they are destined to play a prominent part in the near American future. We must seek to understand them; and this we can do now better than ever before, thanks to their own learned publications, and to the far from infallible books of Boehmer, Tyrrell, Hoensbroech, and McCabe.

CONTEMPORARY PHILOSOPHIES OF RELIGION

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In the present essay I propose to compare certain typical religious philosophies, with a view to discovering what degree of religious hope they justify; or what, in view of the nature of reality, they make of religious ideals. Philosophy, viewing experience roundly, taking into account both the uttermost that man wants and the evidence of reality, has reached different conclusions as to the relation between the two, or as to the consequent status of religious values in the light of critical reflection. There seem to me to be four typical philosophical verdicts of this sort: *first*, that the ideals of religion are illusory and vain; *second*, that its ideals are self-sufficient, and independent of reality; *third*, that its ideals define, or coincide with, reality; *fourth*, that its ideals are progressively efficacious, or may be *realized*. These four philosophies of religion may conveniently be termed: *disillusionism*, *symbolism*, *idealism*, and *progressivism*.

1. By "disillusionism" I mean the view that utterly discredits the religious ideals. This view may be reached by an examination of reality, and the discovery that reality neither corresponds nor responds to ideals. Cosmic reality may reveal itself as inherently hostile or malicious, and so justify only pessimistic dread and loathing. Or it may assume an aspect of indifference, to which man must accommodate himself by preoccupation with secular affairs, or by a purely intellectual contemplation of its necessity. A similar view may be reached by an examination of the desiderative consciousness itself, and

the discovery that ideals are only instruments of torture, such that the effort to realize them only serves to reinstate them with their accompanying sense of suspense, deficiency, and failure. The only remedy is to cease from hope altogether and achieve entire renunciation. I do not think it necessary to estimate this type of philosophy from the standpoint of religious values, inasmuch as it defines its place at the lower end of the scale. It confines itself to the denial of positive values, or to the assertion of the negative value of relief from misery. It imputes no specific hopefulness whatsoever either to the cosmic reality or to the works of the religious imagination. The remaining types of philosophy of religion differ from this first in that they encourage hope. These three remaining types may be illustrated from contemporary thought by three books—Höffding's *Philosophy of Religion*, Hocking's *Meaning of God in Human Experience*, and Hobhouse's *Development and Purpose*.[1]

2. I am using the term "symbolism" somewhat loosely to mean that philosophy which proposes to confine religious value to the free creations of the religious imagination. Such a philosophy may agree with the first type in finding reality uncongenial to man's hopes, or it may find the facts doubtful; but in either case it invites man not to renounce his ideals, but to cultivate, cherish, and take refuge in them.

The chief significance of Höffding's *Philosophy of Religion* lies in its divorce of religion and metaphysics. The author professes himself to be idealistic in faith, and he even employs certain of the characteristic fallacies of idealism.[2] But he devotes the earlier part of his book to showing the theoretical invalidity of the distinctively religious ideas. These ideas give "no explanation of

[1] I do not mean to assert that any of these books is to be identified exclusively with that theory which I have chosen it to represent, but only that the theory in question is peculiarly characteristic of it.

[2] Op. cit., pp. 72–74.

special events," "are not capable of affording a conclusion for scientific thought," and "exhibit the character of figures rather than of concepts." "If," he proceeds, "the religious ideas are to have any significance at all, therefore, it can only be in serving as symbolical expressions for the feeling, the aspirations, and the wishes of men in their struggle for existence."[3] The feeling which is peculiar to religion is "the feeling which is determined by the fate of values."[4] Religion springs from the hope or assumption "that value will be preserved."[5] In expressing this hope, the imagination draws upon actual relations "between value and reality as experienced by us."[6] But it attaches to this relation a general or cosmic significance. "In all symbolisation, ideas taken from narrow although more intuitable relations are used as expressions for relations which, on account of their exaltedness and ideality, cannot be directly expressed. . . . A particular element of existence is promoted to be the most characteristic mark of the whole of existence; it is treated as though it entirely summed up the relation between value and reality given in experience."[7] And similarly myth, legend, and dogma involve the transference to relations and events of the external world of ideas strictly applicable only to inward or human relations.[8] In this extension they have only a poetical significance.[9] The function of religion lies in this faculty of forming symbols. The religious consciousness must entertain "no mistrust of the instinctive formation of re-

[3] Philosophy of Religion, p. 93. Owing to our scientific ignorance of those ultimate matters to which our religious ideas refer, Höffding refers to his view as "Critical Monism." He objects to the term "agnosticism," so it appears, only because this view "is inclined to assert that 'the Unknowable' is entirely different from everything that appears in experience." Cf. pp. 88, 89.

[4] Ibid., p. 107. [5] Ibid., p. 384. [6] Ibid., p. 376.

[7] Ibid., pp. 207, 208. [8] Ibid., pp. 199–203.

[9] Ibid., p. 207. Poetry is the only means of access to the "highest," and *may* be "a more perfect expression of the highest than any scientific concept could ever be" (p. 376). Were Höffding to claim to know what he here only ventures to suggest as possible, his philosophy of religion would pass over to the idealistic type.

ligious ideas," and must break down the present "barriers of creed and dogma" in order to be "free and positive" in its production.[10]

In judging this type of religious philosophy it is important, first of all, to recognize that religious ideals are avowedly regarded as expressions of human needs.[11] They signify not the most we know concerning existence at large, but what we like to think, the most hopeful cosmic notion that we can form. They are the cosmic analogies not of the necessary, typical, or most probable experiences of relation between value and existence, but of those selected experiences in which value is "conserved." Now if this were all, this type of philosophy would at worst be guilty of belittling religion by confining its values to the values of fancy or fiction. Religious ideals would possess value in so far as pretty, congenial, quieting, or stimulating. Man is surely entitled to avail himself of such values. But it is clear that they are values of small magnitude. They attach only to fleeting images, and they satisfy only momentarily, or in the last extremity. They are comparable to the purely sensuous aesthetic values, or to the medicinal tonics. There can be no objection to fiddling while Rome is burning, or telling Boccaccio-tales while the plague is raging, provided the fire and plague cannot be extinguished. The mirage is the greatest possible good to the man who is dying in the desert, provided no water is in reach; and there are doubtless situations which justify the ostrich in hiding his head in the sand. Such values are values of last resort, a consolation when all is lost. And provided such be indeed the human situation, a religion of deliberate picture-building stands justified.

But there is a second consideration that alters the aspect of such a philosophy of religion. The ideals of religion, its myths, legends, symbols, and dogmas, not

[10] Philosophy of Religion, pp. 208–209. Cf. p. 350. [11] Ibid., p. 207.

only spring from human needs, but *they are believed.* To this fact Höffding does not attach sufficient importance. He does not sufficiently emphasize the difference between the augur who sees the imaginative origin of these ideals and the layman who accepts them in good faith as an account of reality. Viewed in this light religious ideals become illusions—and as illusions they conflict with cognition; as when the ostrich for hiding his head in the sand fails to perceive and avail himself of means of escape. "What would make the preaching of the Gospel utterly impossible," says Santayana, "would be the admission that it had no authority to proclaim what has happened or what is going to happen, either in this world or in another. . . . Even the pagan poets, when they devised a myth, half believed in it for a fact."[12] In stating this undeniable truth Santayana has in mind the proposal of certain modernists to rid Christian dogma altogether of cognitive import. A dogma, according to LeRoy, remains the same, provided the conduct and feeling it inspires are the same. The dogma of transubstantiation is a means of stimulating a form of ritual or a kind of mystical experience.[13] But the fact is that dogmatic formulas not only refer to facts and events, but *mean* facts and events, together with all their implications. They generate plans and expectations consistent with their real meaning, and could not be varied in this objective reference without modifying the attitude of the believer. Suppose that a man plans with joy to go to New York to meet his sweetheart upon her arrival from Europe. The dogma in this case is the proposition that a real sweetheart is in fact arriving on a real steamer at a specific time and place. Suppose now that we substitute another formula. A rich uncle has died in New York and left the man a considerable fortune which is to be put into his hands by the executors. The plan and

[12] Kinds of Doctrine, pp. 32–33.

[13] Cf. Santayana: op. cit., p. 45, note.

the emotion are the same. He still leaves with great joy for New York, and perhaps by the same train. These two propositions then are dogmatically the same, or constitute the same dogma. But it is clear that their emotional and practical implications only very partially coincide. They will *not* in the long run lead to the same response. Nor could any two formulas be thus identical so long as they remained two in their reference to facts and events. Such identity could be obtained only by altering the dogma to read: "Good news from New York. Come at once. Imagine, if necessary, that your sweetheart has arrived from Europe or that a rich uncle has left you a fortune." But in this case the dogma consists in the first statement, which the man is asked to take literally. And note that if he were simply asked to imagine that there was good news from New York, he might play with the idea if he had nothing better to do; but he would do nothing about it, unless indeed he were unfortunate enough to succumb to its suggestive power and pass from conscious fancy to misleading and dangerous illusion.

In other words, religious ideals are ordinarily believed. As beliefs they determine action uniquely. And in that case the profitableness of the action depends on the truth and not on the hopefulness of the belief. Furthermore, the hopefulness of the belief is a positive danger in that it tends to lead to the acceptance of false belief, and so both to the loss of truth and the misdirection of action. If, on the other hand, religious ideals were universally regarded as the work of fancy, they would cease altogether to play the important rôle which they have filled in historical religions. The average worshipper would say with Bishop Butler: "Religion is true or it is not. If it be not, there is no reason for any concern about it."[14]

[14] From the Sermon on Self Deceit, quoted by Arnold, St. Paul and Protestantism, p. 239.

The fundamental objection to a religious philosophy of the type represented by Höffding lies in its obscuring the trivial amount of the values of the religious imagination, consciously recognized as such, when compared with the values of true belief, or of the cosmic reality which true belief may reveal. The risk of error far outweighs the advantage of subjective taste, peace, or buoyancy. At best these values should be regarded as supplementary or as compensatory, when the possibilities of truth and reality have been exhausted. Both the types of religious philosophy which remain recognize this principle. They look for religious values in the nature of things rather than in the content of ideals as such. They differ in that idealism regards ideals as determinative of reality or as possessing metaphysical validity, whereas realism or progressivism regards ideals as efficacious or capable of realizing themselves in time. Let us turn next to idealism.

3. Under the label of "idealism" I have here loosely grouped not only tendencies that are ordinarily so termed, but also tendencies that would usually be labelled pragmatism, mysticism, or absolutism. The common ground among these tendencies is the ontological status of the religious ideal. There is an important difference of method and argument between the version which would assert that "the ideal is the real" and the version which would assert that "the real is the ideal." The exponents of the former version would contend that ideals have ontological validity in proportion to the degree of satisfaction they afford. The very fact that an idea does express desire, aspiration, or hope would be taken as giving it a certain guarantee of truth. The exponents of the latter version would propose rather to render the ideal consonant with reality in its ultimate metaphysical aspect, or would find the ideal and the real in one deeper experience of the ideal-real. Thus Professor Hocking

would mean by reality "that which first is, and afterward is in accord with our purposes," by which he means, if I mistake him not, that reality prescribes our purposes. For reality to be independent of man means that man is dependent on reality.[15] Although I shall be dealing immediately with this latter version, I shall have in mind the fundamental contention common to both versions—the contention, namely, that the supreme reality and the supreme ideal are one and the same thing.

Professor Hocking thus records his acceptance of reality as the proper locus of religious values: "I believe, with McTaggart, that men have no right to the satisfactions which their religion affords them except as they earn that right by successful metaphysical thought. We cannot pass at once from our needs to the satisfaction thereof, without considering what that reality is from which we must obtain satisfaction. 'What people want,' says McTaggart, 'is a religion they can believe to be true'; than which nothing could be better said. . . . God can be of any worth to man only in so far as he is a *known* God."[16]

In what sense then is God known? Hocking's fundamental argument runs somewhat as follows: To know at all is to know socially. In knowing nature I share the content of other minds, and am acquainted with other minds as fellow-knowers. As our author expresses it, "we look at nature through the eyes of a social world." "This present world of nature *is* known by me as being, in just this sense, a common world: it seems to me, indeed, that it is *not otherwise known*—that is, that a knowledge of Other Knower is an integral part of the simplest knowledge of Nature itself."[17] God, I take it, appears upon the scene at the point at which Other Mind

[15] Meaning of God in Human Experience, pp. 161, 572.

[16] Ibid., pp. 214–215. [17] Ibid., pp. 280, 268, 269.

is capitalized; which is the point at which cognitive companionship is correlated with the permanent and orderly system of nature.[18]

But to be God in the religious sense this absolute and unfailing Other Mind must reconcile me unqualifiedly to my world. It must enable me to find perfection in things as they are, to find the most real also the most good. "We must find some worth in God," says Hocking, "that we cannot find in the forward look of evolution. . . . We must be free to open ourselves, wholly, in imagination and in fact, if need be, to the *whole* of human experience."[19] In short, though we know all that there is to be known, we must have no regrets. But how does the existence of a Knower of the cosmic order make this possible? There is only one clear answer that I can gather from our text. "The presence of a companion Mind, standing outside the arena of human effort with its contrasts of good and evil, may be found in experience to transmute evil into good."[20] "That pain which is taken in common, like effort which is carried on in common, is found through the association to lose its hardness."[21] In other words, whatever be the misery of existence or the tragedy of the spectacle it affords, God and I can endure it together. Like bereaved parents, we may extract a last consolation from the fact that we have each other.

In addition to this bare presence, gratifying to my social instincts, God is said to possess a certain moral value or "justice" in his impartiality, "a justice which so strongly resembles an indifferent treatment of the righteous and the unrighteous."[22] How this detach-

[18] I do not wish here to examine the validity of this argument, except so far as to say that it appears to me to illustrate the characteristic idealistic fallacy of identifying objects of knowledge with their cognitive rôle, and then inventing a type of cognition that shall sustain them during the lapses of finite cognition. I am here concerned not with the constructive arguments but with the religious import of the conclusion.

[19] Meaning of God in Human Experience, p. 218. [20] Ibid., p. 331.

[21] Ibid., p. 222. [22] Ibid., p. 331.

ment and impartiality is distinguished from the indifference of fate or mechanism is not clear. Even granting the author's doubtful claim that the essential morality of man is "that he make himself universal," one does not see that man is brought to this escape from his "self-enclosedness" any more effectually by the idea of a being that contemplates "the contrasts of good and evil" from above, than by such an idea of these contrasts as might be afforded by any secular generalization. And here, except for those who are privileged to enter into the mystical consciousness, the account of religious values ends. God is "an Other Mind," "an individual Subject, wholly active," "the Eternal Substance . . . . known as such," "the Eternal Order of things," "that which does whatever substance is found to do."[23] The net advantage which accrues to man from the existence or knowledge of such a being, is, apart from the immediate cognitive value itself, the moralizing value of detachment and the social value of a companion in misery. For the rest, one is left to acquire a taste for things as they are, or a poise of mind that shall enable one to face the facts without flinching. Except for the social value itself, these values are simply the values which man may manage to earn *whatever be the specific nature of the world.* And the social nature, as here defined, guarantees nothing whatsoever except a social relation as such. Its value would be great only in case of great extremity, or in case love could be so exclusively bestowed upon this abstract object as to make all other losses negligible.

We are told, however, that God has "a responsiveness of his own," a superlative lovableness, I take it, in which all values are somehow caught up and preserved, and that "herein lies the immediate experience of the personality of God."[24] But here again we are doomed to disappointment, as I fear must always be the case when

[23] Meaning of God in Human Experience, pp. 332, 336. [24] Ibid., p. 336.

we look to the report of the mystical consciousness. "I shall always be more certain *that* God is, than *what* he is." "Man knows well that he is not alone; he does not know so well in what companionship he is." "May it be that the mystic is more sure *that* he is sure than of *what* he is sure—except that he is sure of God and of his own relation to God?"[25] I gather from the balance of the text as well as from these admissions, that the mystical experience is essentially an experience of conviction. For some reason our author holds that "in these matters, the *that* actually precedes the *what*, both in time and in importance."[26] Why there should be any importance whatsoever in intensity of conviction so long as there is doubt as to its object, is difficult to see, unless indeed one falls back upon the hygienic value of the state itself. In any case, the mere existence of a peculiarly intense state of conviction which may attach itself to different objects cannot be regarded as evidence for any of these objects, and irresistibly suggests a subjective explanation.

There is the best of authority, as well as of evidence, for regarding mysticism as a type of emotionality, a subjective form of conviction, in which any content may be presented or any object judged. Mysticism may, as James has pointed out, be ascetic or self-indulgent, dualistic or monistic, personal or impersonal, naturalistic as with Walt Whitman, or supernaturalistic as with Saint Augustine or Bunyan. "The fact is," concludes James, "that the mystical feeling of enlargement, union, and emancipation has no specific intellectual content whatever of its own. It is capable of forming matrimonial alliance with material furnished by the most diverse philosophies and theologies, provided only they can find a place in their framework for its peculiar emotional

[25] Meaning of God in Human Experience, pp. 296, 317, 453–454.

[26] Ibid., p. 454.

mood."[27] The ideas precipitated by mystical experiences re-echo the normal experiences or thoughts of the time. Their importance or truth may be realized for the first time, but they are not original. "Generally speaking," says Höffding, "they have their source in the circle of traditional ideas with which the subject was already familiar, but which he had previously disregarded."[28] Thus Bunyan says of his Christian inspiration: "This made a strange seizure on my spirit; it brought light with it, and commanded a silence in my heart of all those tumultuous thoughts that before did use, like masterless hell-hounds, to roar and bellow and make a hideous noise within me. It showed me that Jesus Christ had not quite forsaken and cast off my soul."[29] Can one doubt that Bunyan in another age and environment and with another dogmatic tradition, would have interpreted the same experience in other terms?

The conviction itself is more simply accounted for than by the reality of the object which it reports. Is there any one who has not had an inspirational or ecstatic dream, from which he has alas! awakened; or a flash of insight that has felt profound only to turn stale or commonplace upon reflection? And can any one distinguish such illusory experiences from veridical insight except by the rationalizing consciousness? If the mystical experience is to be regarded as cognitive, it must be tested in sober moments of observation and analysis. Taken in its immediacy, it is equivocal and variable. That religious beliefs should assume a mystical intensity and vividness is well, *provided they be true.* There is a bathos in clearness and articulation, but there is no other purge from the confusion and error to which moods of inspiration are otherwise liable. The objection

[27] James, Varieties of Religious Experience, pp. 425, 426.

[28] Philosophy of Religion, p. 102.

[29] Quoted by James, Varieties of Religious Experience, p. 186.

to an appeal to the mystical experience lies not only in the doubtfulness or emptiness of its report but in its discrediting of the critical consciousness, so hardly won and so incomparably important.

In leaving this type of religious philosophy, let me restate in a word what seems to me to be its characteristic defect. We are to identify the consummation of hope with the totality of things as they are. But to accomplish this unnatural union, it proves necessary either to cultivate an acquiescence in things as they are, an acquiescence that may be tinged with a sort of sublimated love, provided reality be conceived as content of a universal mind; or to abandon the ordinary canons and tests of thought and acquire a mood of ecstatic conviction to which one imputes the maximum both of truth and value. In the first case, one adjusts hope to reality, which is always possible theoretically and even psychologically in the worst of worlds. Such an equilibrium is gained by the abandonment of all values save one's personal peace of mind. In the second case, one loses sight both of reality and of values, or at least of all values save the sensuous value of the ecstatic state itself. This type of religious philosophy, no less than the last, is a counsel of desperation, a last resort. I will not say that it is unjustifiable, but only that it is to be held in reserve until another possibility has been canvassed. This other possibility is the responsiveness of the cosmic reality to our concrete empirical preferences. I say "responsiveness" because I take it to be self-evident that our empirical interests are not already realized in the existing nature of things. But is there ground for believing that cosmic reality will eventually let us have our way; or that our interests may be efficacious and in the long run triumphant? Whatever be the answer, of one thing I feel certain, namely, that a favorable answer would be the best news that philosophy could report.

4. By "progressivism," then, I mean a philosophy of religion that justifies the naïve and daily practical hope that we may some day have those particular things which we want, such as wisdom, power, harmony, long life, virtue, friends, universal happiness, together with the removal of fear, pain, sin, death, and all the innumerable miseries that now beset us. If it could be shown that some hope of this empirical and differential kind is well founded, there would be so much the less need of the consolations of religion, or these consolations could be reserved to offset the residual misgivings that would abundantly remain.

Hobhouse's *Development and Purpose* is an inspiring example of patient philosophical research. Some twenty-six years ago, dissatisfied with what he took to be the theoretically premature and morally confusing spiritual philosophy of the Anglo-Hegelians, the author set to work to study the actual course of natural evolution, with special reference to the development of mind in animals and man, and the development of the human mind and will as exhibited in the history of society. The results of these investigations he published in two works: *Mind in Evolution* (1901), and *Morals in Evolution* (1906). In 1896 he had already published the result of his examination of fundamental concepts (*Theory of Knowledge*), especially as to the nature of mechanical causation and organism. He now gives us the larger generalizations which he believes the results of his previous special studies to justify. He presents his conclusion, he says, "not as something which is to satisfy all emotional cravings or end all intellectual doubts, not because it is artistically complete or even because it is proved with demonstrative certainty, but merely on the humble and prosaic ground that, on a complete and impartial review of a vast mass of evidence, it is shown to be probably true."[30]

[30] Development and Purpose, p. 372.

The conclusion falls into two parts, that based more strictly on "a comprehensive review of experience," and that attained by the analysis of the conception of causality. The review of experience establishes, in the author's judgment, the central place of self-conscious mind in natural evolution. The first stage is the development *of* mind, and the second the development *by* mind. Blind struggle and natural selection may have been the chief factors in bringing about the existence of man, but once established and enabled to function in its own characteristic manner, the human mind has introduced a new principle of correlation and harmony. The guarantee of the permanence of achievements of this type lies in the mind's power to assimilate and regulate those very forces which would otherwise disintegrate and annul it. "Only if mind should once reach the point at which it could control all the conditions of its life, could this danger be permanently averted. Now it seemed to me that it is precisely on this line that modern civilization has made its chief advance, that through science it is beginning to control the physical conditions of life, and that on the side of ethics and religion it is forming those ideas of the unity of the race, and of the subordination of law, morals, and social constitutions generally to the needs of human development, which are the conditions of the control that is required."[31]

The transition from this empirical generalization of history to the more fundamental or metaphysical view is made by an analysis of the conception of mechanism and teleology. An examination of the action of the organism reveals a determination of part by whole, and of present by future. In life, action is determined not merely *a tergo* and indifferently, but by its tendency to produce specific effects upon co-ordinate processes. We thus reach the definition of a purpose as "a cause conditioned in its operation by its own tendency," and of an

[31] Development and Purpose, pp. xxii–xxiii.

organic unity as a group of such causes governed by "the tendency of their combination towards a certain result."[32] This same *modus operandi* is characteristic of mind and of society. Is it also characteristic of the cosmic process as a whole? Hobhouse concludes that the larger synthetic operations of nature cannot otherwise be explained. I cannot here enter into the merits of the argument. He concludes that "the evolutionary process can be best understood as the effect of a purpose slowly working itself out under limiting conditions which it brings successively under control."[33] Both the empirical and the analytical arguments lead us "to conceive the world-process as a development of organic harmony through the extension of control by Mind operating under mechanical conditions which it comes by degrees to master."[34] As in the case of the previous types of religious philosophy, I shall not attempt to argue the strictly philosophical questions. Let me say only that a more careful, well-reasoned, and convincing examination of the question of purposiveness and progress it would be difficult to find. But what shall be said of the religious value of this type of philosophy?

First, as to its results. It attributes to the cosmic reality an actual working tendency in a forward direction coincident with man's hopes of first intent. It promises the fulfilment, through the complicity of the cosmic order, of those ends for which men are actually exerting themselves. It does not promise something else, or offer consolation for inevitable failure, or teach renunciation, but encourages the belief that the enterprise of civilization in which men are actually engaged, civilization with its concrete and specific values, will *succeed* in that historical future towards which its efforts are directed. It not only defines reality as friendly to man, but as friendly to man's actual interests. Furthermore, it endows man

[32] Development and Purpose, pp. 318, 319.
[33] Ibid., p. xxvi.
[34] Ibid., p. 372.

himself with power to make his way. Instead of teaching man's dependence on a power to whom he should be grateful for small favors, whom he should love as the dog licks the hand of the master that beats him, it teaches that the masterful will moves in him, giving assurance to his hopes and strength to his hands.

And this philosophy confirms not only the hopes of man, but also his moral judgment. Man is not asked to adjust his ideals to reality, but to persist in his ideals. He is encouraged to pursue with better heart and with a broader cosmic outlook the same end that moves him to earn his living, support his family, make much of himself, and exert himself to improve the state of mankind. These secular motives are taken up into what Chesterton calls "the oldest and the best of all causes, the cause of creation against destruction, the cause of yes against no, the cause of the seed against the stony earth, and the star against the abyss."[35] The religion which here finds justification is that religion of *service* which received its classic formulation a generation ago in the essays of John Stuart Mill. "A virtuous human being," he said, "assumes in this theory the exalted character of a fellow-laborer with the Highest, a fellow-combatant in the great strife; contributing his little, which by the aggregation of many like himself becomes much, towards that ascendency and ultimately complete triumph of good over evil."[36]

A word, finally, as to the method of religious philosophy which is represented by this work of Hobhouse. Its great merit, quite apart from the correctness of its results, lies in its clear recognition of comparative values. The values of reality itself, as these bear upon the actual human interest at stake, are of first and most momentous importance. And second in importance is correct knowl-

[35] Chesterton's Bernard Shaw, pp. 102–103.

[36] Three Essays on Religion, p. 116.

edge of this reality, in order that man may guide his action aright. The subjective and imaginative values must not be allowed to obscure the importance of the values of reality and true belief. Not that I would for a moment wish to discredit the values of fancy and subjectivity, or, for that matter, rob man of any atom of comfort which his faculties may enable him to extract from his lot. But it would be fatuous to seek consolation so long as, or wherever, it is possible to remove the need for it. If the spectacle of existence and destiny be unendurable, by all means let the lights be turned low; but man should see things in a *dim* religious light only, if need be, after he has seen them clearly. He should be satisfied to regard life as a predicament only after he is sure that it is not an opportunity. It is possible both to seek the best and be prepared for the worst. Discipline is justified because total success is impossible. Compensation is justified when failure is inevitable. If sober and vigorous thought does not justify hope, then man may well fall back upon his imagination, and nourish illusions that shall be flattering in proportion to their unreality. But this will take care of itself. The optimistic bias of the imagination is the one religious source that will never fail. It should be the part of a philosophy of religion to scan the cosmic horizon for signs that shall be as hopeful as possible but that shall first of all be trustworthy; so that if there be any chance of *really reaching the haven originally desired*, it shall not be lost from a too hasty resignation or abandonment to soothing distraction. A philosophy of religion, in short, should devote itself to the construction, not of the most hopeful belief, but of the most credible hope.

THE CHURCHES OF FRANCE AND THEIR SEPARATION FROM THE STATE

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It is a matter of common knowledge that during the last ten years the Churches of all denominations in France have been passing through a profound crisis. Such convulsions are not inevitably the death-agony of religion. Only the world's contempt or the world's forgetfulness could kill the Christian faith; but it is apt to be quickened rather than deadened by struggles for its life. Yet religion has a more subtle danger to encounter than the opposition of public authorities however violent. It is not impossible for the Church to be unconsciously seduced into imitation of her adversaries. She may come to make use of their methods. She may gradually slip downwards to the level of their spirit. So that, while prophesying among men as if she were the voice of God, her actions may be indistinguishable from those of a godless world. That is the danger. It is threatening the Church at this moment, and is more or less a menace to religion, everywhere and always.

Part First: The Catholic Church

Strange as it is, and unremarked as the fact may have been, the years which followed the disastrous war of 1870 saw the Catholics becoming or remaining masters of France. From the President of the Republic to the humblest functionary of the State, from the top to the bottom of all officialdom, military as well as civil, Cath-

olics held the ground, and Catholicism was deferred to. How is it that in the few years which have elapsed since, they have fallen so low and are now reduced to short commons? To begin with, one cannot help seeing that during their more prosperous period Catholics were malcontents. Religious enthusiasm was wanting. Had this been otherwise, if as a body they could have risen to the spiritual nobility of a de Mun, whose heart drew an uplift and a baptism from the terrible defeat he witnessed on the field of battle, so as to hear in it but a summons to a splendid moral resistance, how glorious had been the prospect to Catholic ambitions! But alas! let there but arise to agitate France a self-seeking, mischief-making, and bungling General Boulanger, and forthwith the whole Catholic body wheels after him, and follows his blundering lead. Or again, let a new and grave crisis arrive, as was the Dreyfus affair, pushing home to the individual conscience problems on whose just settlement the very foundations of society rested, then what happened? This happened: The Catholics ranged themselves on the side of order, it is true; but at the same time identified their party foolishly with the side of moral confusion. Nevertheless, when in 1901 Waldeck-Rousseau, then the President of the Council, carried a law through the Assembly against the teaching and trading Congregations, it is not necessary to believe that he did so with the idea of retaliation. He was shocked at the wide gulf between the Catholic and lay mind. He desired that the State should be in a position to exercise permanent regular control over the instruction given to young Catholics. Standing up against the Congregations encroachment has been carried on in France many times in its past history. Royalty has from time to time set an example of resistance. The secular clergy themselves have often been among the foremost to call a halt. But under Waldeck-Rousseau the temper of the times was

changed, so that what had been hitherto on the side of the laity nothing more than a defensive wall against the encroachment of the Congregations was converted into a policy of aggressive attack. Combes, a former Seminarist, having succeeded Waldeck-Rousseau as President of the Council, took advantage of the covenant of lay resistance against the Church power which had put his predecessor in the chair, and proceeded to open battle not only with Catholicism, but against the very idea of religion. His manner of dealing with the issue was more than coarse. No citizen with any feeling for liberty and justice could approve such conduct unreservedly. No man of religious ideals could fail to be disgusted at the outrageous harshness and frequent displays of passionate hostility which marked the administration's methods. While all this is true, however, there must be an explanation for the success of the government's vigorous policy, for the majority which steadily sustained it, and for the futile barrenness of the opposition it has met with. The explanation in a word is this. The bulk of the French nation were frightened. They were frightened both by the Catholics' openly defiant reactionary temper, and even more by their supposed plottings and conspiracies. They were eager to be delivered from it all. The explanations of the clericals are often shallow. Their favorite phrase is "the influence of Jewish gold." But, thank God, great events in human history are derived from deeper causes. As is the case in the strifes of nations, so has it been here. The French Church and the French State went to war with one another simply because one, or rather both, of the parties desired there should be war. At first the government wanted it. After a while, the civil authorities, out of breath, were more anxious to compromise than not. By this time however, Rome had become exasperated, and was unwilling to give way. Combes picked a quarrel with the

Pope, because his Holiness protested against the visit of the French President, M. Loubet, to the Italian Court, and added fuel to the fire by mixing himself up at the same time with the ecclesiastical relations of certain bishops, Monsignors Geay and le Nordez, who at that particular moment were on bad terms both with the inhabitants of their respective dioceses and also with the Pope himself. What the rights of the bishops' case were, it is not important for us to know. One thing is certain, the French government in June, 1904, took advantage of the opportunity to break off diplomatic relations with the Vatican and recall its ambassador. It is hinted in some quarters that a movement is beginning to show itself just now to resume official relations. So far, however, France continues, as it has been for the past nine years, without an ambassador at the Vatican. The separation of the Churches from the State was definitely voted by the Chambers in the following year. And thus, though not without some opposition, was at last accomplished a reform, which had had a place upon the programme of advanced republicans for more than half a century. A number of different bills had been offered upon the subject, only to be immediately thrown out, as being frankly hostile to religion itself as well as to the Catholic Church. The measure brought in by M. Briand, however, a member of the Cabinet, met a better fate. The bill he introduced was not benevolent to the Churches, since it ruled out from State remuneration all religious officials alike. But under the new name of "worship associations" he permitted the Church organizations to continue, and even to progress morally, under strict financial limitations. Needless to say, a law which was so novel an experiment, and which affected the interests of the people so deeply, would need to be retouched at many points, according as experience of its results should gradually point out. With a little tact and patience the

Catholics might have parried direct injury to religion and have prepared to adapt themselves to the new situation. But Rome does not believe in evolution nor officially, in adaptation. Strange as it may seem, at the time when the bill was introduced no one expected that it would pass. Surely something out of the ordinary would happen to prevent it. The most amazed man, when the law was actually voted, was the head of the Department of Religion, M. Dumay (Ministry of Home Affairs), against whom it has since been proved that he actually conspired with the Clericals to prevent the bill's passage. Instead of clinging to a system which was tottering to its downfall, the Catholics might, as we said, have made prudent preparations for the new order. Such a policy however would have required some active co-operation, however discreet, with the French government; and this, the Vatican—I do not say the Catholics —repeatedly and absolutely refused to allow.

The question arises, what might have been the effect of the new law upon the life of the Catholic Church? From the moral point of view, the papal authority was strengthened. Formerly two powers, the Roman hierarchy and the French government, co-operated together in directing the affairs of the Churches. Now there is but one administrator. The government's administration is effaced. Rome, appointing her bishops without an intermediary, no longer needs to have any understanding as to the matter with the State. So much the better then for the Pope; he has recovered his old exclusive rights, and is delivered from State interference.

On the other hand, the Catholic Church loses a large amount of money. The suppressed religious budget is some thirty-five millions of francs. Even here, however, it might have got some advantage. The effect upon the people of being compelled to raise so large a sum for the

very subsistence of religion may have had some influence in attaching them to their Churches. What is more serious is the loss of the free use of their vicarages, of the archbishop's palaces, and of the seminary buildings. It was provided that they should belong to the State or to the Commune after some few years. The time of grace originally allowed was too short; but the refusal to accept the law reduced it to a single year. The law, moreover, was too harsh in its manner of dealing with the compensation of the clergy. Only those who were forty-five years old and had been recipients of State remuneration for not less than twenty years, could receive a life-pension. Others who could not come up to these conditions—men in active duty—saw their emoluments gradually fall to nothing in the course of four years. Surely there ought to have been shown some degree of respectful and moderate treatment while the law was taking these men's living from them, instead of the sudden harshness which was actually employed. One of the bishops saw himself brought in a year's time nearly to the point of actual starvation.

While it cannot be denied that the material losses, and by natural consequence the injury to its moral influence, which the Church in France has sustained, have been very great, on the other hand it must likewise be recognized that if she had submitted to the law she would have succeeded in preserving for herself no small measure of her enormous wealth. The truth deserves to be openly proclaimed that the government had no intention of seizing the Church's patrimony. This amounted to three hundred and fifty-one millions of francs, the property of the parishes, of the Cathedrals, of the archdioceses, or to speak more strictly, of the religious edifices, and their "chapters" or trustees. The law in its fourth Article contemplated the transference of the respective endowments to the new religious "Associations"; while the

eighth Article made the Council of State responsible for the equitable carrying out of this arrangement. While there was thus needed some delicacy of administration, yet the law itself was not impossible; neither was it of such a nature as to diminish popular respect for religion or its institutions. Why then has the Church become so transformed as it now is? Why is it that at the present time her aspect is one of such disorganization and disorder as to justify a member of the government in declaring, from the Senatorial Tribune, in the year 1908, that the French Republic had no interest in and did not concern itself with the present anarchical condition of the Catholic religion? "*Le gouvernement de la République n'avait pas intérêt à cet état anarchique de la religion Catholique.*" We propose to find the answer to this question by examining the events with some care, in the order of their sequence.

Once the law of Separation was passed, to their amazement, in December, 1905, there was but one thing for the Catholics to do, namely to await the Pope's official mandate. During the following February this appeared in the Encyclical, "*Vehementer nos.*" It condemned severely the new order of things, especially on these two grounds: first, the danger of the predominance of the laity; secondly, the impossibility of trusting the Council of State (the Supreme Court) with the solution, or with the right to arbitrate the differences which would possibly arise. This condemnation of the principle underlying the law was no surprise. The Pope could not but pronounce condemnation upon any Civil law presuming to affect the Church. He further gave notice in his mandate that what were called "practical" instructions were to follow. These would direct the conduct of the clergy in their new circumstances, which they could not avoid examining attentively. Three days later, Mgr. Merry del Val communicated to the Archbishop

of Paris a list of the questions which the assembled bishops were to examine at their meeting in the month of May. About the same time Mgr. Fulbert-Petit, of Besançon, made the remark that such an assembly of bishops was a favorable sign; compliance with the law might not be an impossibility.

The Commission on preparations for the meeting consisted of five archbishops, and two of the most distinguished bishops, men who welcomed the idea of making an experiment of the law's practical operation. The business transacted at the Plenary Assembly was at first kept secret. The following details, however, came out later. Each of the bishops on coming to his seat in the House found in front of him, in his place, the Fulbert-Petit proposal, as to the possibility of organizing new "Associations." He had also before him a confidential memorandum by Mgr. Fuzet, of Rouen, discussing the subject of worship Associations in Germany. An additional argument on that side of the question was a recent article by the archbishop of Paris loyally approving the new system of things contemplated by the law. Three subjects were voted on in the meeting: first, a complimentary address to the Pope (obviously *de rigueur* in the circumstances), which was passed with only two dissenting votes; secondly, it was decided by forty-eight against twenty-eight that it was expedient to try some *modus vivendi;* thirdly, fifty-six against eighteen adopted favorably the scheme of the archbishop of Besançon as to the possible organization of new "Associations." Notice too that in March of that same year the petition to the bishops had already appeared, called the Petition of the "Green Cardinals" (an allusion to the fact that several of the most distinguished signers were members of the *Institut de France,* whose official dress includes a coat with green embroidery), expressing a fear that civil war would ensue if the "Associations" were not

accepted. And still further, the public press, newspapers of the highest standing (like the *Journal des Débats* and the *Temps*) published some articles insisting that a representative lay element ought to be included, and take part in the administration of the Churches.

Put together the facts above named, and the conclusion is inevitable that at the time referred to, the entire body of enlightened pious and active Catholics were cordially in favor of endeavoring to comply with the new law, in spite of its imperfections. Especially is it noticeable that the great majority of the clergy were disposed to accept the new "Associations." But while the country was once more waiting in expectation of light from Rome, there came instead, in August of the same year, 1906, a thunderbolt, in the shape of the Encyclical "*Gravissimo*," which stunned even the foremost champions of the altar. This rejected the law, root and branch. It would accept no compromise whatever. It cut every cable, as it were, which connected "The Ship of Our Lady" with the now accursed shore of the French Republic. This document from Rome contained an extraordinary and almost inexplicable intimation that not only had the Vatican rejected the new law absolutely, but that the recently held Episcopal Assembly had done the same thing. Now what is the explanation of this strange piece of news? What was it that actually took place? The fact has come to public knowledge that the bishop of Orléans, Mgr. Touchet, one of the minority who voted against any compromise with the Government, had caused a statement to be sent to the Pope, to the effect that his own antagonism to the bill, however it might not be the attitude of the majority, was nevertheless the view which was actually held by the most influential bishops in France. It is also known that at that very time, Mgr. Fuzet, the author of the scheme which the bishops had approved, was denounced to His Holiness as a "moderate" by the Vice-Nuncio

Montagnini; and moreover, it is also known that at this juncture the dominant French influence at Rome was in the hands, not of the French Cardinals or French Clergy, but of a small group of mere politicians, of whom two among three were atheists, and who insisted on having the new law rejected. The thoughtful reader will ask himself, however, how do we know all this? What is the use of mixing up history with a lot of uncorroborated gossip? Our reply is: We have documentary proof in the papers which were seized at the Nuncio's quarters, when Montagnini was put out of office. These papers expose clearly this person's conversations and correspondence with the clerical leaders, and show us therefore the Catholic hierarchy checked and checkmated by the active interference of a set of people, who, with no papal warrant, assume the position of established masters of the bishops and other dignitaries of the Church, and boldly denounce them accordingly. We who are outside cannot comprehend how "the successor of Jesus Christ" could allow such men and such proceedings to be used in the interest of his cause. We believe this fact to be a weak point in the Catholic Church. A Jesuit Father frankly admitted, on the day after the Encyclical, the distrust, terror, and dismay of Catholic circles. If the Roman Curia desired to test the loyalty of the French clergy, certainly it has succeeded. Without protest, without a murmur, they have bowed the head to the gale, which has burst upon them. What is in their hearts, what are the secret thoughts of these accused bishops, as they find themselves doomed to be ignored for the future by the French government, while they are ruled by their own chief with a rod of iron, who shall say? Think of that poor Bishop Lecamus, formerly bearing to the second Plenary Episcopal Assembly, in September, 1906, the papal sanction of his proposal on the subject of diocesan administration, and then receiv-

ing, like a blow in the face, a telegraphic message sent from Rome, and read to him by the notorious Montagnini, cancelling that sanction. The blow struck home to the bishop's heart; he withdrew from the place and died. A certain Breton Cardinal received something like three thousand abusive letters, because he had ventured to make the remark that compromise with the law was not impossible.

During that same year, 1906, the public mind was excited to disorder and resistance almost everywhere, by the government's proceeding to make inventories of the properties of the Church. The agitation arose, not unnaturally, in this way: since the Churches were to revert to the State, and since the State for this reason had to make an exact statement of every detail which the sacred edifices contained, it was unavoidable that the civil power should set its detested foot even within the limits of the sanctuaries. This act, harmless in itself, but in the eyes of the more militant Catholics a symbol of worse to follow, was moreover just the kind of offense which would make an easy pretext for exciting unreasoning anger, and for instigating the people to defy the law. It is proved by the Montagnini papers that Merry del Val himself, understanding the situation, availed himself of the opportunity to spread public disorder. The doors of the Churches were barricaded. A few State officers, who of course were in no position to defend themselves, were drenched with water or otherwise treated roughly. Yet in all this there was nothing very tragic or even serious, any more than there could be said to be anything of real religion. The outside look of things, however, was sufficient to spread in Rome the idea that the French people was holding itself ready for mortal combat; whereas, on the contrary, at that very time it was desiring nothing more than what it always does desire, namely, peace. In several localities the

inventory proceedings brought to light a curious condition of mind among what we have to call the Catholics "*du nouveau style*." These people were more zealous than their curé, whose commands indeed they expressly disobeyed. The best known, though not the only example, was the Church of St. Clothilde in Paris. The parish priest protested in the most explicit manner: "If the curé is no longer master in his own Church, if the bishop is no longer master in his own diocese, if the Pope is no longer master in the Church Universal, there is an end to all respect for the hierarchy, there is an end to the principle of authority, which is the soul of the hierarchy, there is an end of Catholicism. If there exist a new species of Catholics who claim they have the right to overturn the traditional order, their extraordinary claim cannot be fought too strongly." How many bishops and parish priests have *thought* the same thing without being ready to say so!

In December, 1906, the Church not having accepted the new law, nothing remained but that the Episcopal palaces and ecclesiastical seminaries had to be evacuated, and temporary provision, however poor, made for the accommodation of the inmates. One eager effort after another was made first by the bishops, and later by members of the Parliament, to find a scheme of compromise. The second of the Bishops' Plenary Assemblies appointed three of its members to negotiate secretly with the government as to the possibility of creating "Associations" which should be both canonical and legal. Here and there, in spite of the Pope's prohibition, religious Associations actually arose. Well-disposed members of the laity took the initiative. Success, however, could not be reasonably expected. It was waste labor to work against the Pope; it was equally so to work without him. The movement too had a certain smell of schism about it, and naturally enough its attempts were followed by the condemnation of Rome.

In this melancholy year a humorous note was struck at Bordeaux by Cardinal Lecot, and by an Association which he had founded in that diocese. This Society had received the Pope's toleration. One fine day during a debate in the Chamber, the Minister, M. Briand, replied to a question of Jaurès, that Mgr. Lecot's Association was "in conformity both with the law of France and with the law of religion." This was doing an ill turn to the poor Cardinal, inasmuch as Rome had distinctly prohibited the creation of these institutions. Shocked and startled out of his wits, the good man sent a categorical denial. All the same, however, he had actually been guilty of forming, without knowing it, a "worship Association." On the strength of the toleration which the Pope had granted to Lecot, the bishop of Tarentaise solicited Rome's permission to set up in his Alpine diocese an Association like it, and received in reply an unqualified refusal.

There was a time when the Catholics feared that at the expiration of the term fixed by law (December, 1906) the government would deprive them of their churches, in which case they must have resorted to worship in private houses. But in October, 1906, the government made the announcement that the faithful would be allowed to continue the use of the church buildings, on condition of making some simple formal declaration. Rome, however, after hesitating a little, forbade the acceptance of this offer. In January, 1907, the government, still with the hope of alluring the Catholics into adopting a *modus vivendi*, passed an act permitting the Churches to form themselves into "Associations" of common law. Some days later Rome rejected the offer, saying that it aggravated the offensiveness of the previous proposition. In spite of these discouragements however, a third Plenary Assembly of the bishops was convoked with the same object as before—to discuss and

try to discover what would be their best course. After some vague and fruitless discussion, one of the prelates proposed that each parish priest should enter into a contract with his mayor, for the use of the church building. The assembled bishops accepted the proposition; and most surprising of all, the Pope, when he was consulted, did the same. But after the bill was drawn, his Holiness objected to a certain clause inserted by the government, prohibiting foreign monks from acting as parish priests on the ground that it was "vexatious." Thus the whole scheme of accommodation completely broke down once more, and the last chance vanished of an honest and equitable common understanding. The cause of the failure was mutual hatred and bitter feeling. This, whenever it reached a certain degree of irritation, converted each difficulty as it arose in the controversy into a fresh obstacle to reconciliation. So well was this state of things understood by the members of the government that after a while they ceased altogether making proposals of any kind. They felt that the mere fact of their offering a suggestion doomed it to rejection. This distrust on Rome's part can easily be understood. "*Timeo Danaos, et dona ferentes.*"

On the other hand, M. Briand was ready to welcome individual propositions which had the look of being helpful to the Church in its present desperate condition. Thus he was glad to accept the proposal made by the Abbé Lemire [the solitary priest among the deputies] whose tall form in the Chamber commanded the respect of the entire body, the Clericals alone excepted. The Abbé asked if the Mutual Benefit Societies, which the priests would form under common law, would receive from the State the funds which had formerly been in the hands of the Church for the benefit of the aged clergy. An amendment to this effect was passed. Thereby an amount of nineteen millions of francs out of the Church's

wealth might have been saved. M. Lemire expressed an additional wish that the same funds as before should continue to be employed in keeping up the masses for the benefit of the "pious Founders." M. Berger proposed the amendment in the Senate, and here also it was accepted.

The passage of this bill by the French Parliament was thus a very great benefit to the Catholics, not only morally but materially, since it preserved to them as much as a fifth part of the former ecclesiastical property —a capital of forty-eight millions of francs. Mgr. Fuzet forthwith hastened to Rome to point out how opportune, at this critical moment, the Mutual Benefit Act was, and on his return made this announcement to the Press. He said, "I limited myself when in Rome to putting the question, 'Will it be possible for the Ecclesiastical Benefit Societies to form themselves into acknowledged Associations?' To this the Holy Father answered, 'I give my consent.'" It was too good, however, to be true. Only a short time after, the Roman newspapers denied that any such authority had been given by the Pope, inasmuch as a merely oral approval was insufficient. In short, Rome rejected the Ecclesiastical Benefits proposal made by Mgr. Fuzet, as she had rejected all the rest. Presumably the Curia did not want to put itself under obligation either to M. Lemire, a republican, or to Mgr. Fuzet, who was a liberal; or else she was aiming to keep the French Clergy closely in her own grip. But it was a blow, and one that had the look of cruelty; since it struck both at the aged clergy, and also at the pious endowments bequeathed by the dead. All this was sacrificed. The only palliation was the papal announcement at the time, that "the departed Founders would have the benefit of two thousand masses, said on their behalf by the French monks in Rome."

What after all are the results to religion which have been produced by the Separation? They are not so

important as one might think. Looking at the Churches from the outside, nothing is changed. The priests continue saying mass in the same Churches as before. The faithful continue to attend more or less numerously, according to time and place. Here and there there is a country church abandoned, or another threatened by decay. All the world knows how hard Barrés labors, and what talent he displays in his effort to save these sacred walls (yet he is not a believer). Bishops' palaces are turned into libraries or museums, and seminaries have their quarters changed into barracks or colleges. This is the look of things upon the surface. The Separation has brought to light the wealth of some dioceses, and emphasized the poverty of others. If at Toulouse, Montauban, Lille, the archbishop has found a palace to live in, the archbishop of Tarentaise in the Alps is lodged like a pauper. The only bishop who continues to occupy his episcopal residence is the bishop of Rodez, and he does so by paying rent. But what is more serious is the falling off of funds in nearly all the dioceses, together with the scarcity of candidates for the ecclesiastical vocation. The bishop of Perigueux complains in 1910 that the subscriptions in his diocese are ridiculously small. Of the five hundred parishes in the diocese of Bayonne, only one-half pay the amount needed. Paris, Lyons, and Lille alone cover their expenses. Yet even here in Paris, the very richest parishes—St. Honoré d'Eylau, St. Philippe du Roule, the Madeleine—are like the rest in showing diminished receipts. The first announcement of Separation was defied by Catholic enthusiasm. This gradually failed, however, and the efforts of the people relaxed. At the same time, as an offset to these depressing results, in the great centres at least, the fact is undeniable that there is more practice of religion than there was before. The faithful have begun to feel that they owe a duty to their Churches. Persecution is

apt to re-kindle faith which long-continued ease had made lukewarm; or, to put it otherwise, the wind which blowing on the hearth scatters the ashes, revives at the same time the languishing sparks. So that the result of the Separation on the whole was a distinct revival of Catholic activity especially in the cities.

The bishops felt on their part they now enjoyed greater freedom. They no longer dreaded vexatious annoyances, or deprival of their emoluments at the hands of the prefect, nor displacement from their office for a mere casual expression of irritation. But the liberty which they gained politically they soon found they were in danger of losing ecclesiastically. First, the Pope suppressed Plenary Episcopal Conventions. Curiously enough, it was a heretic, M. Paul Sabatier, a man very well informed as to Roman affairs, who on the 11th of August, 1907, was able to announce in the London *Times*, that the Plenary Conventions would for the future be discontinued, while the poor archbishop of Paris, one of the highest Catholic dignitaries in France, was actually making his preparations to hold the Conferences in December. This shows how little the Curia troubled itself about the French clergy. Three days later, on the third of December, this suppression was announced in the Roman *Corrispondenza* (the official paper). The country parts of France have certainly suffered from the Separation, whatever may be the case as to the cities. This was to be expected. A rural environment, with a regular life of patient toil, imparts a repose and balance of disposition, which through being habitual become men's second nature, and which, if destroyed by any cause, it is almost impossible to restore. The understanding had hitherto been that the government should pay on the people's behalf the salaries of the clergy, in return for their administration of baptism, confirmation, marriage, and burial. Now,

however, Catholics are told that for the future they themselves are to be responsible for the clergy's maintenance—an announcement which, at first, however it may be later, they refused to believe or to agree to. The country clergy, on their part, do not regret their new freedom from the dictation of superiors, nor the abandonment of the idea of creating religious "Associations." But where and how are they to get their bread? Already hundreds of their number have taken up different forms of secular work—stock-raising, bee-raising, farming, printing, and the like. Candidates for the sacred office, according to statistics published by M. de Narfon, have decreased in all the dioceses, sometimes by as much as one-half. Parents find that since the State no longer guarantees priests' salaries, livelihood by the sacred profession is too precarious. Even the bishops point out in their charges the life of persecution to which the clergy are subjected. How then can parents be expected to devote their sons to such a destiny?

"*Spies and a Reign of Terror.*" In his keen and striking book, *Le Bilan de la Séparation*, M. de Narfon gives the above heading to his final chapter; and in the course of it makes the remark that even at dinner-parties among the clergy, the guests, if tempted to talk freely about ecclesiastical affairs, keep a careful eye upon their company. At a clerical dinner-party, a soutane might conceal a Roman telltale more successfully than in certain salons the evening dress of a gentleman would conceal a professional police spy. Who would like to dedicate his son or his friend to spend his life in such an atmosphere? It is nothing less than stifling. No wonder that the candidates for the priesthood are few.

What we have been saying naturally suggests the subject of the Modernist movement in France. So far as the features of this are common to other Catholic countries, the reader may be referred to Paul Sabatier's enthusiastic,

too enthusiastic, *Les Modernistes;* and above all to a few chapters in Gaston Riou's recent book, *Aux Écoutes de la France qui vient;* where he sketches the disillusions he found when he came to close quarters with the Modernist *élite.* At this point, however, we should like to point out briefly the different currents of thought and feeling which are now stirring modern Catholic France.

The previous pages have shown the operation of a certain influence which has not only opposed the policy of the bishops but many times succeeded in reversing it. This influence is that of the monastic Congregations—as for example the "Assumptionists"; whose newspaper organ, *La Croix,* is sent to the very smallest villages, to the curé in his vicarage, to the proprietor in his château, and to every notorious bigot in the community. With regard to this paper I affirm distinctly, with sorrow and quite without ill-will, that the prevalent tone of its columns is violent and sometimes vulgar. Its insults and calumnies are as mordant and corrosive as a chemical acid and produce typical excitement. It stands as a religious herald, but it upholds religion even by violent means, and that is against true Christianity; and being read by the clergy everywhere, the result is that the future prospects of any unfortunate curé denounced by it as a liberal are blasted beyond repair. Another newspaper, *L'Action Française,* ably edited and addressed to the "Intellectuals," is the organ of the more self-confident reactionists. They are clever in organizing public attacks against such as do not hold their narrow-minded patriotic views. They are royalists, and being such, though not necessarily personal believers, they pose as partisans of the Catholic Church; though not infrequently their newspaper contains what are nothing less than insults to the moral teaching of Christianity and to the person of Jesus Christ. Why the Church does not repudiate such allies is a mystery. On the other

hand, Marc Sangnier, a man of high moral character and unimpeachable orthodoxy, founded a League which he called "*Le Sillon*," and which some years ago counted among its members a considerable number of priests with a large band of enthusiastic young laymen. M. Sangnier himself is a man of exalted personal faith, which in his lectures he never attempts to disguise. What happened? The Pope dissolved the League, demanding the personal submission of M. Sangnier; who now, for fear of excommunication, can only conduct noiselessly his paper, *La Démocratie*. In 1908 two other orthodox periodicals, *La Vie Catholique* and *La Justice Sociale*, were suppressed by the Curia. Surely these unexplained proceedings compel us to suspect that their actual inner motive was hostility to the democratic republican spirit which these journals represented. Contrast with this conduct the treatment of the atheistical but royalist newspaper, *L'Action Française*, and we are driven to the conclusion that Rome regards the politics of her children as more important than their faith. Not that she is humanly illogical in doing so, since the government of the Republic is anti-clerical. All the same, this is a dangerous attitude. When the Church identifies herself with any political party, she lowers her sacred dignity in the eyes of her own children, and still more in the opinion of those who are inimical or indifferent to religion. Becoming thus identified, she rises and falls with the party's vicissitudes of fortune; she shares its occasional contempt; she lessens, if not forfeits, her authority over souls; she puts herself on a level, in the eyes of her own servants of whatever rank, with the low quarrels of political elections and the cackle of the political press. An earthly government which denies the existence of a God may descend as low as it likes without being illogical. But surely the institution which represents Jesus Christ in the world has not the moral

right to be equally vile. It is the terrible misfortune of Catholic Christianity in France that the religious enthusiasm and the ardor of its best children not only are of no use to them under present conditions, but may be said, on the contrary, to cause their ruin, whenever their relations with the Vatican are not perfect and their opinions are not identical with the pronouncements of the Curia. Shocking is the state of things when a moderate writer like Paul Sabatier, who is in sympathy with Catholicism, has to pronounce upon its present character the following fatal criticism: "The Curia issues its commands. These commands are obeyed. But alas! the obedience of such true Catholics as honestly mean to serve God and not to make use of Him for their own service, is despondent and discouraged, and they feel even scandalized."

Part Second: The Protestants

The Protestant world has been less excited by the law of Separation than the Catholic. In spite of the new burdens which it imposes, in spite even of the divisions among them which the change was ready to introduce, Protestants, taken as a whole (leaving out the Lutherans, who were often partisans of the Concordat, being more "ecclesiastically" minded than the "Reformed") have for a long time been calling for the order of things which the present new law brings with it. Long ago the Protestant current fell apart into two streams of tendency, which, though they differed greatly in point of doctrine, were very similar, strangely enough, in their modes of worship and their moral life. The recent removal of the embracing bond of the Concordat resulted, not in uniting these two currents, but in driving them more obviously apart. It soon appeared that a united General Assembly of all the Reformed was im-

possible. The orthodox would have none of it. Doubtless they had their reasons. There was a group of "Moderates," whose peculiar combination of fervor in religious and social affairs with championship of liberty in theological opinion gave a moment's hope that reconciliation might be brought about; even though some of their leaders, Wilfred Monod, Gounelle, and others, were handicapped as peacemakers by their recent notorious abandonment of the Orthodox Synod precisely on the question of the new Protestant organization. However that may be, in October, 1906, the moderates summoned all the Churches in France to send representatives to an Assembly to be held in Jarnac (Charente). Very few orthodox attended. The Assembly itself was only saved from failure—but it *was* saved—by the lofty eloquence of Charles Wagner, who at the critical instant was powerful enough to inspire and fill men's hearts to the full with the spirit of peace and union. Then and there a Society was founded, which, "outside of and above party considerations," was to unite together all Churches which were disposed to prefer religious to ecclesiastical unity. This seemed encouraging. Soon however the fact came out, in spite of the desire of the "Founders," that against their intentions they had actually created a third group of Churches, intermediate between the "orthodox" and the "liberals." This new bent was probably the inward thought of most of the Protestants. But many of the laity saw in this proceeding a step in the direction of rationalism—the *bête noire* of those familiar with the story of Scherer and Colani. Besides this, the Churches of the "orthodox" tendency having made prudent preparations, the shock of the Separation found them duly organized and equipped for the consequences. This consideration greatly influenced the decision of many of the Churches when the time came to decide to what

party they should attach themselves. How could they be rash enough to throw in their lot with a vague "Association of Jarnac," which possibly the next day might be non-existent! How could they separate themselves from their traditional root, the Reformed Evangelical Church, which assured them of their future! I should hesitate to assert this in writing, if it were not that I have it directly from the lips of pastors, whose Churches actually stuck to the orthodox ranks. Optimists might encourage the hope that the orthodox would gradually go over to the moderates. Nothing of the sort happened for this reason: in consequence of a request from many of the liberals to be allowed to join the moderates, moderates and liberals have been steadily drawing together, until last year they came to the point of fusion with each other. Notice too, that now for some time many of the liberal Churches, awaking out of their lethargic isolation, have been welcoming with joy the hand reached out to them by a number of the old orthodox at Jarnac, while the third or moderate party is finding its glory in having had faith enough to mingle, without fear of being lost, among brethren holding different views. Still further, the mentality of a purely orthodox mind is so different from that of a liberal, that one can scarcely blame the former for refusing to coalesce with the latter. Rather, the characters deserving censure seem to us to be those who, while really heterodox in their opinions, have nevertheless joined themselves to the orthodox for no better reason than in order to profit by their organization, and there are not a few who belong to this class. There are many Protestants who think of God as better pleased with a superficial belief in an extensive range of doctrines, whereas our goal is profound devotion and real self-denial.

As was the case with the Catholics, the Separation sorely tried the generosity of the Protestants also. In

1905 their budget had been calculated by Professor Raoul Allier as two million, four hundred and sixty thousand francs. Today it amounts to more than three million, one hundred thousand. It is a surprising fact in the history of French Protestants that since the Separation their good works, their religious enterprises have continued to increase in number (instead of diminishing) in proportion to their budget of expenses. It is fair to say, however, that some of the Societies find more difficulty than formerly in collecting the amount necessary to make ends meet. M. Allier notices the fact. It is mostly in towns that the people are in the habit of giving. The country parts, even where the peasantry are well off, scarcely give at all. The city spends, the country economizes. There are deeper reasons, however, in the present instance. Many of the Protestant pastors shocked by the withdrawal of State support left their Churches to seek their livelihood otherwise. The only advantage of this action of theirs was in the case of certain localities, where the decline of Protestant population no longer justified their being severally kept up. At the same time, while reviewing the general condition of the Protestant Churches resulting from the new law, it is astonishing that in this time of pressure several pastors of diverse denominations are supported in some of the larger southern villages where, to all appearances, one would be quite sufficient. In most regions, indeed, as the Department of Les Hautes Alpes, religion suffers cruelly for the want of pastors. Yet it is all the more cheering to see in other quarters that the supply of the ministry, seriously embarrassed as it has been for some years, is actually at the present moment encouragingly on the advance. One remarkable phenomenon in French Protestantism is worth noticing. Philanthropic enterprises are more prosperous than the Churches. While the Churches seem to be in almost as low a state as they

were a few years ago, or at best are having fluctuating success according to the spiritual power of their leaders, a host of charitable movements, especially medical, have become enormously popular with the faithful. What is still more extraordinary, the great efforts for Christian evangelization both in and out of France, while they are not without the support and sympathy of religious people, are being conducted, not by but without the direct instrumentality of the constituted Churches. In a word, the Church, as if stricken with a kind of paralysis, is no longer, as formerly, the inspirer and leader of benevolence, but benevolence or charity has become the director and leader of the Church. The fault is with the very ideal of the Church, more conservative than active. A mark of this spirit may be found in the unintelligent manner in which the faithful choose their pastors. Sometimes they do so without really knowing the candidate; sometimes again they select him for his ecclesiastical opinion's undisturbing affinity to their own; still more frequently perhaps for his agreeable relations to his official predecessor, with no other view than to keep peace in the house; while, on the contrary, philanthropic work demands a different order of recommendation altogether, namely, definite ability to carry it on.

Let us quote an example. So far as the young are concerned, while the Church has remained nearly as incapable as ever, the Christian Associations have done an amazing work in collecting and benefiting members of both sexes. It is truly remarkable to see how directly these Associations bring high moral and spiritual influence to bear on modest groups of "students" and of young people in the Christian Lyceums, so as not infrequently to furnish as pastors for the Churches capable young men whose help the Church itself had besought in vain. Most Paris Churches, however, are progressing on that line.

The Protestant press is not very flourishing. The journal *Foi et Vie* is the only one which, animated with a Protestant spirit, represents modern thought and ideas. Its circulation is announced as having doubled. A building, as an audience-hall for the purpose of lectures, is on the point of being erected. The courses given in the former quarters have proved a great success. *La Revue Chrétienne*, of somewhat more modest dimensions, frequently contains solid contributions from the pen of distinguished Protestant writers.

Let us now come to a general conclusion. There are many of the French people who have become weary of the free thought, as shallow as it is cold, which has prevailed among us for twenty or thirty years. Taine's intellectualism, Renan's dilettantism, no longer hold undisputed sway. Part of the present generation honestly desires, nay, it is truer to say, thirsts with a passionate thirst to know the whole truth of things, God included, if indeed there be a God. On the other hand, there is a general feeling that we need, each one of us, to lay upon our life some rule for its guidance; we need to have a frame of regulated conditions within which to pass our existence; we need some kind of discipline for its training. Popular teaching itself, though the born enemy of the Church, agrees with the rest of the world in these opinions. Indeed, as a literary task it would be deeply interesting to trace the approach of this new Spring, this gradual new Springtide, which is now beginning to blossom in the human mind. We are using the phrase "spiritual tide" in its widest and worthiest sense when we affirm that at this moment it is conspicuously on the rise in the best French minds. It is not the Church which has called forth this movement. Rather she has fought it by attacking Modernism, which is one of its forms. Nevertheless, she intends using this actual upheaval to her advantage, and often succeeds in

directing the rise of these new streams of life into the channel she has formed of strictly legal methods. Too frequently however, she diverts it to political purposes, even to electoral uses. There is the Bishop of Orleans, Mgr. Touchet, the very man who sent a memorial of protest to the Pope, after the first Plenary Assembly; have we not seen him, within the last few months, make the proposition that the Catholics should abandon their schools, and throw in their disposable funds to the treasury of the electoral campaign? This sort of thing is done too often. The Church, whose solitary use and function is to spiritualize, or give of the spirit to the world, is found to be actually doing the reverse and materializing the world's spirit. These things are a pain to us. We are not among those who desire the Church's death. On the contrary, we wish it may live. But while it lives, we crave for it the rectitude of conduct and the spirituality of purpose which alone give her the right to live.

A book has recently appeared under the title *Ce qu'on a fait de l'Église*, by five anonymous priests, who seriously, sadly, and even with tears, have drawn up an indictment against their sacred Mother. We could wish from our heart that such a book were impossible; and now here it is. And Rome will suffer from it, even while declaring its condemnation. As regards Protestants, their Churches suffer from intestine strife and doctrinal disagreements. Even extreme evangelicals do not avoid these difficulties. Some fifty years ago, complains one of the most venerated orthodox pastors of our time, orthodox on one side and liberals on the other fought each other squarely in the face, each of them expressing themselves in the terms of their most extreme views. But let this dear man regret these old days; we do not. Actually the intellectual positions taken up lie scattered along between the extremes. A change has come over us which it is useless to blame. Faith is not less keen, though it is

more enlightened. A new impulse, a craving for progress, are the features of the day. We must not fear then for our faith, but rejoice for it. The honor of any Church is always to be looking forward, without pride yet without fear, thankful for the spiritual treasures it has gathered in the past, and confident that it will surely develop in the future, if it keeps alive the glorious spirit of its Master.

BOOK REVIEWS

THE ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF RELIGION AND ETHICS.[1]

The first volume of the Encyclopaedia was noticed in this REVIEW, Vol. II (1909), pp. 95–99. Since that time five volumes have been issued, coming down to "Hyksos," and five or six more will be required for the rest of the alphabet. As announced in the Preface, the ambition of the editor has been to include everything that falls under the broadest definitions of religion and ethics; as a matter of fact many things are included which have only a remote relevance to either. The articles on "Bards" (Breton, Irish, Welsh), "Arthurian Cycle," "Feinn Cycle," on "Fiction," on the "Drama," are of this kind; it is remarkable that "Drama," which covers, in its ten divisions, all climes and times, has no place for the religious plays of the Christian Middle Ages.

A considerable class of articles deals with the physical and biological sciences: *e.g.*, "Atomic Theory" (Greek, Indian, Mohammedan, Mediaeval and Modern), "Attraction and Repulsion," "Biology," "Environment" (biological), "Evolution" (biological), "Development," "Degeneration," "Atrophy," "Atavism." There are many articles on philosophical subjects, such as "Epistemology," "Continuity," "Cause, Causality," "Certainty" (logical), "Attention," "Forgetfulness," "Beauty," "Form" (aesthetic), besides articles on individual philosophers—Hegel, *e.g.*, claims twenty pages. Economics has its share: *e.g.*, "Consumption," "Distribution"; there are legal articles on "Forgery." and a definition of "Delict." Finally, mention may be made of articles which are written, not on subjects, but on words. Thus the author who undertook to furnish an article on "Emancipation" saw nothing to do but to descant on as many senses and uses of emancipation as he could think of, from the separation of church and state to Ellen Key; with perhaps unconscious humor—the author is a German—the bibliography begins with Münsterberg's *Die Amerikaner*. Many of the articles named are in themselves very good; but an Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics is not the place where a reader in search of enlighten-

[1] Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics. Edited by James Hastings. Vol. II (Arthur to Bunyan), 1910; III (Burial to Confessions), 1911; IV (Confirmation to Drama), 1912; V (Dravidians to Fichte), 1912; VI (Fiction to Hyksos), 1914. Charles Scribner's Sons. Each volume (about 900 pages), $6.00.

ment on such subjects would look for it, and every library which possesses this work is sure to have the works of reference to which the inquirer would naturally go.

What principle determined the selection of subjects in some fields is not evident. We have articles, for example, on "Cecrops," "Centaur," "Charites," "Danaids," "Gorgon," "Graiai," "Harpies," but none on Demeter or Dionysus (and no references to the general article on "Greek Religion"); separate articles are given to many places of no especial religious mark, but "Eleusis" receives no notice; the "Camel" has four columns to himself, but the writers have not discovered his religious significance or his moral qualities.

In many cases a subject seems to have been divided on an alphabetical scheme of countries or religions, without considering whether there was anything to put into the pigeon-holes thus provided. Thus, under "Atheism," after a general sketch of antitheistic theories and an article on Buddhist atheism, we come to one on "Atheism (Egyptian)," beginning, "No trace has yet been found of any definite atheistic teaching in Egypt," in the absence of which the author fills a paragraph with some illustrations of a *carpe diem* attitude to life and the hereafter. Thereupon follow a very thin article on atheism among the Greeks and Romans and three short but competent ones on India, which brings us to "Atheism (Jewish)": "Atheism as a system of thought has no place in Judaism, and there is no equivalent for the term in the Hebrew language or literature." The contributor to whom it fell to write on the Mohammedans was not much better off for real atheists, but gives an interesting account of various dualists, skeptics, and agnostics. A more striking example of what this method leads to is the article "Creeds," which has rubrics for the Babylonian and Egyptian religions! *In fugam vacui* the authors write about some of the general religious notions and beliefs of the peoples in question. On the other hand, the author to whom Moslem creeds were assigned confines himself to the profession of faith, and does not even mention the existence of theological creeds in the proper sense.

The plan of the Encyclopaedia makes a great deal of duplication and repetition inevitable, especially between general articles on religious phenomena and articles on particular countries or religions; but this, while it adds to the bulk of the work, is for the convenience of the reader.

It is inevitable that in a work which maps out the field for the first time there should be serious omissions. Thus, there is no

article or entry for "Attributes, Divine," though it is evidently much more closely related to religion than "Attraction and Repulsion," which gets nearly a page, and though the Attribute Controversy is a large and highly significant chapter in the history of mediaeval Moslem and Jewish theology. There is none on "Confession, Auricular"; none on "Chasidism" (or Hasidism), one of the most important movements in modern Judaism, though there is one on the "Hasideans" of Maccabaean times. Other omissions which I have noted incidentally are, "Bardesanes," "Carvakas," "Chu Hi," "Constantinople," "Dionysius Areopagita," "Dositheus, Dositheans," "Fourier, Fourierism," etc. Under "Druses," we are bidden see "Sects, Christian," a company in which the Druses will be surprised to find themselves!

The high quality of the individual articles set in the first volume is well maintained. The editor has been singularly successful in enlisting not merely competent but eminent contributors, and in keeping them. And—what does not always follow from great reputations—the authors have done their work honestly and with evident interest. One or two might be named who are plainly tired of saying the same things in lectures and popular series and new encyclopaedias, and their weariness communicates itself to the reader; but such cases are few. The articles move pretty evenly on the plane of the educated, but not specially learned, reader, and the impression of solid learning united with sane judgment which the first volume made is confirmed by its successors.

Of conspicuous excellence are the articles on India—religions, peoples, places, persons. The materials collected by the British government in its various Surveys and Reports, and the co-operation of scholars who have been in this service and add to what is in print intimate personal knowledge, make it possible to treat this field with exceptional thoroughness. The reader will not complain of the resulting disproportion. But he may ask whether China, for example, has been as well provided for as conditions permit. No such question arises about the articles on Mahayana Buddhism, which have fallen into excellent hands (Anesaki, de La Vallée Poussin, Takakusu).

Some articles of conspicuous note in Volume II are: "Aryan Religion" (O. Schrader), "Assam" (Gait), "Bab, Babis" (E. G. Browne), "Berbers, North Africa" (R. Basset), "Bhakti Marga" (Grierson), "Bible in the Church" (E. v. Dobschütz), "Bodhisattva" (Poussin), "Brahamanism" (Jacobi). In Volume III there is a comprehensive article on the "Celts" (J. A. MacCullough). The

article on "Christianity" (Garvie) is written from a dogmatic point of view; the author expressly rejects at the outset the "religious-historical method" (*not* the loud-voiced "religionsgeschichtliche Schule," but the application of historical method to the Christian religion), and in fact the article, so far as it deals with the beginnings of Christianity, is chiefly a controversial discussion of various modern theories (Pfleiderer, Harnack, Loisy, Orr, and others). It is perfectly proper that the dogmatic construction of Christianity should have place in the Encyclopaedia, as Buddhist or Moslem doctrine has; but the reader has a right to expect that it shall also be historically presented, as other religions are; not specifically exempted from the application of historical method on theological or apologetic grounds. The volume contains several long composite articles ("Calendar"—80 pages; "Charity, Almsgiving"; "Charms and Amulets"; "Chastity"; "Circumcision"; "Communion with Deity"). In the first of these, in an excellent presentation of the Jewish Calendar by Poznanski, an inexcusable misprint occurs on p. 117 and is twice repeated on p. 123, by which the Seleucid era is transformed into the "era of the Seljūks"(!), which the Jews are said still to continue to use. American readers will be mildly amused by the conclusion of the article by Dugald Macfadyen on Horace Bushnell; Bushnell's ideas were introduced into English religious thought by Alexander Mackennal and Charles Berry, "but, owing to want of sufficient theological training, the representatives of the monistic tradition have strayed into pantheism." When, "for want of sufficient theological training," a monist takes to straying into pantheism, he is in great danger of keeping on in the same direction, and landing in theism before he knows it!

Volume IV includes extended composite articles on "Cosmogony and Cosmology," "Death and Disposal of the Dead," "Demons and Spirits," "Disease and Medicine," "Divination." The article on "Confucian Religion" is singularly meagre; that on "Covenanters" is longer than "Crusades"—a somewhat provincial estimate of historical dimensions!

In the fifth volume special attention may be called to the article on "Dravidians," particularly the first part (by Crookes). There is a long article on "Dress"; "Dualism," in some sense or other of twoness, is discovered among the American Indians, Egyptians, Jews, and other peoples. "Education," "Ethics and Morality," "Expiation and Atonement," "Family," "Fasting," "Festivals and Fasts," "Fate," are the titles of comprehensive articles, carrying us to all parts of the globe, and distributed among numerous

authors. The article on "Egyptian Religion" (by Petrie) does not attempt much more than a classified inventory of facts about the religion—catalogues of sacred animals and gods, beliefs about the dead and funerary customs, etc.

Volume VI brings, among others, an article on "Fortune" (which is not always properly distinguished from astrological fate); E. F. Scott treats "Gnosticism" soberly—a subject which has on many minds the effect which South is said to have attributed to the Apocalypse. In this part of the alphabet fall also the entries, "God" (composite), "Gospels" (Burkitt), "Greek Religion" (Farnell), "Harranians" (D. S. Margoliouth—somewhat meagre), composite articles on "Health and Gods of Healing," "Hearth and Hearth-Gods," "Heroes and Hero-Gods," "Holiness," "Human Sacrifice." Special mention should be made of W. Crooke's masterly article on "Hinduism."

In conclusion we can only repeat what was said in our notice of the first volume: The Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics must have a place in every reference library, and is an indispensable tool to every one who undertakes either the study of religious phenomena, or of particular religions, or of the history of religion as a whole. The editorial control will doubtless be firmer as the work proceeds; the prevailing level of the individual contributions is extraordinarily high, and the bibliographies appended to the articles are in general good both in inclusion and exclusion. Instances like Iverach's "Caesarism," in which none of the works of first rank on the subject is mentioned, are conspicuously infrequent.

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St. Paul and the Mystery-Religions. H. A. A. Kennedy, D.D., D.Sc. Hodder & Stoughton. 1913. Pp. xviii, 311. $1.50.

Dr. Kennedy has given us a book which is in many ways important and valuable. As its title shows, it is an attempt to consider the relationship of Pauline theology to the contemporary cults of the Roman Empire. In successive chapters he discusses the influence of Stoicism, Astralism, the Orphic movement, Jewish affinities with the Mystery-religions, the general characteristics of the chief Greek and Oriental cults, Pauline terminology and the central conceptions of Paulinism as compared with those of the Mystery-religions, baptismal rites, and sacramental meals.

As a collection of facts this will be of much use to the theological student, especially so far as it concerns the Mystery-religions rather

than Paul; it is remarkably complete for the size of the book. It should, however, be noted that Mithraism is excluded for chronological reasons, and the Hermetic literature is included, and there will be a difference of opinion in many quarters as to whether this procedure is either justifiable or consistent. It suggests, what may possibly be the fact, that the origin of the book was the desire to controvert Reitzenstein rather than to investigate anew the whole field, and that so far as matters are dealt with outside the field covered by Reitzenstein, they are accretions due to Dr. Kennedy's scholarly desire to be complete.

As to the relationship of Pauline teaching to the facts of contemporary religion, I must admit that I differ wholly from Dr. Kennedy, and do not feel shaken in my views by his hostile though always courteous criticisms. I hope that I do not misrepresent his position by saying that he is inclined to think that the greater part of Pauline ideas can be better accounted for by the influence of the Old Testament than by contemporary Hellenistic thought, though he admits that this may have affected Pauline terminology. Faith, not sacraments, is the preëminently Pauline teaching, and Dr. Kennedy's contention is that this is ignored by those of us who are, roughly speaking, followers of Reitzenstein.

The reply to Dr. Kennedy is not quite simple, and to make it intelligible it is necessary to indulge in a little criticism of his position, which he will, I trust, not regard as personal, or as intended to derogate from the value attached to his book. In common with so many Scotch scholars, he seems unconsciously to reflect back his own enlightened Protestantism into the Epistles, and he talks about sacraments which work *ex opere operato* without sufficient sympathy for the Catholic interpretation of this doctrine. It is necessary to insist that the Catholic is much nearer to early Christianity than the Protestant, and there is not in Catholic eyes any antithesis between faith and sacraments: faith is the necessary attitude which is brought (or perhaps it would be better to say which brings men) to the sacraments. Paul saw a clear antithesis between faith and the works of the law, and therefore he argued this point at length. But neither he nor any one else saw any antithesis between faith and sacraments. The discovery, if it be one, that such an antithesis exists was reserved for the Reformation, and the cardinal defect of Dr. Kennedy's book is that he never looks at early Christianity except through the spectacles of Protestant theology. The reason why there is very little about sacraments and a great deal about faith and ethics in the Pauline Epistles, is because the position of the

sacraments was not denied by any one within the circle of Hellenistic Christianity. The relation of faith to law was disputed, and the relation of ethics to religion was misunderstood, and therefore we have a great deal about these problems in the Epistles to the Romans and Corinthians. That, however, does not prove that Hellenistic Christianity was not sacramental any more than the complete absence of any discussion in the British Parliament in the twentieth century as to the advantages of monarchy proves that there was no British king; it only proves that the monarchical principle was not in dispute. The proof that that principle was accepted in Parliament is that it was used at intervals as the incontrovertible basis of argument or as the last word in discussion; and in the same way the proof that the Hellenistic Christianity to which Paul belonged was sacramental is the fact that he uses the sacraments, just as he does the Resurrection, as the basis of argument with regard to disputed questions. I am therefore unable to see the force of Dr. Kennedy's remark on page 233, in which he controverts the contention in my *Earlier Epistles of St. Paul*, that an unethical view of baptism can be traced in some of Paul's antinomian opponents, and quotes passages which show the existence of other forms of antinomianism. No doubt he is right; but to disprove that some men are black, it is insufficient to show that others are white. Dr. Kennedy's exegesis of Romans 3 and 5 may be perfectly correct; but it does not alter the fact that in Romans 6 Paul connects baptism with his argument in a way which suggests that some people had failed to realize that the union with the death and resurrection of Christ which it affected brought with it ethical responsibilities. It is true that Paul frequently connects the forgiveness of sins with faith; but that is no argument, unless it can be shown that he had reached the position of those Protestants who see an antithesis between faith and sacraments. Moreover, it is a fact that he never suggests that baptism was ever a matter of dispute, and he never stops to argue about it. But was the preliminary requirement faith or the works of the law? That point *was* disputed, and he argues it at length. Again, was the consequent result an ethical responsibility or libertine freedom? That again was in dispute, and is consequently argued.

My objection then to Dr. Kennedy's method is that if we follow it, we overlook the essential features of controversial letter-writing, and repeat the mistake of the Tübingen school; which turned the controversies of the Church into the foundation of Christianity, and led directly to a view of Paulinism which, however admirable, seems to

be based on ideas unknown until the Reformation—an epoch which, with all its faults, I cannot help regarding as one of real progress and not mainly the return to a primitive standpoint.

I have been unable to resist the temptation of emphasizing the points on which I differ from Dr. Kennedy; but I can sincerely thank him for an interesting and learned book. In reviewing, as in controversial letter-writing, it is the points of difference which are apt to come to the surface.

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St. Paul, a Study in Social and Religious History. Adolf Deissmann, D.D. Hodder & Stoughton. Pp. xix, 316.

Professor Deissmann has written a valuable and suggestive book on the Apostle Paul in such untechnical language that the general reader will find it as interesting as it is instructive. The author is a recognized master in the field of Graeco-Roman life and thought, and he has the additional advantage of having made two well-planned journeys to the East in recent years. His object is to penetrate through the dogmatic "Paulinism" of the schools, and see the great missionary living and working in his ancient environment. The purpose of the book is achieved; for even though one may dissent from some of the writer's conclusions, the reader gets a fresh and vivid impression of the Apostle's personality as it must have appeared to those who knew him in the flesh.

A few points deserve special mention. Dr. Deissmann accepts as genuine ten of the epistles traditionally ascribed to Paul, all of which he regards as letters rather than formal epistles. He also uses the Pastorals in a way which indicates that he believes them to contain certain genuine elements. The question whether the Apostle was set free after two years' detention in Rome is left open. He agrees with most modern critics in holding that Rom. 16 is a short note sent to Ephesus, and he thinks that our Epistle to the Ephesians is the letter to the Laodiceans mentioned in Col. 4 16. The South Galatian theory, which is held by many scholars, is rejected in favor of the older view, that the recipients of Paul's letter lived in the so-called "region of Galatia." Professor Deissmann rightly emphasizes two seemingly opposite aspects of Paul's nature—his mysticism, and his interest in the practical side of religion. These are the two keys which unlock his profoundest thoughts. Faith is union with God in fellowship with Christ; but Deissmann expressly repudiates the view of scholars like Heitmüller and Lake, that

baptism and the Lord's Supper are the means by which the Christian enters into fellowship with Christ. In view of this position the reviewer is surprised to read that the primitive disciples "possessed in baptism and the Lord's Supper two institutions which may be called, in the ancient technical sense of the word, the two Primitive Christian mysteries" (page 117). It is certainly a great gain to see in the Pauline ideas of justification, reconciliation, forgiveness, redemption, and adoption, so many different figurative expressions, each taken from the life of the time, for the same fundamental religious experience, namely, salvation in Christ. For Paul Christ was more than Messiah. He was Lord and Spirit; and in him the poorest and most helpless soul could come into union with the infinite life of God.

There are three appendices, four useful indices, and an excellent map of the Mediterranean world in the time of Paul. In the longest appendix Deissmann discusses in detail the well-known Delphic inscription relating to the proconsul Gallio, and concludes that the Apostle arrived in Corinth early in the year 50 and departed late in the summer of 51.

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Development of Religion and Thought in Ancient Egypt. Lectures delivered on the Morse Foundation at Union Theological Seminary by James Henry Breasted, Ph.D., Professor of Egyptology and Oriental History in the University of Chicago. Charles Scribner's Sons.

Professor Breasted was able to avail himself of material for the treatment of his theme which was not open to his predecessors, and he has also used other material which they passed by. The substance of earlier treatises has been drawn from that immense mass relating to the innumerable pantheon of Egypt, details of which are largely late and come from a debased period in the history. Previous treatment has been almost encyclopedic in character, but without the ease of reference attaching to the alphabetic arrangement. There has also been a radical defect in most writers, in that they have failed to see any of those changes and advances of conception which are usually denoted as evolution. At least one author has stated baldly that there was no development in the Egyptian religion. The historical method has been wofully absent in the majority of cases, and there has been a lack of that constructive imagination which is essential to the presentation of any great theme.

The most important documents not previously available are the so-called "pyramid texts" of the V and VI dynasties. To be sure, an edition was published and a translation made by Maspero in the eighties of the last century. But the version was doubly imperfect, owing to the lack of a reliable copy of the originals, and also to a very meagre acquaintance with the orthography, grammar, and vocabulary of the period. In the interval since, the second of these difficulties has been largely remedied, and the first has been removed within the last five years by the publication of a definitive edition of the original, made at an enormous expenditure of time and pains. Thus a series of documents has been made available to the student, taking him back many centuries nearer the beginnings of things. These documents were composed within the space of a century and a half, and they give unmistakable evidence of a process of evolution capable of proof by chapter and verse.

Material already at hand has been neglected heretofore. Separated from the "pyramid texts" by the interval between the V and XII dynasties, is a papyrus, long since published in facsimile, usually known as the "Tale of the Eloquent Peasant." Less than thirty years ago this writing was described by one of the foremost of German scholars as almost entirely unintelligible. But since then it has been resolved, and has been found to be one of the most intensely human documents which antiquity has bequeathed to us. It illustrates the emergence of a moral sense and a demand for righteousness between man and man which had not been known to exist at so early a period.

Besides these documents Professor Breasted has used a multitude of writings from all periods of the history, and he has not only treated them in their historical order but he has shown how they illustrate the relations between religion and morals, their mutual interaction and their influence on popular conceptions. Thus he has again demonstrated that there was a decided development and evolution, and that the changes are capable of exposition.

The book shows throughout not only a thorough and profound scholarship, but also constructive ability and remarkable appreciation of the striking points in the history. It would be impossible to find Professor Breasted's superior in fineness of feeling and sympathy, or in brilliancy of portrayal. His treatment of the religious system introduced by the "heretic" king Amen-hotep IV—Ikhnaton of the XVIII dynasty—illustrates preëminently these specifications. The conception of a world-religion which here comes to expression is so enticing as to cause one nearly to forget any doubts

whether political considerations did not figure in the matter, as well as the ideal of a universal domination of the sun-god.

The ten chapters which compose the book show the successive steps in the development. Various elements entered into the process. Natural phenomena, particularly the sun and the river, together with the type of constitution of the state, supplied both material and form. From the very beginning, the Egyptian was much concerned with the hereafter and preparation for it, and much space is necessarily devoted to these subjects. On account of the dominating position occupied by the king as the son of a divine father and the immeasurably inferior position of mere men, it was not till well along in the history that moral considerations came to the fore, both in the present life and its consequences in the future. The king alone was considered to be the subject of immortality, and the thought of a hereafter for the ordinary man was of slow growth. With the territorial expansion due to foreign conquest under the XVIII dynasty and the consequent widening of the horizon beyond the limits of the narrow native valley, occasion was afforded for the conception of a world-religion. But this enlargement of view was too bold and ambitious for the popular mind, which cared more for immediate personal interests than for the ideals of a religion which was universal in its scope. The pendulum swung back again in the following periods till formalism, sacerdotalism, and magic displaced the ideals of writers and royal reformer, and there came the lowered standards which furnish most of the materials for the delineations of the ordinary work on the Egyptian religion.

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Paganism and Christianity in Egypt. Philip David Scott-Moncrieff. Cambridge University Press. 1913. Pp. viii, 225. 6*s*.

This little volume has a pathetic interest as the last and not quite completed work of a young scholar already known as a man of unusual promise and of substantial accomplishment. It is a brief review of the most important influences of Egyptian religious and social ideas upon the earliest development of Christianity. It has the great merit, rather rare in the work of specialists, of weighing the evidence with the utmost impartiality. There must have been no little temptation to exaggerate the Egyptian element in the constructive forces of Christian faith and practice; but Mr. Scott-Moncrieff has guarded himself with great discretion at every point.

He has sought to show precisely how large a debt Christianity owes to Egypt without any effort to make this debt as large as possible. We venture to doubt whether he would have written the final words added by the editor "to round out the chapter," namely: "In any case it is evident that to Egypt . . . the Christian world owes monasticism."

While the author's attempt is mainly to give the results of others' investigations, he offers at every stage his own original interpretation of these. The volume makes, therefore, with its abundant reference to the principal authorities, a welcome manual for the student of Christian origins.

ROMAN LIFE AND MANNERS UNDER THE EARLY EMPIRE. LUDWIG FRIEDLÄNDER. Authorized English Translation, Vol. IV. Appendices and Notes. E. P. Dutton & Co. 1913.

There is, says Plato, a certain ancient quarrel between poets and philosophers; but a later age has seen them united in another almost as sharp. All authors are liable to have the opinion about publishers which led Southey's friends to honor his toast to Napoleon—"because he had hanged a bookseller." Martial, to take an instance from the work before me, had a somewhat similar feeling. And all students of antiquity will sympathize with authors in the matter of Friedländer's great thesaurus of ancient life. What could have induced the German publishers to issue the seventh edition without the notes? Of what use would the book be to the student (of all persons) without the references for the thousands of facts here massed relative to ancient life?

There was no help for it. Messrs. Freese and Magnus, translating this great companion to classical studies into English, naturally were bound to take the last edition, and they rendered it from the seventh. The demand for the references and authorities led to their being issued in a fourth volume, translated by Mr. A. B. Gough from the sixth edition. And meantime an eighth edition appears in German, with the apparatus.

However, here we have the whole work in an English form, and every student of the Roman Empire in English-speaking lands will be grateful, while he wonders why it was never done before. And those who are not familiar with the work may well be glad to turn to it, and for a guinea possess the most complete and encyclopaedic book that was ever (one imagines) written on a nation's life. For such readers a word may be said on Friedländer's plan. He maps out the life of the Roman world into great areas; e.g., the

theatre and the games, the court, travel, religion, *belles-lettres*, and under each heading pours forth his amazing collection of facts, and very readably too.

At the same time there is a certain drawback in Friedländer's method. He covers a period of four or five hundred years, and his illustrations are drawn from descriptions of very different dates and places. This is of course legitimate enough, especially when we are given, as we now are, the sources of the data and can more or less check them for ourselves. In all scientific history the principle is conceded of filling gaps with material from a similar place in a parallel development. This is freely done by the experts in the early history of man; e.g., in completing one and another series that shall show the development of the stone tool or weapon. So that Friedländer may very well complete his picture, let us say, of the games by references to the crocodiles and Saxons of Symmachus. It is a curious thing, by the way, that some of the most illuminating material we have upon the beast-fights comes from Symmachus's period, contributed by himself and Claudian. And yet, if we are not careful, a series of fabrics—this woven of Juvenal and Claudian, a piece from Cicero on elephants, let us say, and bits from a dozen other authors—may in the end give us not a true picture. For while in many things culture is stationary throughout the Roman Empire —as, for instance, it has been remarked that tools show no improvement or development—it is still the case that the five centuries with which we are concerned differ profoundly.

It may be urged too that such a method as we are considering must of necessity deal chiefly with the external aspects of life, while if we are to grasp the real life of a people it can be done only by a closer knowledge of its formative or representative men and women. Whether the latter be significant, as in case of Synesius of Cyrene, or insignificant, as in the case of Apollodorus of Athens, the contemporary of Demosthenes; or whether it is a group of contemporaries in Egypt writing casual letters of no importance to any one but the recipients and not of any consequence even to them very long, does not perhaps matter. The main thing is that life has to be studied in a life or a series of lives. Nothing else will give it; not even, as we know, histories of thought or of dogma.

None the less, a great encyclopaedia, organized and controlled by a great scholar of the widest reading, written in a way that permits the coexistence of interest and thoroughness, and subjected in appendix, note, and reference to the reader's own judgment, is an asset of high value to any one who has to do with the early centuries

of our era in any aspect of their influence. So that there should be a wide welcome for the English translation of Friedländer's *Sittengeschichte.*

T. R. Glover.

St. John's College,
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The Early Church in the Light of the Monuments. A. S. Barnes, M.A. Longmans, Green, & Co. 1913. Pp. xx, 223. $1.50.

It is a good book that Mgr. Barnes has written. Although it appears in "a series of manuals for Catholic priests and students" (entitled *The Westminster Library*), it is worthy of a much broader circle of readers. Not only is it evident that the author is intent upon discovering the truth and telling it, but his work is marked by real candor and critical discrimination. To say that the book reports only the most familiar common-places of Christian archaeology is by no means to disparage it. That is what it is for, and it fulfils its purpose very well. I know no other book which would serve so well to provide the cultured reader with a brief and readable orientation in the field of Christian archaeology. Mgr. Barnes is known chiefly by his learned and sumptuous monograph, *St. Peter's in Rome.* Were he not well acquainted with the whole field of Christian archaeology, he would not have been able to do this simple work so well.

The monuments *do* cast "light" upon the history of the Early Church; but the written history of the Church casts still more light upon the monuments, which would be dark indeed without this illumination. It is not unreasonable, therefore, that the author in the first part of his book, *The Growth of the Church in the First Three Centuries,* depends chiefly upon written records. He has selected topics which receive new emphasis and illumination from the study of the monuments. The titles of the chapters are: I. The Apostles at Rome; II. The Earliest Converts; III. The Blood of the Martyrs; IV. The Collegia and the Catacombs; V. The Christianizing of Rome.

Part II. treats of "The Witness of the Monuments to Christian Dogma." It must always be remembered that the written word is the only adequate expression of the dogma of times gone by. Without it the pictorial symbolism of the early Church would be unintelligible. The "monuments" serve chiefly to reveal the popular prevalence of a dogma otherwise well known, or they may point more precisely to the age in which it first became popular. What

one first wants to know, therefore, is the *date* of the monument in question. That consideration the author has generally left out of account. He contents himself with proof of the prevalence of the dogma *some* time before the fifth century. He deals frequently with controverted points, where the point of the controversy lies in the answer to the question, How early? One cannot find fault with the author for devoting one chapter to "The Witness of the Monuments to the Primacy of the Holy See." The monuments *do* bear witness to the primacy of Peter (which is at least as plainly set forth in the Gospels), and to the claim of the Bishop of Rome to a similar primacy. But the unanswered question is, How early? And is it not a far cry from Damasus to Hildebrand?

I must challenge the author sharply on one point, though I agree with him even there in substance. He says: "There is always a further distinction by which St. Peter is given a rank superior to his brother Apostle [Paul]. It is not merely that he is on the right hand of our Lord while St. Paul is on the left. To that rule there are several exceptions." Now the fact is that in the monuments of the fourth and fifth centuries, whenever the two Apostles are depicted on either side of our Lord, it is St. Paul that is on the right and St. Peter that is on the left, and to this rule there are few exceptions. It is not only on the sarcophagi and other sepulchral monuments that we have the Apostles in this position, but also, more solemnly and emphatically, in the great mosaics of the basilicas. It is vain to affirm that "the question [of the relative dignity of the right and left] was finally decided in favor of the dexter side only by the rise of the science of chivalry." For this is a distinction of immemorial observance; it was familiar to the Jews, and it is strikingly employed in the Gospel. The mere fact that the early artists placed St. Paul almost invariably on the right shows that they followed a rule and recognized the distinction. In the ancient mosaic which decorates the triumphal arch of St. Paul's in Rome the Apostle to the Gentiles occupies as usual the post on the right of Christ. Immediately below this arch two modern statues represent the Apostles in the reverse order—St. Peter is on the right. Mgr. Barnes proceeds: "The mark which most frequently distinguishes St. Peter in the earliest representations [they are none of them anterior to the fourth century] is that our Lord is depicted in the act of handing to him a roll or a volume, an act which is sometimes explained by the accompanying inscription, DOMINUS LEGEM DAT." I am disposed to think that St. Peter receives the roll simply because he is on the left. The Lord's right

hand being engaged in the gesture of instruction or benediction, it is only with his left he can hold the roll of the "new law." Thus the monuments, far from affording a salient proof of Peter's primacy, actually *seem* to contradict it. I say "seem," for there is no doubt that the Roman Church in the fourth century attached great importance to the primacy of Peter. The fact that in the official art of the Church Paul appears in the place of honor is an enigma. I seek to explain it by the consideration that Paul represents "the Church from among the Gentiles," Peter, "the Church from among the Circumcision." Such are the inscriptions we find attached to two symbolical female figures in the Church of Sta. Sabina, and the Gentile Church is on the right. In the apsidal mosaic of the Title of Pudens similar figures (though without any inscription) are depicted behind Peter and Paul, and again it is the Gentile Church which has the place of honor. Originally, no doubt, Jerusalem and Bethlehem were depicted in the lower part of this mosaic, as they were in so many other places, and Bethlehem must have been as usual on the right, as symbolizing the manifestation of Christ to the Gentiles (through the Magi). History had accorded the place of honor to the Gentile Church; the Church of the Circumcision was no more than a reminiscence. The Church of Rome was conscious of its Gentile character and proud of it. My notion is that this is the feeling which placed Paul, in solidarity with Bethlehem and the personification of the Gentile Church, on the right hand of Christ. It may have been thought that the honor of receiving the law made up to Peter in some measure for the position of inferiority into which he was forced.

"The Witness of the Monuments with regard to Holy Baptism" is the author's next topic. It must be confessed that the witness with regard to the age and form of baptism is meager and ambiguous. Here it would have been very much to the point to date the monuments. The claim that infant baptism and baptism by affusion were practices of the earliest Church is a claim which has more truth than evidence on its side, to use an expression of Jeremy Taylor's. There is more interest in "The Witness of the Monuments to the Doctrine of the Holy Eucharist." But again it must be remembered that pictorial symbols can never define dogma so sharply as do words. If one holds the dogma of transubstantiation, it is natural enough to see it expressed in the fish as it is used for a symbol of the Eucharist. But does it really express that precise dogma more clearly than any other dogma which acknowledges a real though spiritual participation in Christ?

In no case is a sense of perspective (implying an accurate dating of the monuments) more necessary than in "The Witness of the Monuments to the Communion of Saints," *i.e.* to the practice of prayer for the dead and to the dead. The fact that there is nothing of the sort here may perhaps be excused by the popular character of the book. But between the simple inscription, VIBAS IN PACE ET PETE PRO NOBIS—an unreflective cry of the heart—and the medieval doctrine and practice which absorbed the greater part of men's piety and constituted the keystone of ecclesiastical finance ("high" as well as "low"), there lies a long history and a great transformation.

In the concluding chapter of this part the author writes about the supposed portraits of Christ, the Virgin, and the Apostles, with more discrimination than do some Protestants.

In the third part—"The Development of Church Buildings"—the author is in his own special field, and permits himself to elaborate in some detail certain personal observations and theories. He has interesting observations to make about the form of the Constantinian churches in Rome and the transformations they underwent. He justly opines that these great churches, together with those in Jerusalem and Constantinople, fixed the traditions of Church architecture. He has interesting remarks to make about the orientation of the churches, but it does not seem to me that he has come near to solving the problem. It used to be the fashion for archaeologists to endeavor to explain why one or another church in Rome has its portal facing east and its altar at the west end. Some practical reason could generally be adduced to explain such a breach of the "rule." It was tardily recognized that the *rule* in Rome—the invariable rule during the first half of the fourth century—was to place the altar at the west end. This the author rightly recognizes. But he falls into error when he asserts that this was peculiar to Rome. It was characteristic, so far as I know, of *all* the churches which Constantine built, whether at Rome, at Jerusalem, at Bethlehem, at Tyre, or at Constantinople. That observation casts a dim ray of light upon this obscure subject. Constantine apparently had a fancy for opening the door of the church towards the rising sun. He stubbornly confused sun-worship with Christianity. It is by no means clear to me why the generation which immediately followed him resolutely turned their churches the other way.

WALTER LOWRIE.

ROME, ITALY.

Friedrich Blass's Grammatik des neutestamentlichen Griechisch. Vierte, völlig neugearbeitete Auflage besorgt von Albert Debrunner. Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht. Göttingen. 1913. Pp. 346.

Blass's *Grammatik* (well known to English readers in a translation of the first edition) appears now in an entirely new form. The material is much the same, but it is much more conveniently arranged, all less important matters being grouped in separate paragraphs in small type. It is to be regretted, however, that the renumbering of the sections makes obsolete all the references to earlier editions found in existing commentaries. The chief advantages of the original work, especially the quotation of the Apostolic Fathers and of variant readings in New Testament manuscripts, are still retained, and in addition the abundant new literature on the grammar of papyri, inscriptions, and other Hellenistic Greek has been diligently used and cited. In comparing the new edition with the old, one is impressed with how rarely this fresh information modifies Blass's earlier conclusions; it rather confirms them. His remarks on prose rhythm are, however, entirely omitted as being now generally discredited. The hand of the new editor shows itself to advantage in the rewritten introductory paragraphs and in an excellent but all too brief summary on vocabulary (§ 126). Since its first publication in 1896 Blass's Grammar has been the only New Testament grammar which was both complete and modern. In its fourth edition it is not only more readable than ever before, but it has been brought completely down to date.

Henry J. Cadbury.

Haverford College.

Introduction to the History of Religions. Crawford H. Toy Professor Emeritus in Harvard University. Ginn & Co. 1913. Pp. xi, 639. $3.00.

The study of the world's religions has been revolutionized, almost within our own time, by the adoption of the historical method. An imposing array of scholars, some among their books and others among the long-buried remains of antiquity, have been busy with the discovery of new facts or with the reinterpretation of the old evidence in the light of modern knowledge. Meantime anthropology and sociology, latest born of the humanities, have sufficiently developed to be of service to the investigator; and now no treatment of a historic religion is deemed complete which does not pay full attention to its remote origins and to its social setting. For the purpose of presenting in compact form the results of contemporary research

Professor Morris Jastrow of the University of Pennsylvania began to edit, about twenty years ago, a series of Handbooks on the History of Religions. Three volumes—on India by Professor Hopkins of Yale, on Babylonia by the general editor, and on the religion of the Teutons by De la Saussaye of the University of Leiden—had already appeared before the publication of the present work.

Professor Toy calls his manual an *Introduction to the History of Religions*. The title is a little misleading, since one might suppose that we have here an introductory survey of the several religions in their historic development. Works of this sort have been published before, the latest being the *Orpheus* of M. Salomon Reinach, whose uncompromising opinions, somewhat truculently expressed, have in France provoked a veritable "battle of the books." But Professor Toy's treatise belongs, rather, to the field of comparative religion; its object is "to describe the principal customs and ideas that underlie all public religion," in other words, to preface the examination of the different faiths of mankind by an analysis of what is common to every one of them. His volume, the fruit of protracted research and meditation, enjoys the distinction of being the first in any language to attempt this task from a purely objective standpoint and in a comprehensive manner. The difficulties attending such a pioneer study are immense; to have overcome them so successfully is an achievement for which the author will receive the congratulations of every serious student.

Few subjects have suffered more at the hands of well-meaning amateurs than comparative religion. What Tyler once wrote of serpent-worship—that it had fallen into the hands of speculative writers "who mixed it up with occult philosophies, Druidical mysteries, and that portentous nonsense called the 'Arkite Symbolism,' till now sober students hear the very name of ophiolatry with a shiver"—applies equally to many other topics within this field of learning. Even competent scholars have sought to find in ancestor-worship, sun-worship, totemism, or fetishism, keys to all the mythologies. Against such tendencies to exaggerate the importance of particular aspects of religion the present book provides a wholesome corrective. Indeed, the writer's consistently agnostic attitude and the severely critical way in which he lays bare the weak points in many a fashionable theory are among the most valuable features of the book. Significant instances of his cautious treatment occur in the discussion of the divinization of animals and corn-spirits (pp. 112, 116), in the analysis of the evidence

for the existence of totemism among civilized peoples (pp. 211 ff.) and for "high gods" among low races (pp. 46 ff.), and in the examination of theories of sacrifice associated with the names of Robertson Smith, Dr. J. G. Frazer, and MM. Hubert and Mauss (498 ff.). The author seemingly lacks either prepossessions or prejudices, unless indeed he may be said to have a prepossession for whatever encourages individual initiative and freedom of thought, and a prejudice against whatever cramps and binds the human spirit. This judicial temper enables him to present well-balanced accounts of such institutions as the priesthood (pp. 526 ff.), monachism (p. 556), and sacred books (pp. 561 ff.), as well as to discover seeds of good in beliefs and practices so generally reprobated as idolatry, magic, divination, and taboo.

These very characteristics, which most commend the book to the scholar, are likely to repel the general reader, who may weary of the reiterated expressions of dubiety and may feel some irritation at the author's unwillingness to express more decided opinions on matters of controversy. The style of the work, though it suffers from the extreme condensation necessary in a textbook, is often admirably pithy and sententious: "Man has shown himself practical in all stages of religion; he is always the center of his world, and treats objects and theories with sole regard to his own well-being" (p. 46); "The aim of religion has been, and is, to banish magic from the world" (p. 406); "Divination is an inquirer, and its virtue is obedience; magic is an investigator, and its virtue is achievement" (p. 407); "A true monotheism has never arisen except as a criticism of polytheism" (p. 464). Such sentences compress much wisdom in little space.

The materials of the book are distributed among eleven chapters, which deal respectively with the nature of religion, the soul, early religious ceremonies (including those at birth, puberty, marriage, and death), early cults (including plant- and animal-worship, ancestor-worship, and cults of generative powers), totemism and taboo, gods, myths, magic and divination, the higher theistic development (a discussion of polytheism, dualism, and monotheism), social development of religion (a discussion of sacrifice, the priesthood, the church, and monachism), and finally scientific and ethical elements in religious systems. This enumeration will show how widely Professor Toy has cast his net. There are few aspects of comparative religion which do not receive here due attention. More space should have been devoted to fetishism, even if the special characteristics of that cult be limited to West Africa, as the author

apparently holds. Man-gods, as distinct from divine chiefs and kings, might have been more fully treated, especially in the light of Dr. Frazer's interesting researches; and the same remark applies to the cult of saints and holy men generally. The Trinity concept and Mariolatry are two subjects which would have repaid comparative study. Prayer receives no independent treatment. This is regrettable, considering how much attention has been given to it both by anthropologists and psychologists. The reviewer, personally, would like to have had more space assigned to primitive manifestations of religion, and less proportionately to the higher cults; but doubtless such an arrangement was not in harmony with the purpose of the series to which the work belongs.

A book of this sort offers such a wide range of subjects, many of them highly debatable in character, that a notice of it must necessarily deal with a few points selected almost at random from the great number which present themselves. It is a satisfaction to find that the author holds so firmly to the conception of religion as a social product, a conception illustrated by him in many ways; for example, in the study of ceremonies and of the idea of "sacred" (pp. 97 f., 103), and throughout the chapter on the social development of religion, which contains an especially valuable discussion of the church as a voluntary association for worship. It is toward the church, as Professor Toy remarks, that society has hitherto moved (p. 538). On the vexed question of the "origin" of religion he assumes a prudent position: the beginning of religion "is not to be referred exclusively to any one order of ideas; it springs out of man's total life" (p. 160). "Religion is man's attitude toward the universe regarded as a social and ethical force; it is the sense of social solidarity with objects regarded as Powers, and the institution of social relations with them" (p. 1). He is at one with the most recent investigators in recognizing as the basis of the religious feeling, the conception of a life-force existing in all natural phenomena (pp. 5, 48, 101 ff.); but *mana*, as this life-force is coming to be called, might have taken a more prominent place in his discussion. The chapter on magic, in particular, would have profited by a fuller recognition of the implications of this conception, and the Christian doctrine of "grace" might have been profitably illustrated by reference to it. The cult of generative powers—a difficult theme—is here handled soberly and conservatively, yet with full recognition of the important place which it has occupied in many religions. The long account of totemism, reflecting the current interest in this subject, owes much to Frazer's monumental treatise, but contains

an original presentation (pp. 215 ff.) of the conditions favorable and unfavorable to totemistic organization. Though Professor Toy is able to show that many features, such as exogamy, totemic designations, descent from the totem, and the like, are not invariable concomitants of totemism as we now find it, he concludes, nevertheless, that it is a definite social institution, which deserves study in and for itself (pp. 191 f.). This conclusion is especially gratifying in the light of some recent attempts to get rid altogether of totemism. With totemism is linked in the same chapter an admirable survey of taboo; but it is not clear why the two should have been thus united, since totemic taboos form only a small fraction of the whole number of such regulations. In any case the vast importance of taboo entitled it to a chapter by itself. Chapter VIII on magic and divination comes so late in the book that the author, when discussing taboo (pp. 256 f.), is obliged to anticipate to a certain extent his treatment of magic. The present arrangement has the further disadvantage of separating the chapter on the higher theistic development from the two which deal with gods and myths. Of these, the former contains much valuable evidence on the little-known subject of clan gods (pp. 271 ff.), and the latter includes some terse criticisms of that sciolism which has recently foisted itself on the attention of scholars under the name of Panbabylonianism (pp. 384 ff.). But the reader must be content with these very partial indications of the wealth of material which Professor Toy has succeeded in compressing within less than six hundred pages.

As to minor points, it may be said at once that the work preserves throughout a high level of excellence. The writer has gone to the latest and best books in each division of his field; and in Semitics he speaks as one having authority. Positive misstatements are extremely rare. It is, however, not true to say that a seven-day week was approached independently in Babylonia, Hawaii, Java and Ashantiland (p. 253), or to imply that all Australian initiation ceremonies are regarded as established by the mythical ancestors (p. 371). The general impeccability of his treatment compels a reviewer to dwell on Professor Toy's sins of omission rather than those of commission. It might have been well to mention the evidence for Zeus as an oak-god (p. 335), and for the diverse origins of flood legends (p. 365). That some myths arise as reflections of savage society and that others are pure allegories from the start, would have been worth stating and explaining. Westermarck's suggestive theory of human sacrifice as a sort of collective life in-

surance deserved at least a passing reference. Other omissions will suggest themselves to the attentive reader; but the wonder is that the author, covering so vast a range, has not left out many more points of greater importance. On the whole the only serious lacuna is that of a preliminary chapter—which need not have been a long one—setting forth the history of the science of religion; and for this Professor Toy's own article in the *International Monthly* (1900) might have served as a basis. The proof-reading is well-nigh faultless: the text appears to contain no misprints; and among the hundreds of references only a few trifling errors have been noted (e.g. p. 59, n. 1; p. 280, n. 2; p. 587, l. 5).

This book is likely to remain for many years *the* text on comparative religion in American universities. To make it still more useful for teaching and study, the reviewer would suggest that a pronouncing index to the proper names be added; and further, that in the footnotes specific references by pages be inserted where these are now lacking. The bibliography at the end of the work is scholarly and sufficiently extensive; it would, however, be a great gain if the references were more elaborately classified and also were accompanied by brief descriptive notes, as was done by De la Saussaye in the preceding volume of the series. A bibliography of this sort would itself be a contribution to the study of comparative religion.

Hutton Webster.

University of Nebraska.

Kyrios Christos. Geschichte des Christusglaubens von den Anfängen des Christentums bis Irenaeus. Wilhelm Bousset. Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, Göttingen. 1913. Pp. xxiv, 474. 12*m*.

The sub-title of the volume describes its scope. Disregarding the academic frontier between New Testament theology and the history of early Christian doctrine, Bousset discusses the chief epochs in the development of Christian belief and thought concerning Christ, from the primitive Palestinian conception of Jesus, the Son of Man, with its reflection in the gospel tradition, and the early Gentile Christian worship of Christ as Lord, through Paul, the Johannean writings, Gnosticism, the worship of Christ in the subapostolic age and the types of Christianity evolved from it (Ignatius, Hebrews, 1 Clement, etc.), the Apologists (Logos-theology), to Irenaeus, who stands between two ages and marks a natural halting place in the history of the doctrine of Christ.

This history can be understood only when Christianity is set in its environment and brought into connection with the religious

movements of the times, and Bousset endeavors to do this for every stage in the development. For this undertaking he was well prepared by his former investigations of the Judaism of New Testament Times, the Chief Problems of Gnosis, and others.

That Gentile Christianity rapidly assumed a form widely different from the primitive type represented by the church in Jerusalem is plain on the face of the New Testament, and Paul is commonly regarded as the author of the conception of Christ and his work which prevailed in the Gentile church. To this view Bousset also would subscribe; but he lays stress on the fact that Paul's starting-point was not the Jewish Christianity of Jerusalem, but that of a Gentile Christian community in which Christ was already the object of religious worship under the title, "Lord" (Κύριος).

The Pauline transformation of Christianity into a redemptive religion—salvation through the death and resurrection of Christ—and the relation of this presentation to the current mysteries, are set forth from various points of view. The method pursued, however, gives us a series of special investigations, rather than a constructive whole; and if the reader gets either a clear definition of the problem or a historical apprehension of the process, he will have to get it for himself. The same criticism applies in varying degrees to other parts of the book. In the chapter on Paul, indeed, it does not appear that the author has grappled with the problem as a whole; and though he is at pains to explain how such a development was possible in Paul, he does not show why it was in itself inevitable.

Many things in the volume invite discussion, but the limits of this review forbid. It must suffice here to say that in it Bousset has made an important contribution to the investigation of early Christianity, and if we add that it raises many more questions than it solves—what can be better in a book than that?

George F. Moore.

Harvard University.

Introduction to the Books of the New Testament. W. C. Allen and L. W. Grensted. T. & T. Clark. 1913. Pp. viii, 302.

This volume is apparently meant to be a statement of assured results in the field of New Testament Introduction as conceived at present by one of the clergy-training schools or theological colleges of the Church of England. The writers, Messrs. Allen and Grensted, respectively Principal and Vice-Principal of Egerton Hall, entertain the "hope that this book may be of use to students in theological colleges, and to others." Mr. Allen discusses the Synoptic

Gospels and Acts; the remaining books are assigned to his colleague. The questions at issue are fairly stated, and the conclusions reached are in the main traditional, the authority of Harnack being manifest at many points. Of special interest is Mr. Allen's theory of the dates of the Synoptic Gospels. The Second Gospel, he thinks, was originally written at Jerusalem between 44 and 50 A.D. by Mark who himself translated it into Greek at Antioch and perhaps republished it at Rome before or after Peter's residence there. The First Gospel, which is a Greek work from the start, was composed at Antioch about the year 50, while the Third Gospel was written by Luke either during Paul's imprisonment in Caesarea or during his first imprisonment in Rome, when Acts also was written. This theory may conceivably prove to be in part correct, but the evidence adduced for it in the present brief discussion hardly warrants its acceptance.

J. E. Frame.

Union Theological Seminary, New York.

Great Texts of the Bible, edited by J. Hastings, D.D. John xiii–xxi; pp. vi, 458. James–Jude; pp. vi, 433. 2 vols. Scribner's. $3.00.

The homiletical treatment of the Bible is perhaps an inevitable evil. It is probably necessary to spoil the Bible by cutting texts out of it and preaching sermons upon them. But the method is only justified when some great word has seemed to the student as he read it suddenly to stand out from the page in letters of burning gold, and has demanded to be proclaimed upon the housetops. The only justification for preaching upon texts is that as the preacher studies, a text suddenly seems to smite him upon the face with an absolutely new meaning, while immediately all the rich experience of his lifetime seems to crystallize around it, and lo! a sermon is formed in his mind. The most immoral book which a preacher could have in his library would be a book which would rob him of this intimate personal experience, the very fire of preaching, and try to show him an easier way. One cannot wear to any advantage second-hand clothes in the pulpit. In order to preach a sincere sermon on a text, one must either have discovered it or re-discovered it himself. It may be that it was natural for somebody, upon reading the first two words of the text, "I am the Way," to record his inner experience in this manner (as given on page 108 of the first of these volumes): "(1) Man's need is satisfied only by a person. (2) Christ supplies man's need of a leader. (3) Christ would not be so great a person if he were not more than man. (4) Every

word in the text is emphatic and remarkable." But how dull a sermon would you and I write upon this ready-made frame! The mistake of a book like this, to which Dr. Hastings has lent his eminent name, is that it tries to make sermonizing easy by dumping into various great texts a hodge-podge of other people's thoughts upon them. The result has none of the personal unity and practical suggestiveness of a volume of real sermons.

We do not deny that these volumes are well done and much above the average of such books, and might aid some preachers in their busy lives to "get a sermon" quickly; but we advise such men far rather to buy a good commentary, or a good life of Christ, or a good book of history, or a few great biographies, and leave these *Great Text* volumes alone. We guarantee that in the reading of the life of one great man or woman the average preacher will receive more help and find more suggestive lines of thought for sermonizing than in the whole twenty volumes of this series.

J. Edgar Park.

West Newton.

The Philosophy of the Present in Germany. Oswald Külpe. Tr. from the 5th ed. by Messrs. Patrick. The Macmillan Co. 1913.

This is not a book of importance for scholars. But on account of the inaccessibility of much of the literature with which it deals, it may prove useful as a text-book or for popular reading.

The Message of the Disciples for the Union of the Church. Peter Ainslie, Minister of the Christian Temple, Baltimore, Maryland, President of the Commission on Christian Union of the Disciples of Christ (Fleming R. Revell Company, pp. 212. $1.00), contains three lectures delivered before the Yale Divinity School, on the following subjects:

The Message of the Disciples of Christ;
The Origin of the Disciples of Christ;
The History of the Disciples of Christ;

together with an appendix containing

The last Will and Testament of the Springfield Presbytery, by B. W. Stone;
A Declaration and Address by Thomas Campbell, and a Bibliography.

This book states in a clear and succinct way the teaching of the Disciples of Christ, and the relation which they wish to sustain toward other religious bodies. The writer is a representative Disciple, and while he speaks only for himself, no doubt his book would be accepted by the great majority of his brethren as a very

satisfactory statement of their position, aim, and history. The style of the book is smooth and flowing, partaking of the grace, elegance, and sweetness, of its highly esteemed author.

HALL LAURIE CALHOUN.

LEXINGTON, KENTUCKY.

THE SHORT COURSE SERIES. Edited by Rev. JOHN ADAMS. Charles Scribner's Sons. 1913. 60 cents each.

The character and purpose of this series of little books is admirably indicated in the opening words of the general preface:

"Few preachers or congregations will face the long courses of expository lectures which characterized the preaching of the past; but there is a growing conviction on the part of some that an occasional short course, of six or eight connected studies on one definite theme, is a necessity of their mental and ministerial life. It is at this point that the projected series would strike in."

The books are suggestive and useful to overcrowded ministers.

THE GOD WE TRUST. G. A. JOHNSTON ROSS. (The Cole Lectures for 1913.) Fleming H. Revell Co. Pp. 203. $1.25.

The title of this book is infelicitous in that it lacks characterization. It could head as well a dozen different books on religion. The chief place might fitly have been given to the sub-title—"Studies in the Devotional Use of the Apostles' Creed." This gives the reader at once the key.

It is popularly supposed that our age cares little for creeds and, for the most part, rejects them. Professor Ross has seen more deeply. He believes that one of the profound desires of our time is for a systematic view of religious truth, somewhat akin to the old-fashioned "plan of salvation." He does not attempt to set forth such a system; his aim is not directly doctrinal. But he takes the Apostles' Creed and endeavors to exhibit it as the basis for an intelligent and devout religion. To him the Creed is the embodiment of experience, facing both the facts of primitive Christian history and the life of today. He emphasizes therefore not so much the historic meaning of the different articles of the Creed nor their theology, as their value for spiritual development. Those are equally unwise who claim that the whole Creed must be held in its original significance, and those who reject it altogether. "There remains the possibility of using the Creed, if we be in general agreement with its drift, as the vehicle of an act of Faith, in which we associate ourselves with our predecessors in the Church, while we hold

ourselves free from the tyranny of words, and claim the legitimacy, when we require it, of changing the interpretation of the words of the symbol."[1]

In furtherance of his aim Professor Ross interprets the "I believe in" of the Creed not as an expression of intellectual assent but as a thrice-repeated act of self-committal. "'I commit myself to God' (who is thereupon described in terms fitted to stimulate confidence); next, 'I commit myself to Jesus' (who is thereupon described in terms of selected points in character, origin, and career); finally, 'I commit myself to the Holy Ghost' (who is described in terms of certain of His operations in human society)."[2]

Professor Ross insists that the real meaning of any article is not the idea its words may convey to us, nor even the idea as originally expressed by its framers; but it is the thought underlying the original expression. Thus he holds that the religious worth of the phrase, "conceived by the Holy Ghost," is that "it emphasizes the responsibility of God for all that Jesus from the beginning was."[3] This important canon of interpretation he applies with uniformly reverent handling and a deep insight into human experience and the Divine character; though his treatment of the different articles is not likely to be regarded as equally satisfactory.

The punctuation of the book is often poor. Capital letters (page 53) make a statement refer to Jesus which can only have reference to St. John. The essay will not satisfy one who conceives that his use of the Creed must be limited to the literal meaning of the words before him. But to one who is restless until he has grasped the underlying meaning, the book will furnish food for thought, trustworthy guidance, and the inspiration which comes in face of deep things.

Frederic Palmer.

Harvard University.

Life of St. Francis of Assisi. Father Cuthbert, O.S.F.C. Longmans, Green, & Co. 1913. Pp. xii, 446.

Since Paul Sabatier's *Vie de S. François d'Assise* was crowned by the French Academy and awarded the Guérin prize twenty years ago, a host of Franciscan scholars—Boehmer, Goetz, Paschal Robinson, Père Alençon, Lemmons, Little, Van Ortroy, Ehrle, to mention but a few—have been at work in every nook and corner of Europe to discover the least scrap of testimony that could throw light on the life and teachings of the most popular saint of the Roman calendar. Father Cuthbert has studied the vast deposit of Fran-

[1] P. 14. [2] P. 19. [3] P. 69.

ciscana with great diligence and thoroughness, and has given us the most delightfully written life of the *Poverello* that has appeared since Sabatier's. The author confesses that the new material found in the last score of years, like Celano's *Tractus de Miraculis* and the better texts of the *Opuscula*, has not brought to light many facts or sayings that "have not been in some way recognized in the hitherto accepted story of the saint"; but he nevertheless thinks this new material of great value in enabling us to set the facts and teachings of Saint Francis' life in clearer sequence and more authentic relations to his age and time.

The most conspicuous result of the newer discoveries, and one which Father Cuthbert himself confesses is unexpected, is the testimony which the new documents bring to the essential truth of the popular conceptions of Saint Francis. Critical study has generally shattered popular ideals. But in this case, says Cuthbert, "the wider our knowledge of the sources of the Franciscan story becomes, the more accurate appears that traditional estimate of Francis, which has been kept sacred in the people's mind through all the ages since he lived" (page 418).

This is really the text of Father Cuthbert's biography of Saint Francis. The book is a most faithful and fascinating work of piety, in which the author openly and sometimes almost ecstatically rejoices in the wealth of documentary evidence confirming his vision (already amply confirmed by faith) of the Poverello of Assisi. On almost every page of Father Cuthbert's work the adoring disciple is visible. Sabatier's book is that of a sympathetic brother of Saint Francis, rejoicing in his limitless charity and unqualified humanity; Father Cuthbert's is the proud vindication of Saint Francis as the father of the strictest of the communities bearing his name, and the guardians of the Portiuncula, the most sacred spot in the Franciscan legend. For Father Cuthbert is a Capuchin.

It is this enthusiastic discipleship that gives Father Cuthbert's work both its strong and its weak points. The glow of conviction in it, joined to a delightful narrative style and a fine feeling for the beauties of nature and human character, gives the book a charm which is sustained from the beginning to the end. In this respect the book is worthy to stand beside the remarkable work of the French scholar. But at the same time, one feels the dangers attendant on this ardor of discipleship.

In the first place, the treatment of Saint Francis is too intimate. The author again and again presumes to read the mind of Francis and his companions, to assign them motives, to attribute to them

feelings, which they may or may not have had. He tells what Saint Francis' thoughts were on leaving Rome after the reception of Pope Innocent III (page 92), pronounces on the sincerity of a sermon (page 175), knows of the influence of romantic chivalry on the Saint (page 273), analyzes the workings of his mind when confronted by a condition requiring action (page 394). In all this Father Cuthbert uses categorical language. If pressed for its justification, he would have to confess that, while consonant with the sources we have of the Saint's life, it runs beyond them in its enthusiastic desire to know his inmost thoughts.

The same enthusiastic devotion seems to us somewhat to mislead Father Cuthbert in the use of his sources. He has mastered the abundant sources and literature on Saint Francis with rare diligence. There is nothing to be desired in the *amount* of documentation that Father Cuthbert adduces. But when it comes to the discrimination of his sources we feel that the author is weak. He heaps up instances instead of weighing testimony. One gets the impression that all the mediaeval legends of the Saint are of equal value, and that any reference to him is sacred *because* it is a reference to him. Whether an event is related in the biographies of Celano, or the Three Companions, or the *Speculum Perfectionis*, or the *Conformitates*, or the *Fioretti*, it is accepted with apparently "equal thanks." So all the trivial miracles of the legends are told (pages 116, 140, 210, 212, etc.), with no attempt at all to probe their origin, with no apparent doubt of their perfect actuality; the "critical" effort of the author being exhausted in placing them in their correct setting in the Saint's life. What can we think of the scientific attitude of a mind that can treat the wolf of Gubbio episode as Father Cuthbert does on page 164! The legend of the taming of the wolf by the courageous exhortation of Francis comes to us as a charming allegory from the *Fioretti*. Father Cuthbert finds "two curious supports for its substantial authenticity" in recent years: one the discovery of the *Passio S. Verecundi*, which "puts it beyond doubt that Francis came to Gubbio at a time when the country was being ravaged by hungry wolves" (as if the legend could have any other source!), and the other, that a wolf's skull was found embedded beneath the ancient walls of the church of San Francisco della Pace in Gubbio (as if the legend could have any likelier result!). These discoveries are about as substantial an authentication of the miracle of the wolf as the demonstration that they had ovens to bake bread in in Galilee, or that there was an abundance of fish in the Lake, would be a substantiation of the miracle of the loaves and fishes.

Again, in his enthusiasm for the beloved Saint Father Cuthbert makes his influence so great at the very beginning of his preaching career (1210) that it was by Francis' sermons that the alliance of Majores and Minores in Assisi was accomplished (in spite of the contempt with which the families of the rich looked on this insane young man who had deserted their ranks to lead a life of evangelical poverty); although Father Cuthbert naïvely adds in the next paragraph: "It may be that the presence of the emperor's forces almost at their gates had something to do in bringing about this act of civic concord." The reader acquainted with the mediaeval history of the northern Italian towns will judge whether the preaching of Saint Francis or the presence of Otto IV's German troops had most to do with the temporary promotion of civic concord in Assisi.

With Father Cuthbert's acceptance of all the miracles of Saint Francis and of his disciples we cannot quarrel. There is absolutely no ground for argument between those who accept miracles and those who do not; for the reason that the documentation of miracles is also offered by those who accept them. But it gives one a curious feeling of the limitations of "scientific" scholarship to find Saint Anthony of Padua's miracle of attracting the fishes, which flocked to the shore like the oysters in *Alice in Wonderland*, soberly handled a few pages away from the keen analysis of the *Regula prima* and an exhaustive sifting of the relations of the Third Order to the original Franciscan community. On the treatment of the miraculous, then, we will not enter; it being to us also, in spite of the withering scorn of Father Cuthbert, "a more plausible theory that Saint Francis, to ease the itching of his body, scratched the wounds in hands, feet, and side," than that they were imprinted there by the seraphic rays from the vision on Monte Alvernia.

The chapters on Francis at the Fourth Lateran Council (Book II, chapter 6), on Brother Elias (Book III, chapter 5), and on the Third Order (Book III, chapter 6), seem to us particularly good, although a high standard of literary excellence is maintained from cover to cover. Once make allowance for the rather distorting influence of the author's personal devotion to Saint Francis as an impeccable father, and of his acceptance of the miraculous wherever it testifies to the enhancement of Francis' glory, and the book is a most delightful piece of work. Its charm of style is increased by the inclusion of a dozen beautiful full-page half-tones representing the scenes of the saint's labors and devotions.

David Saville Muzzey.

New York.

SYNDICALISM, A CRITICAL EXAMINATION. J. RAMSAY MCDONALD. Open Court Publishing Co. 1912. Pp. vii, 74. 60 cents.

AMERICAN SYNDICALISM: THE I. W. W. JOHN GRAHAM BROOKS. Macmillan, 1913. Pp. 264. $1.25.

THE LAUNCHING OF THE INDUSTRIAL WORKERS OF THE WORLD. PAUL F. BRISSENDEN. University of California Press. 1913. Pp. 82.

"Syndicalism is the most modern phase of the revolutionary movement. It can with perfect safety be dubbed revolutionary, but to call it socialistic would elicit the protests of many syndicalists to whom 'socialism' is a mere middle-class reform, and to call it anarchistic would also be unwise, as an even larger number of them believe syndicalism to be the only true socialism. . . . In syndicalism there is a synthesis of elements: the socialist indictment of capitalism and part of the socialist programme; the anarchist method and ideal; and the unionist idea of organization in trade or industry." (Brissenden, p. 1.) The syndicalist proposes to substitute industrial unionism for trade-unionism; men performing different kinds of work in the same shop, some high-paid and some low-paid, may organize into different unions which bring all in the same *trade* together, or may organize into one great union which includes everyone at work in the shop, regardless of his particular trade, the latter form constituting the industrial union. The I. W. W., which is the American syndicalist organization, is thus in direct opposition to the American Federation of Labor, of which Gompers is President, as that organization is based fundamentally on the trades-union idea. The I. W. W. has bitter words for the "union scab," the carpenter who remains at work when the bricklayers' union engaged on the same building has called a strike. The syndicalist wishes to substitute a wider humanity, a "class-consciousness," for the narrower (but more effective!) "craft-consciousness" which breaks up labor into groups which may work at cross-purposes. But the syndicalist would still be miles away from the American Federation of Labor if the latter made this change in policy. The A. F. L. seeks to get the best conditions of work and pay for labor *within* the present social order, with the wage-system and private ownership of capital; syndicalism, holding all capital to be robbery, attacks the wage system itself, and proposes to take over the shops and mines and railroads for the workers themselves. But it does not intend, as does socialism, to do this by political methods. The syndicalist is sick of the slippery ways of politics, and has seen too many labor leaders debauched and turned respectable by political advancement. "Direct action," he proposes;

strikes and yet strikes; *sabotage* (damaging machinery, spoiling goods, misdirecting shipments, irritating the capitalist in a thousand secret ways); no violence, because the employer has the army behind him (which means no violence when it is of no use); and finally, as the great dream of the near future, the "general strike" —all labor is to fold its hands, show the employing class how helpless it is without labor, and then take over the control of industry from the nerveless hands which drop it. There are two classes, the exploiters and the exploited, between whom no peace is possible. Patriotism, which would make the worker of one country side with the capitalists of that country against his real brothers, the workers of another land, is a cruel delusion from which men must be freed.

The syndicalist has his idealism, his wide humanity, and his religion, though he proclaims, "No God, no master!" The philosopher of syndicalism, Sorel, has prepared a mythology for him, the centre of which is the "general strike," which Sorel explicitly declares a myth, and defends on the ground that myths are necessary. Sorel is supposed to draw his philosophy from Bergson, but the reviewer will stand sponsor for the statement that Bergson does not consider himself to blame for it.

For an interesting impressionistic picture of the syndicalist movement, Mr. Brooks' book is to be recommended warmly. It is interesting, sympathetic, and fair—Mr. Brooks has talked with the men who are in the movement, and knows their point of view. But it is not a book about the American I. W. W. There is scarcely any concrete information in it as to who they are, how they are organized, what they have done, how important they are, what their relation to the French syndicalists is. Mr. Brooks writes as if his reader knew the facts. Splendidly documented, with a bibliography of 28 pages, Mr. Brissenden's book really gives us the facts as to the beginning of the I. W. W. in 1905. The imposing bibliography tells how much the movement counts for, as few other things would. Mr. McDonald's book is clear and readable, and not open to great criticism, but not much more can be said for it.

B. M. Anderson, Jr.

Harvard University.

Railway Transportation. A History of its Economics and of its Relation to the State. Charles Lee Raper. G. P. Putnam's Sons. 1912. Pp. xi, 331. $1.50.

This is a general survey of the various matters of prime importance to a right understanding of the railroad problem of our day.

It treats railroad transportation historically from its beginnings to explain conditions; it deals with railroad transportation at the present time in various countries to test conclusions; it gives statistics on various points; and it develops theories on fundamental matters. Dean Raper modestly insists—even to the extent of putting it on his title page—that the work is based upon President Hadley's Railroad Transportation. It is indeed apparent that the earlier book has had its influence in the writing of the later; and this is particularly true in regard to the respect with which the doctrines advanced by Hadley are treated by Raper. But when it comes to subject-matter there are whole topics which have acquired importance since the earlier book was written. This reviewer has only examined with care that part of the book dealing with the Interstate Commerce Commission, as that is a subject with which he has had much to do of late years. The development of the powers of this Commission to its present control over our railroads has all been wrought since the earlier book was written. That history the present book tells with sufficient detail to make plain to the reader the overshadowing importance of governmental regulation of interstate transportation. And however much the Dean of North Carolina University may feel with the President of Yale University that railroad rates should be based upon the value of the service, in accordance with the theories which usually appeal to the economists, he is sufficiently alive to the tendencies of the times to note the progress going on in confining rates to the cost of the service, in accordance with the doctrines which lawyers usually fall back upon. Under governmental control he sees that some working principle like this is inevitable in order to have a fixed basis for accommodating the conflicting interests of different parts of the country. Indeed, when the coercive power of the State is invoked it must be exercised upon established principles founded on return for expenditure made in performance of the service, if we are to have a government of laws—not of men. The old days of economic development under benevolent despotism passed away with the new era of commission control; and in the latest decisions of the Supreme Court—so late as not to have found their place in this book—the end of all possibility at law of establishing rates without regard to traffic costs has come, for better or worse.

Bruce Wyman.

Cambridge.

A History of Socialism. Thomas Kirkup. 5th edition, revised and largely rewritten by Edward R. Pease. Adam & Charles Black. 1913. Pp. xii, 490. 5*s*.

For a book essentially popular, both easy and delightful to read, this is probably the most satisfying statement yet made. It was greatly improved in its fourth edition, shortly before the author's death. This final, fifth, edition is as completely up to date as it is possible to bring it.

No man was more competent than Edward R. Pease to do this severe task of revision and rewriting. It is in the best sense a history, but it is also a criticism and an interpretation. The somewhat too bookish character of Mr. Kirkup's work is admirably supplemented by the long and active experience of Mr. Pease. In bringing the author's work into line with the "reformist" type of socialism, Mr. Pease does no violence to the spirit and sympathy of Mr. Kirkup. That the latter would have seen in Sidney Webb, the real successor and peer of Karl Marx is open to question, but there is much to justify the opinion. The volume is enriched by the discussion of Syndicalism, and by Chapter XIII on the modern International, one of the most significant developments of the movement. Its bibliography is also excellent.

The writer of this notice is constantly asked, "What is the best book on Socialism?" The question is a little grotesque; but so far as it has to be acted upon for more general readers, the answer has uniformly been "Read Kirkup's fourth edition."

One may say this a good deal more confidently of the present volume.

John Graham Brooks.

Cambridge.

Papers of the American Society of Church History. G. F. Putnam's Sons. 1913. Vol. I, pp. vi, 158. Vol. III, pp. vi, 201.

These volumes contain papers read at meetings of the Reorganized Society, from 1906 to 1911. Among those of interest to a wider circle than the Society are: "The Genesis of the Common Form of Public Worship in our Non-liturgical Churches," by Professor Williston Walker of New Haven (I, 81); "The Letters of Einhard," translated by Henry Preble of New York (I, 107); "The Growth of the Layman's Power in the Episcopal Church," by Doctor D. D. Addison of Brookline (II, 63); and a discussion of the origin of the stigmata of Saint Francis, by Professor Henry J. Weber of Bloomfield, N. J. (II, 175).

THE CAMBRIDGE MANUALS OF SCIENCE AND LITERATURE. Cambridge University Press. G. P. Putnam's Sons. 40 cents each.

This is a series of hand-books whose range is almost that of an encyclopaedia, but whose treatment of its subjects is more extended. These subjects wander from Spiders (No. 36) to Plato (No. 69). A typical volume is *English Monasteries* (No. 68), by A. Hamilton Thompson (pp. 168). It gives an excellent account of the different religious Orders with their discipline and daily life, and details of the monastic buildings.

LETTER

THE EDITOR OF THE HARVARD THEOLOGICAL REVIEW:

Sir—In reviewing my *Rise and Fall of the High Commission* in your April number, your reviewer comments upon the "enormous" number of times I have cited my earlier books. I am afraid that the adjective, "enormous," will give many the impression that the volume is based to a greater extent than is true upon material already utilized. The citations of my earlier books are actually seventeen in number; seven of which refer to the text, seven to bibliographical material there printed in full, and three to documents there printed for the first time. It seems to me that the error is due to inadvertence rather than intention, but that it is likely to create misapprehensions.

Very truly yours,

ROLAND G. USHER.